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Editors’ Preface
Foreword
For the 4th year in a row we met together to honour the memories 
of Dr. Guido Carli and prof. Alberto Predieri. This time, in Florence, we 
discussed the issues related to the role of exchange rates on the foreign 
imbalances of the three great economic areas: United States, Far East 
and Europe. For Dr. Carli e Prof. Predieri this problem was crucial in the 
economic and legal international relations.
Once again, the twofold meeting purpose was met: 
• to exchange friendly and openly our points of view, through the 
discussion of original pieces of scientiﬁc research, 
• to prepare a better explanation for the public opinion on the implication 
of having deep imbalances for the World growth sustainability.
The excellent group of scholars whom we invited in Florence 
prepared some papers, memos and comments which converged on the 
common view that the problem of imbalances comes from an institutional 
incoherence among the exchange rate regimes of the various countries 
involved, mainly between the USA and China (together with a real 
variables effect, as excess or lack in domestic demand, and/or excess or lack 
in domestic savings). The majority of participants believed that we need 
structurally more market and more international cooperation because 
the imbalances went too far, creating a severe risk of an international 
currency crisis which would compound the problem instead of solving 
it. The European participants feared that an exchange rate adjustment 
left only to market forces might create a beggar-my-neighbour effect to 
the Euro area, which has a structural equilibrium in its foreign current 
account balance. The problem of foreign imbalances is also complicated 
by the accumulation of dollar reserves by oil producer countries with 
non-market economies.
A large part of the merit to achieve the goal of the meeting goes 
again to Iftekhar Hasan and Cristiano Zazzara who took care of the 
scientiﬁc organization and to Monica Degl’Innocenti who bore the entire 
logistic burden in a very excellent way.
Associazione Guido Carli
Fondazione Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri
Editors of the Journal of Financial Stability
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Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Your chosen topic – a reﬂection on the current international monetary 
system and its desirable evolution – is a central issue for analysts, 
economic agents and policymakers alike, in a ﬁnancial world that is 
becoming ever more integrated. 
The globalisation of ﬁnance yields enormous beneﬁts. At the same time 
it requires authorities and agents – despite the relative calm in today’s 
ﬁnancial markets – to be alert to old and new risks, especially in the light 
of persistent, indeed widening, current-account imbalances. 
A smooth, seamless functioning of the global capital markets is an 
extremely powerful instrument for efﬁcient resource allocation, and hence 
growth. It helps ensure that the most productive projects are selected 
and put in place at minimum cost. It has surely been a major factor in 
the extraordinary expansion that the world economy has experienced in 
the last few years. While growth has been impressive especially in large 
emerging economies such as China and India, the beneﬁts have spread 
to many low-income countries as well. Advanced economies have enjoyed 
low inﬂation and decreasing unemployment. 
However, the same factors that have contributed to robust growth and 
price stability – enhanced trade integration, high capital mobility, and 
the ready availability of instruments for the transfer of risk – can also 
favour the propagation of ﬁnancial disturbances on a global scale. 
Understanding the systemic implications of risks and devising ways to 
manage them is therefore essential. International monetary arrangements 
and institutions are key issues in this respect. 
Even describing the current international monetary system is not easy; 
searching for a new design, as the title of this Colloquium suggests, is 
a tough challenge. The real world seldom looks iike a textbook model. 
Today we have neither a world of ﬁxed exchange rates, as in the Bretton 
Woods days, nor a pure free ﬂoat. There is a wide range of regimes, from 
ﬁxed to freely ﬂoating rates, including formal and informal pegs. The 
global implications of such a situation are not straightforward. As often 
Mario Draghi
Governor of the Bank of Italy
and Chairman of Guido Carli Association
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happens, a complex system is more than just the sum of its parts. 
It has recently been argued*, for instance, that the current international 
monetary system, while in theory radically different from Bretton Woods, 
works in practice in a way that somewhat resembles it. Today’s regime 
is supported neither by binding rules, nor by an explicit commitment 
of international institutions to enforce such rules (through collective 
decision, multilateral surveillance and emergency ﬁnancial assistance). 
Nevertheless, during the last decade or so, exchange rate movements 
have in fact been rather limited – the euro being one notable exception 
– compared with what could be expected in a context of widening global 
current-account imbalances. The pattern of capital movements across the 
globe has been similar in certain respects to what one would observe under 
a system designed to achieve exchange rate stability. Unlike under Bretton 
Woods, however, there is no internationally agreed, orderly mechanism to 
adjust pegs when current imbalances become unsustainable; the search 
for alternative correction mechanisms has so far proved elusive. 
The dollar is still the de facto world anchor. Asian and oil-exporting 
countries, with their huge current account surpluses, mostly peg their 
currencies to the dollar, formally or informally. In the last ﬁve years this 
has resulted in massive accumulation of dollar-denominated reserve 
assets in those countries. The system seems to work like a tacit pact, with 
short-run beneﬁts for both sides. The issuer of the reserve currency can 
ﬁnance its current account deﬁcits cheaply and easily; surplus countries 
maintain exchange rates at very competitive levels. Initially they may 
want to pursue export-led growth. However, as they accumulate larger 
and larger dollar-denominated reserves, surplus countries develop an 
additional interest in keeping the dollar stable vis-à-vis the domestic 
currency, as the capital losses implied by a realignment dramatically 
increase. Even if they need to cool the economy at some point, doing this 
via aggressive currency appreciation becomes prohibitively costly. 
The proponents of the “Bretton Woods 2” view claim that the current 
system ensures relative stability in the short to medium term: as long as 
international capital ﬂows guarantee a smooth ﬁnancing of the huge US 
current account deﬁcit, and ﬁnancial markets do not ask for a premium 
on their holding of dollar assets, it is difﬁcult to perceive a sense of 
* M Dooley, D Folkerst-Landau and P Garber, “An essay on the revived Bretton Woods 
system”, NBER Workingpaper no. 9971, September 2003.
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real risk or urgency. However, imbalances are not expected to diminish 
signiﬁcantly in the short run and accumulation of imbalances on this 
scale cannot go on forever. The tacit pact is built on shaky long-term 
foundations. 
Addressing these issues is not a purely theoretical concern, but rather 
one of crucial interest to authorities whose task is to preserve ﬁnancial 
stability. The extremely low risk premia now prevailing in ﬁnancial 
markets may in part signal undervaluation of the actual risk; in any 
case, the market sentiment may change abruptly. Carry trades illustrate 
the point: under current conditions they offer easy short-term gains, but 
they are highly vulnerable to increases in volatility. The consequences 
of any disturbances are hard to quantify, not least because it is difﬁcult 
to monitor the size of open positions. The authorities are increasingly 
concerned, and ﬁrmly committed to fostering the transparency of markets 
and transactions. 
Further reﬂection on the working of international ﬁnancial markets 
and the international monetary system is, therefore, as important as 
it is demanding. This Colloquium is welcome. The presence of highly 
qualiﬁed speakers, who will bring the beneﬁts of looking at the issues 
from different viewpoints, ensures that the debate will be rich and lively. 
It will add to our collective knowledge. 
I wish you a very fruitful day.
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Massimo Livi Bacci 
Senator of the Italian Republic
and board member of Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri
Not all the fruits of globalisation are sweet and spread in a reasonably 
even way among the participants in the game. Many parts of the world 
are left behind, inequality and poverty persist, the concentration of power 
in the hands of the few is increasing. The new millennium brings along 
a growing need for international regulation of global phenomena. The 
Fourth Florence Colloquium is a welcome opportunity to discuss how to 
cope with the international disturbances and imbalances deriving from 
increasing ﬁnancial mobility.
Our shrinking world, the growing integration among societies and 
economies and the high speed of development call for new instruments of 
global governance, while the political will is lagging behind. Consequently 
these needs remain largely unanswered. Let me take three examples from 
areas I am more familiar with. First, international migration. Its recent 
rise has been prompted by the differential speed of population growth 
in the rich and in the poor world as well as by the growing gap in the 
standard of living in the North and in the South of the planet and by the 
declining costs of transport. While the economic and ﬁnancial integration 
between countries and regions has increased, favoured by multilateral 
efforts to remove trade barriers, there are increasing obstacles against 
the integration of labour markets at a global level. Labour-rich countries 
cannot export but a small part of their surplus while labour- poor 
regions (Europe and Japan) import only a fraction of the potentially 
needed manpower. As a consequence, irregular migration increases in 
the absence of an international system able to regulate international 
migratory pressures. These tend to grow, posing a threat to the peaceful 
and orderly relations between countries and regions.
A second example is climate and the threats imposed on the world 
equilibrium by an expanding population, increasing human activity 
and, particularly, an exponentially growing energy consumption. The 
world –so far – has been slow in acknowledging that current models 
of development endanger the future of mankind. Even mild forms of 
international cooperation – such as those implicitly deriving from 
the Kyoto protocol – seem to encounter gigantic obstacles to their 
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implementation. As a third example of a different nature, take disease 
and the globalisation of pathogens. The increasing world mobility, the 
human intrusion in isolated habitats, new types of interactions between 
humans and the animal world may generate potentially threatening new 
diseases and are making pathologies thought to be extinct re-emerge. In 
the ‘’50s and ‘‘60s the world thought that infectious diseases had been 
vanquished: traditional warning systems were abandoned or allowed 
to survive under-staffed and under-funded. The HIV pandemic and 
other new diseases like SARS, or the persistence and resurgence of old 
pathologies, like malaria or TB, are alerting the international community 
that without coordinated efforts the ﬁght for improved health and 
survival cannot be successful.
International migration, pollution, contamination and climate change, 
the ﬁght against communicable diseases, have little in common with the 
problems posed by the ﬁnancial imbalances that are the focus of our 
meeting. But they show us that international turbulences, whatever their 
cause - ﬁnancial ﬂows or men on the move, global warming or disease 
control – pose an increasing need for global governance.
On behalf of the board of the Cesiﬁn-Alberto Predieri Study Center, I am 
happy to extend our warmest welcome to Florence to all the participants 
in this Colloquium: a global group of scholars discussing a global 
problem. I wish you a fruitful and successful meeting and a pleasant 
stay in Florence.
Fourth Florence Colloquium

FIRST PAPER
THE US PERSPECTIVE
Mardi Dungey*
CERF, University of Cambridge 
CAMA, Australian National University
Abstract
The question of future arrangements for the ﬁnancial system in the 
light of the current imbalances and the accumulation of international 
reserves has provoked a wide range of responses, from traumatic 
collapse to benign adjustment. These views are canvassed here. Rather 
than arguing the case of currency realignments, this paper concentrates 
on the potential impact of diversiﬁcation by Central Banks on the 
operation of asset markets. The paper argues that markets in which 
Central Banks hold signiﬁcant asset stocks can be substantially affected 
by both their actions and their perceived preferences towards those 
assets. This is illustrated using the recent historical examples of the 
divestment of gold reserves by many Central Banks in the 1990s, and 
the effects of sales of US Treasuries from reserves by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority in 1998. 
Key words: Reserves, Central Bank portfolios, Gold, US Treasuries
JEL Classiﬁcation: C15, F31
  
 
* Thanks are due to the Associazione Guido Carli and Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri and Paolo 
Savona, Iftekhar Hasan, Cristiano Zazzara and participants at the Fourth Florence 
Colloquium on ‘In Search of a New Bretton Woods: Reserve Currencies and Global 
Imbalances’, and my discussants there Julko Velmunen and John Teall. I am very grateful to 
Salih Neftci for generously forwarding his example of market practices, Kern Alexander for 
discussions and Jorge Andrade de Silva and Luba Fahkrutdinova for research assistance. 
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1. Introduction
This paper considers the question of the risk posed to the current 
economic outlook from the increasing accumulation of reserve deposits 
by developing economies and the so-called global imbalances from a US 
perspective. The US has a unique position in the current environment, 
being the economy which is beneﬁting from the current willingness 
to fund US consumption by high demand for US assets through its 
role as the global currency (the so-called “exorbitant privilege”), and 
commensurately the most exposed to a dramatic change in fortunes if a 
sudden adjustment in preferences were to occur. 
A key issue in the concerns about adjustments in global 
imbalances relates to the speed of any adjustment process. Debate is 
quite divided on this issue. While market commentary has deﬁnitely 
tended to focus on the downside for the dollar and the negative risks, for 
example Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004), Jarrett (2005), Irvin and Izuretia 
(2006), Freund and Warnock (2005), there are equivalently reputable 
arguments that the situation is a relatively benign but extended period 
of adjustment, for example Bordo (2005) and Engel and Rogers (2006), 
the latter argue that the situation is a response to expectations of 
future high US growth. More recently Hausmann and Sturzenegger 
(2005,2006) have argued for the existence of ‘dark matter’, comprising 
mismeasured or uncounted FDI and other ﬂows, which when accounted 
for return the world economy closer to net balance.
This debate is even more divided where commentators worry 
about the impact of reserves diversiﬁcation away from the US dollar. 
There is general recognition that this could have a substantial effect 
on particularly the international value of the US dollar, but debate 
over whether this effect is being overstated, see McCauley (2005), 
and whether any transition is likely to be relatively calm, Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003). However, whatever the outcome 
it is certainly likely that the mere possibility of a diversiﬁcation, which 
may or may not occur in an orderly manner, can induce volatility into 
ﬁnancial markets, Truman and Wong (2006). 
The real basis of the argument about the potential future of 
ﬁnancial markets is fear of individual countries following their own 
best interests, rather than some altruistic view of the global good. 
In particular the concern centres on portfolio diversiﬁcation and the 
impact of changing preferences - speciﬁcally whether developing market 
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Central Banks might decrease their appetite for US dollar denominated 
reserves in favour of Euro denominated assets. These questions are 
complicated by the relative economic performance of the US and the 
Euro, with high current accounts coupled with strong growth in the 
US, and low growth but increasing ﬁnancial depth in the Euro Area. 
Although it seems quite probable that the system can maintain the 
status quo for some considerable time, there is a non-negligible risk 
that a small signal from Central Banks may lead to a stampede. Here 
the parallels with earlier periods are most marked. Eichengreen (2004) 
summarises the problem when discussing the collapse of Bretton-Woods 
as “when push came to shove, the imperatives of domestic growth 
dominated the desire to defend the dollar and sustain the operation of 
the international monetary system” (p.19). 
This paper concurs with the view that on balance there are quite 
a number of feasible orderly routes to economic adjustment. The major 
risk rather lies in the response of markets to signals sent by Central 
Banks as to the relative importance of alternative assets in their 
portfolios. This aspect was played out in the gold and currency markets 
in the period around the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. To 
demonstrate the potential impact of changes in Central Bank portfolios 
on the orderly operation of ﬁnancial markets we draw on two more 
recent episodes within the ﬂoating exchange rate period. The ﬁrst is 
the diversiﬁcation of Central Bank gold holdings from the mid-1990s, 
which resulted in the Central Bank Gold Agreement in 1999 and 2004. 
The second is the impact on the US Treasury market of the sales of 
US Treasuries from the reserve holdings of the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority to fund its intervention in the Hang Seng equity market in 
1998. Each of these operations demonstrate the potential for Central 
Banks to affect both market sentiment and market conditions, in the 
ﬁrst case by the escalation of a simple portfolio decision into market 
preferences and in the second case the impact of following the individual 
country’s own best interest. 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the relevant 
facets of the current economic situation in the US are brieﬂy reviewed. 
Section 3 then draws some parallels with the Bretton-Woods era, 
particularly the stresses which precipitated the crisis and eventual 
breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system. Given recent discussion on 
the potential of the Euro to become a second reserve currency, Section 4 
turns to the currency denomination of central banking reserves and the 
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trends in diversiﬁcation emerging in that market. Evidence is presented 
that relatively recent activities by Central Banks in managing their 
reserve portfolios have had substantial impact, notably in the gold and 
US Treasuries market, and thus a signiﬁcant disruption of market 
functioning when Central Banks hold major stocks of a particular asset 
cannot be discounted. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background to the Current Situation
Until the period of the two World Wars the dominant world 
currency in the late 19th and 20th century was arguably the British 
pound. This changed at least partly due to the War itself. The massive 
expenditure requirements of the UK led to them taking on substantial 
borrowings, much of which was sourced from the US, and as an indication 
of the changing status of the two currencies, increasingly denominated 
in the currency of the lending country - the US dollar. The British pound, 
although it has remained an important trading currency, has never 
regained the dominance of the global reserve currency that it possessed 
prior to this period. It is worth bearing in mind when considering the 
potential that the US dollar’s current position as global reserve currency 
will be threatened by the Euro that it took an event of the magnitude of 
WWII to cement the last observed change of this sort. 
The current debate is centred around two main observed empirical 
trends. The ﬁrst of these is the substantial and increasing current 
account deﬁcit being run by the US economy (and the domestic economic 
conditions which accompany it) and the second is the accumulation of 
US dollar denominated reserves by international economies. The two are 
clearly not unrelated, and many of the dire claims for the future of the 
US dollar rest on concerns that the international community may lose 
its preference for US dollar denominated assets and force adjustment to 
the current account pressures back onto the domestic US economy. It is 
worth brieﬂy reviewing the arguments here. 
2.1. The US Current Account
The annual data in Figure 1 show the extent of the deterioration 
in the US current account in the immed,iate past. Longer runs of data 
compiled by the OECD show that the current situation is unprecedented 
in the available data, with the largest previous periods of deﬁcits of 
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less than 2% of GDP in the 1890s, see Jarrett (2005: Figure 1) whose 
detailed paper presents the conventional concerns about the US current 
account. The most recent data available showed strong growth in the 
ﬁrst quarter of 2006 (5.9% in real GDP) and good growth in the second 
quarter of 2.9% in real GDP, but also a continued decline in the current 
account of 5.2 billion for the second quarter of 2006. There does not 
seem to be any end to the increasing current account deﬁcit in the near 
future. 
Figure 1: US Current Account as a Proportion of GDP
(source: BEA statistics)
 
The growing current account deﬁcit in the US is an unprecedented 
development for ,as to whether the relative price effects, income effects or 
quantity effects of international demand will dominate in the outcome for 
the domestic economy; for example Long and Pitchford (1992) on income 
effects. In the case of the US, however, a substantial proportion of world 
trade transactions are denominated in the US dollar, Goldberg and Tille 
(2006) document that over 90% of international trade transactions for 
the US are denominated in US dollars. In contrast, most countries have 
substantial shares of their trade invoiced in non-domestic currencies, 
see Table 4 in Goldberg and Tille (2006). Many countries suffer currency 
risk in funding their export and import activities, but this largely does 
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not apply to the US. One evidence of this is the relatively low pass-
through effects for imports noted for the US economy, compared with 
almost every other country, recent estimates are 25% (short term) 
and 40% (long term) for the US compared with 54% (short term) and 
78% (long term) for the Euro Area countries, see Campa and Goldberg 
(2002) and Campa, Goldberg and Gonzalez-Minguez (2005) respectively. 
Thus a depreciation of the US dollar is expected to have relatively less 
impact on demand for imports than the same size depreciation for other 
countries - hence the extent of depreciation needed for current account 
adjustment via this mechanism is estimated to be extremely high 
(ranging up to 90%! see Table 4 in Jarrett, 2005). 
As the pass-through effects for other countries are documented 
to be relatively high the adjustment of the US current account deﬁcit 
through trade balances could occur through the relative cheapening 
of US exports, which then displace other suppliers. Such a quantity 
adjustment would lead to increased production in US export goods, which 
remain primarily goods rather than services, and hence a reallocation 
of resources within the US economy. However, Irvin and Izuretia (2006) 
calculate that even this process would require a 3% greater growth rate 
in exports than imports over a 15 year time horizon. Nevertheless, this 
type of reasoning has led the OECD to recommend the US concentrate 
on maintaining a ﬂexible labour market to assist in this process (OECD 
2005). It is also possible that the low pass through effects to the US 
may change, particularly if the depreciation of the dollar is relatively 
large; see Goldberg and Tille (2006). Changes to pass through have 
been postulated in other countries; see Campa and Goldberg (2002 inter 
alia). Another possibility, although unsustainable, is that of competitive 
devaluation in order to maintain market share. Recent history suggests 
this will lead to ﬁnancial calamity, but it is still a politically attractive 
path short term as its many instances in economic history demonstrate, 
for instance Goldstein (1998) on the Asian crisis. 
Recently a strong counter argument to the need for adjustment 
in the US current account has emerged with the proposal of ‘dark 
matter’ in international accounting. This proposal suggests that there is 
substantial mismeasurement or underreporting of international ﬂows 
in the current account. In particular, the effects of selling ‘know how’ 
in FDI, liquidity services and what they denote an insurance service, 
where a country may wish to buy the implicit stability of another 
country through their ﬁnancial assets. Their investigations reveal the 
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mismeasurement source to be the dominant one. Dark matter for the 
US is estimated at over $US5 trillion in 2005, over 40% of GDP. If this 
is indeed the correct answer then there is no need to be concerned about 
adjustment in global economies. However, this answer does seem very 
convenient and is still a matter of much debate in the literature; see for 
example Buiter (2006). 
2.2. The US dollar
Figure 2 relates the recent history of the US dollar as a trade-weighted 
index against the major currencies (the Euro, Japanese yen, British 
pound, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar, Swiss franc and Swedish 
krona - see Loretan, 2005). The TWI has 84% of its weight in the Euro, 
Japanese yen and Canadian dollar, with the Euro dominant. In the 
broader index which includes all countries with greater than 0.5% 
weight in the trade volume of the US, China carries only slightly less 
weight than Japan.  However, this makes little difference to the picture 
presented here. A rise in the TWI represents an appreciation of the 
US dollar. What is clearly evident in this data is ﬁrst the substantial 
depreciation in the US dollar against these major currencies since the 
ﬁrst quarter of 2002, amounting to just over 30% in the next two years. 
Since then, however, despite the continuing steep decline in the current 
account as a proportion of GDP, seen in Figure 1, the US dollar has 
remained relatively stable. The factors behind this are complex. 
One aspect that may be important in these outcomes, but has received 
little attention in the literature, is the potential role of intervention. 
Foreign exchange intervention in the US has virtually ceased, and 
the trend in central banking circles has certainly been to a period of 
far less direct intervention, for example see Reitz and Taylor (2006). 
However, this does not mean that other activities cannot be used to 
support currencies. For example, it has long been accepted that it is not 
possible to cleanly identify pure intervention by the Reserve Bank of 
Australia due to its ability to determine the timing of its purchases of 
foreign exchange on the behalf of the Government (for overseas pension 
payments for example) - see Andrew and Broadbent (1994). 
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Figure 2: US dollar Trade Weighted Index: Major Currencies
(source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve)
 
However, there may be another contender in intervention activity 
through the use of derivatives to manage portfolios of reserve assets. 
This is not exactly a new phenomenon, during the 1960s a plethora of 
arrangements were used to support particularly the pound (Tew, 1970), 
including swaps and forwards. Now, with the development of sophisticated 
derivatives it is possible to produce effects which defacto support currency 
bands. For example, there are market reports of a large double no-touch 
option placed by a large Asian bank (possibly a central bank) constraining 
the Euro/USD to a relatively tight band. Keeping the euro in a band 
clearly reduces the stress placed on the new renimbi arrangements*.   
The way in which pressures may be building in the current 
arrangements, although not unknown to those at the forefront, are not 
transparent to the wider community. Although it is not yet clear whether 
such actions have been used, Papaioannou et al (2006) also suggest the 
possibility of further engaging with innovative ﬁnancial instruments to 
manage reserves portfolios, including the potential for short selling. 
* The source of this remark is various Reuters reports and discussions with market 
participants. Reuters reports refer to a “EUR/USD 1.2060-1.2680 DNT option, said to be 
worth over $1B and held by large Asian ctrl bk, said to be expiring Fri, says dealer.... EUR/
USD tripping upside stops above 1.2165, 1.2175, says dealer... Found good base support 
earlier Thu at 1.2100, reportedly from large Asian ctrl bank defending options barrier at 
1.2060 or 1.2080, say dealers. “
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3. The Accumulation of Reserves
The second major indicator of concern in assessing global 
imbalances is the amassing of US dollar denominated assets by foreign 
entities, particularly as central bank reserves. Figure 3 shows the rise 
in the reserves held by central banks as indicated in the IMF COFER 
(Currency Composition of Ofﬁcial Exchange Reserves) database. The 
IMF publishes data in its COFER database on the foreign exchange 
composition of reserves held by central banks. The most recently 
available ﬁgures are those for 1st quarter 2006, which show total 
reserves of 4.3 trillion US dollars. Some currency breakdown is given, 
but not all countries provide this. Neither do all countries report reserve 
assets, but the COFER database claims that the missing countries are 
generally small holders of reserves. 
Figure 3:  Reserve Assets held by Central Banks, excluding gold: 
Annual 1995-1998, quarterly thereafter
(source: IMF COFER database)
 
The currency breakdown of reserves provides some interesting 
insights. Figures 4a) and b) show the $US value of the reserves for 
which the currency of denomination is known (denoted allocated 
reserves) which are held in US dollars and Euros (or pre-Euro in one of 
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the currency groups which became Euro, of course this approximation is 
not exact). Figures 4c) and d) show the proportion of allocated reserves 
held in US dollars and Euros over the period. Of these assets across 
all countries the share of the US dollar is relatively stable between 62 
and 72% of total over the period 1996 onwards, currently at 66% and 
beginning the period at 62%. Chinn and Frankel (2005) document no 
signiﬁcant change in the proportion of dollar holdings of reserves, from 
56% in 1965 to 64% in 2003. 
In the COFER database the Euro share has grown from around 
18% to 24% in the period from 1995 (aggregating pre Euro currencies 
appropriately). Papaioannou et al (2006) in a mean-variance portfolio 
exercise ﬁnd that the current weight on the Euro in reserves portfolios is 
already over high in the COFER ﬁgures, which they interpret as meaning 
that the Euro has already taken on some role as an international reserve 
currency thus accounting for its overweighting. 
Figure 4: Currency Composition of Allocated Reserves
(source: IMF COFER database)
a) US dollar reserves
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b) Euro reserves
   
c) Proportion of reserves in US dollars
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d) Proportion of reserves in Euros
   
Some of the change to Euro holdings is undoubtedly due to changes 
in exchange rates themselves, notably the depreciation of the dollar and 
appreciation of the Euro. But what is particularly interesting is the 
breakdown in industrial versus developing countries, Figures 3d) and e). 
The industrial countries have moved their portfolio allocation to greater 
weight in the US dollar (now 73% compared with 57% a decade ago) and 
out of Euro area currencies. This is presumably partly associated with 
reclassiﬁcation of some of these countries into the Euro Area when some 
of their logical reserves disappeared, such as Netherlands holdings of 
Deutschemarks for example. Truman and Wong (2006) also point to the 
role of Japanese intervention in increasing the share of US dollars. 
However, despite the changes in composition of the industrial 
countries reserves, the discussion of future actions is generally focussed 
on the role of the developing economies, who hold over 3 trillion of the 
reserve assets. There has been some substantial movement on their 
part into Euro to bring the share of the declared currencies up to around 
28% of their assets. If the same sort of distribution was assumed across 
the reserves with no declared currency breakdown, this would indicate 
some 1.8 trillion of US dollar reserves held by developing country central 
banks and 0.8 trillion of Euro denominated reserves. The 4 biggest 
holders of reserves are China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. 
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The concern over the concentration of US dollar denominated 
reserves by foreign central banks relates to their sovereign rights. The 
advantages to being the international reserve currency include those 
of being the invoicing currency as discussed above, and the so-called 
“exorbitant privilege” of being able to borrow abroad in the domestic 
currency and in fact receiving a premium for doing so based on the 
desirability of the US dollar assets; see Gourinchas and Réy (2005) 
for an attempt to measure this effect. In addition to these advantages 
Chinn and Frankel (2005) cite the deepening of the ﬁnancial sector 
resulting from the high demand (the BIS Triennial survey for 2004 
notes $US1.8 trillion dollars a day of total foreign exchange turnover 
for all currencies, almost half of which involve the US dollar) and the 
political power and prestige associated with being the primary currency. 
However, there are also associated disadvantages. A deeper ﬁnancial 
market may lead complexities due to higher demand for the currency, 
including issuance by other parties of debt denominated in US dollars, 
such as the Eurobond market, Chinn and Frankel (2005). This greater 
complexity may lead to uncertainty and certainly can lead to signiﬁcant 
impact on domestic markets of actions of other parties. The potential and 
rights of other parties, such as foreign central banks, to act in their own 
best interest is in essence the source of concerns over the stability of the 
current situation. With such a concentration of US dollar denominated 
assets in foreign owned reserve assets, a change in preferences on the 
part of the central banks, particularly the large holders of reserves, 
has the potential to at the very least disrupt expectations and add to 
ﬁnancing costs, Lomax (2006). 
4. Parallels with Bretton Woods
A number of commentators have paralleled the current global 
currency arrangements with those of Bretton-Woods, characterizing the 
system as one of core and periphery countries, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau 
and Garber (2003). In the Bretton-Woods era the core was the US, as 
it remains today, but the periphery have changed from the European 
and OECD countries of the Bretton-Woods era to the Asian developing 
economies today. Although the role of the US dollar is unarguably 
important in both systems, the structure of these arrangements is 
remarkably different. In fact, the most signiﬁcant feature is that there 
is no formal means by which the periphery countries relate to the core 
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at the current time, unlike Bretton-Woods where the maintenance of the 
existing arrangements was seen as a political imperative. To that extent, 
the analysis resonates with Eichengreen (2004) and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2004), that the similarities of the current situation with the Bretton-
Woods system are limited to the period around the end of that system. 
However, unlike Eichengreen, the likelihood of traumatic collapse seems 
a more distant possibility due to the inherent ﬂexibility in the current 
system, although adjustment may still be economically painful. 
The Bretton-Woods environment provided an alternative to the 
earlier gold and bimetallic eras. During Bretton-Woods the US dollar, 
with a link to gold, provided an anchor to the system. It is worth brieﬂy 
revisiting why the system collapsed and the US dollar ﬂoated as there 
are unsurprisingly a number of parallels with the situation today. Almost 
immediately after Bretton-Woods was set up with a ﬁxed price of the US 
dollar to gold the US economy moved from a current account surplus to a 
deﬁcit and into a recession. A substantial amount of dollar holdings were 
converted to gold at the agreed rate by holders of dollars and there were 
fears that the US would devalue the dollar against gold. However, the 
US economy recovered and the current account moved back to surplus 
in the 1960s. The Vietnam War and other social spending however, 
quickly sent the budget and current account back into deﬁcit and the 
US experienced inﬂationary pressures. Speculation began anew that the 
US dollar would be devalued focussing on the London gold market. 
The end of the Bretton-Woods system can probably be dated from 
the effective end of the gold pool in March 1968 when the gold pool 
members, that is the monetary authorities actively involved in buying 
and selling gold to honour the exchange rate system,* decided to cease 
trading in the private market, and use their remaining reserves only for 
monetary policy purposes, Tew (1970). Gold trading was replaced with a 
two tier system with both an ofﬁcial and private gold price. The ofﬁcial 
gold price would be the one at which the central banks would settle their 
interbank trading which was no longer tied to the market price of gold, 
and they would refrain from operations in the private market. From that 
point forward Central Banks were under pressure and worried about 
the potential revaluation of currencies against the US dollar (and hence 
gold). Eventually it became impractical for the Bundesbank to ﬁght this 
pressure and they began to ﬂoat in May 1971. To adjust its economy 
* Gold pool members were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
the UK and the US.
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the US needed to devalue, but was unable to do so without negotiating 
that everybody else in the system revalued, which of course did not suit 
the will of all. The ﬁnal break came when on August 15 1971 the US no 
longer guaranteed to sell gold for dollars. The Smithsonian agreement 
in December 1971 of a new devalued price for the US dollar in terms of 
gold and other currencies was not effective as the US did not return to 
the gold standard. However, the interim arrangements continued until 
March 1973, when a number of European currencies and the yen ﬂoated 
against the US dollar. The ﬂoat continued with basically this group of 
countries until December 1983, when the Antipodean countries joined 
the ﬂoaters in what is in retrospect the forerunner of the changing guard 
towards the free ﬂoating era of the last 20 years. 
5. Potential Impact of Reserves Diversiﬁcation
The breakdown of Bretton-Woods was due to an unsustainable 
arrangement. Internal and external balance could no longer be 
maintained, and participants in the system began to question whether 
the value of their assets would be protected under the current 
arrangements. By acting in their own best interests the European 
countries precipitated the breakdown of the system. There are some 
interesting parallels in the current arrangements. In the Bretton-Woods 
era countries held reserves of US dollars which were considered to be 
over-valued against the ultimate reserve of gold. Eventually there was 
a switch in preferences and demand for US dollars dropped sharply. 
In this instance the US was able to protect itself from fully paying out 
on its commitment of the US dollar gold price by ﬂoating. The problem 
perceived today is that again foreign central banks own a signiﬁcant 
portion of US dollar assets in their reserve portfolios. The question is 
what might happen if they change their preferences away from the US 
dollar, and more particularly what might be the implications if this were 
to happen moderately quickly? 
There are some indications in recent history of the potential 
impact of changes in reserve portfolios. The following draws some 
lessons from the decision of a number of Central Banks in the 1990s to 
divest themselves of gold reserves in favour of other assets. The second 
example concerns the sale of US Treasuries from the reserves of the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority to support their intervention activities 
in the equity market. The following analysis shows that both these 
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actions had substantial, and unanticipated, effects on the asset markets 
the reserve assets were drawn from. 
5.1. Gold Reserves in the 1990s
Many central banks have substantial holdings of gold. Until the 
1990s this gold was largely simply stored. However, in the mid-1990s a 
number of Central Banks began to diversify away from gold. The Central 
Banks divested themselves of gold for a number of reasons which 
resonate with the current discussions on holdings of US Treasuries. In 
some cases it was for diversiﬁcation purposes, for example the Bank 
of England announced its intention restructure its portfolio from 50% 
of gold holdings to 20% in 1999. In other cases the arrangement was 
undertaken at least in part to increase the return on the reserves 
portfolio, for example the sale of gold by the Reserve Bank of Australia 
announced retrospectively in 1997 where the proﬁts were reinvested in 
higher return assets. 
As the Central Banks were substantial holders of stocks of gold 
the diversiﬁcation strategy had market impact. Initially the market 
was not really aware of these changes and the sales seem to have been 
conducted in a relatively orderly manner without causing too much 
concern for market prices. Gold prices since 1990 are shown in Figure 
5. That changed substantially in July 1997; the announcement that 
the Australian central bank had sold two-thirds of its stock of gold 
(167 tonnes) in the immediate past, with a substantial part of that on 
a forward basis to be delivered in the next three months, rocked the 
gold markets. The Australian actions were totally motivated by its 
own utility maximising behaviour, although it seems they had carried 
out the operations with due caution so as not to disrupt the market’s 
operations. 
Although a number of other central banks had also been involved 
in selling gold, news of the Australian sales led to a substantial impact 
and outcry from gold producers and gold market participants alike 
that central banks should not be disrupting the market. A result of 
the discussion was in fact a signatory agreement, The Central Bank 
Gold Agreement on 26 September 1999, by 15 mainly European 
Central Banks declaring that they would not engage in substantial 
sales of gold other than those which had already been announced, and 
imposing limits on the sales of gold by the participants. In particular 
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they stated that the pre-announced sales would be conducted “through 
a concerted programme of sales over the next ﬁve years. Annual sales 
will not exceed approximately 400 tonnes...”. During this period the 
Bank of England divested itself of 395 tonnes of gold (HM Treasury, 
2002) via preannounced auction in a period when the gold price dropped 
consistently. A subsequent enquiry reported no evidence of market 
manipulation around the auction dates (HM Treasury, 2002). On 8 
March 2004 the Central Bank Gold Agreement was renewed by 14 of 
the participants in the original agreement, signiﬁcantly the Bank of 
England was not a signatory. The new agreement limited the concerted 
actions to no more than 500 tonnes per year, and not to expand their use 
of gold futures and options. 
Figure 5: Gold prices 1980 to 2006
(source: Reserve Bank of Australia Monthly Bulletin)
 
The use of derivative instruments in the gold market is an 
important element. As noted with respect to other reserve assets it is 
known that Central Banks engage in gold futures, swaps, options and 
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leasing arrangements as well as forward sales. It is not clear the degree 
to which to this is the case, and Turk (2004) speculates the reason that 
the Bank of England was not a signatory to the 2004 agreement was that 
it did not wish to be bound to the (unspeciﬁed) existing level of futures 
and options. While there are important non-signatory countries to the 
Central Bank Gold Agreement, almost 45% of gold reserves were owned 
by European countries (excluding the UK) in 2005 according to ﬁgures 
compiled by Wener (2005) from the World Gold Council data. The next 
largest holders are the United States and the IMF. The IMF is particularly 
constrained as it cannot buy gold, and cannot dispose of gold other than by 
direct sales which require prior approval from its member countries, the 
last of which was to fund their involvement in the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative which involved gold sales in 1999-2000. 
It is quite apparent that gold market participants regard the 
Central Banks as having a major inﬂuence when they are active and as 
potential players, even when they are relatively inactive. A number of 
commentators have expressed concern as to whether the recent lack of 
Central Bank gold sales has allowed the current substantial gold prices. 
The lesson for the current situation is that it may take only a small 
signal by the central banks on changes in their portfolio preferences to 
precipitate large scale changes in preferences by market participants 
more broadly, even though a substantial proportion of this may be an 
overshooting reaction. 
5.2. US Treasuries in 1998
There are parallels with the change in reserve management 
behaviour over gold with the current arrangements. By holding reserves 
in US dollar denominated assets, central banks are accepted a lower 
rate of return than other potential assets, see also Frankel (2005). This 
is particularly true for US Treasuries. Some of this lower return is 
compensation for the associated lower risk. However, other assets may 
also provide similar levels of risk at higher return, the most often cited 
of these alternatives is a move to Euro-denominated assets. To examine 
this more closely consider the breakdown of the asset types of US dollar 
denominated reserves. 
McCauley (2005) gives an estimated breakdown of the US dollar 
denominated reserve assets held overseas, which is replicated in part 
here in Table 1 (this does not match the total holdings of reserve assets 
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as not all countries provide a breakdown in these terms). Holdings of 
riskier assets, represented by equities are clearly relatively unimportant, 
at around 5 percent of the total; Lomax (2006) reports the decreased 
holdings in these assets post the dot-com bubble burst and associated 
movement into agency securities and corporate bonds. Agency securities 
are an important feature of the current breakdown at a little under 10 
percent of the total. The potential for diversiﬁcation into agency securities 
has increased with growth in this market, however, its currency spread 
remains somewhat limited. Repos, and offshore and onshore deposits 
are clearly important asset classes, accounting for around one quarter 
of the total, particularly concentrated as short term assets. The bulk of 
the longer dated securities, and in fact the bulk of the reserves, are held 
as US Treasury securities, with 40 percent held as long term securities 
and a further 11 percent as short-term. It is primarily the US Treasury 
market which is likely to be affected by any change in reserves portfolio 
management behaviour by central banks. 
Table 1: Composition of US dollar reserves at end-June 2004
(billions of US dollars)
Short-term Long-term Total
Treasury Securities 249 923 1172
Other Assets 635 434 1069
Repos and deposits in the US 141
Commercial paper and CDs in US 93
Offshore deposits 401 37
Agency securities 216
Corporate bonds 47
Equities 134
Total 884 1357 2241
source: McCauley (2005) Table 1 p. 59
In large, central banks are not unaware of the potential effects of 
their actions. It is not common practice to rebalance reserves portfolios 
during periods of stress in ﬁnancial markets, nor to take advantage of 
portfolio size and opportunities to make proﬁt, although Bank Negara 
was infamous for its actions in foreign exchange markets during the early 
1990s. Usually central banks behave according to some unwritten code 
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and ignore potential short term gains for the believed trade-off of longer 
term stability. However, when crises occur, the rules no longer apply, 
and central banks will act in their own best interests. In this instance 
of course, crises may not necessarily be exogenously generated, but may 
result from a simple decision to change something such as the portfolio 
allocation, as alluded to above in the example of gold holdings. 
The potential for a desired change in US Treasury holdings to 
affect the operations of the US Treasury market is marked, and this 
is aside from the clear price impact that such portfolio changes could 
affect. Although it is common to think of the holdings of any individual 
portfolio as trivial with respect to even the daily turnover of the secondary 
market for US Treasuries, this is a misplaced illusion. What matters in 
this market is not gross ﬂow of turnover, but rather net ﬂow. Brandt 
and Kavajecz (2004) document that the average net daily purchases for 
on-the-run bonds with maturities of 1-2, 2-5 and 5-10 years, of $US247, 
$US308 and $US145 million respectively. Signiﬁcant ﬂows in one 
direction or another beyond these levels, due perhaps to market herding, 
can create lack of liquidity to fulﬁl orders creates disruption, volatility 
and price uncertainty. To illustrate this we consider evidence from the 
actions of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority during its interventions in 
the Hong Kong stock market during August 1998, a period conveniently 
commensurate with the ﬂight to US Treasuries associated with the 
Russian bond default and the subsequent near-collapse of the US based 
hedge-fund Long Term Capital Management. 
Brieﬂy, in August 1998, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) decided to act to prevent a further attack on the currency 
board arrangements based on a speculative double play. The double play 
involved shorting the Hang Seng Futures index while simultaneously 
attacking the currency. If the HKMA responded as to previous attacks 
by increasing interest rates the speculators would gain on the futures 
market positions as the Hang Seng declined, alternatively they may 
win by breaking the currency board. The background to this incident is 
described in Dungey, Goodhart and Tambakis (2005). In the event the 
HKMA protected its currency by buying a substantial portion of the 
Hang Seng market itself to sustain the stock market in the face of the 
speculative pressure; see Goodhart and Dai (2003) for details. 
To undertake this intervention the HKMA spent some $US 
15 billion, funded from reserves, over the period of 14 to 28 August 
1998. Although it is not speciﬁcally stated, the known composition of 
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Hong Kong’s reserves mean that effectively this involved the sale of a 
substantial sum of US Treasuries. In what seems to be an unrelated 
coincidence, at almost the same time the Russian Government announced 
that it would suspend payment on its sovereign debt on 17 August 
1998. This precipitated an enormous ﬂight to quality, in particular to 
US Treasuries from almost all developing economy sovereign debt. 
Spreads over US Treasuries increased for almost all categories of debt; 
see Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Martin (2006). What makes 
this incident particularly interesting for the current purposes is that 
it indicates the potential impact of changes in reserve portfolios on US 
Treasuries markets. 
The impact of the HKMA sales in the US Treasury markets can 
be backed out by examining what did not happen in the US Treasury 
market during the two weeks of their intervention. Analyses of the 
events of the last weeks of August and into September focus on the 
impact of the Russian default, the ﬂight to quality, and the effect on 
LTCM. The uncertainty and extra demand for safe-haven assets such as 
the German bund are documented in the rise in volume traded and the 
immediately widened spreads in Upper (2001) and Upper and Werner 
(2002). The US Treasury market displays the same characteristics, but 
only after 28 August, which is the date on which the HKMA ceased 
intervening and hence ceased selling substantial amounts of US 
Treasuries to fund its activities. During the time in which the HKMA 
was inadvertently injecting supply into a market which coincidentally 
experienced substantial demand the characteristics of the market were 
quite different. 
To illustrate this phenomenon Figure 6 shows the net purchases 
of US Treasuries in the period of August 1998, showing the substantial 
net sales of 2 and 10 year Treasuries on the signiﬁcant dates associated 
with the HKMA interventions - most particularly the heaviest days on 
27 and 28 August when the HKMA is estimated to have spent some 
$HK19 and $HK72 billion dollars respectively (Goodhart and Dai, 
2003). The solid horizontal line gives the mean purchases according to 
Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) and the dashed lines their 95% signiﬁcance 
levels. The substantial net sales are inconsistent with the heavy 
demand for Treasuries emanating from the ﬂight to quality and are 
clearly signiﬁcant. This is most evident at the longer maturities, at 
shorter maturities there is deﬁnite evidence of ﬂight to cash also, but 
consistently across all maturities there are net sales of Treasuries. Even 
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more convincing is the evidence on the bid-ask spread on US Treasuries 
at this time. In the case of the German bund the Russian bond default 
produced uncertainty and extra demand for safe-haven assets and 
immediately increased the spread on the bund. In the case of the US 
Treasuries, this widened spread did not appear until 28 August, after 
the ﬁnal HKMA interventions. Figure 7 illustrates this for the 2 and 10 
year bonds - showing also the short period of wider spreads associated 
with the large decline in global equity markets on 21 August. It is worth 
noting that it is at this time, in early September, that concerns about 
a liquidity crisis emerged in the US ﬁnancial markets. Although this 
corresponds with greater public awareness of the plight of LTCM their 
problems had in fact begun much earlier, as documented in Lowenstein 
(2001). This period culminated in the co-ordinated rescue package for 
LTCM facilitated by the Federal Reserve, and the surprise inter-FOMC 
rate cut in October 1998. 
Figure 6: Net Purchases of US Treasuries, July-Sept 1998
(source: GovPX database) 
a) 2 year US Treasury bonds
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b) 10 year US Treasury bonds  
Figure 7: Bid-Ask spreads for US Treasuries, July-Sept 1998
(source: GovPX database)
a) 2 year US Treasury bonds
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b) 10 year US Treasury bonds  
   
The evidence from the HKMA interventions is that portfolio 
shifts from central banks can dramatically affect the operation of the US 
Treasury market. In this case the evidence suggests that the potentially 
$US15 billion of sales of US Treasuries over two weeks by the HKMA 
was sufﬁcient to at least partially offset the potential liquidity effects 
of the ﬂight to quality of US Treasuries during the course of those 
sales - of course it was not sufﬁcient to offset the change in sentiment 
and price. Truman and Wong (2006) suggest that $10 billion worth of 
diversiﬁcation per month would be sufﬁcient to be of concern to the 
currency markets, and the evidence here would suggest this could make 
a substantial difference to the US Treasury markets. Clearly the ﬂow 
which could be injected into the market by any of the major holders of 
US Treasuries is substantial - according to McCauley (2006) the US 
Treasury holdings in reserve assets are over 70 times what the HKMA 
injected in a two week period. 
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6. Conclusion
There has been much discussion over the role of global imbalances 
and the accumulation of international reserve assets in the resolution 
of what is largely viewed as an unsustainable current account position 
on the part of the US economy. In one view the US exchange rate must 
depreciate to correct global imbalances. However, the particular role of 
the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency gives it a special status 
which makes it unclear how the situation may evolve. The majority of 
US trade is invoiced in its own currency and hence it experiences very 
little in the way of pass-through effects compared with other countries. 
A depreciation of the US dollar may then lead to an improvement in 
export competitiveness and subsequent adjustment through the labour 
market rather than inﬂationary pressure. There are competing views 
as to whether the situation will resolve gradually, such as in Bordo 
(2005) or Engel and Rogers (2006), or potentially with trauma, as in 
Eichengreen (2004) and Freund and Warnock (2005). 
This paper has been more concerned with the potential impact on 
the functioning of ﬁnancial markets if Central Banks were to diversify 
their reserve assets. While there have been papers worrying about the 
impact of the diversiﬁcation on currency value that has not been the focus 
here. Rather, the paper argues that as Central Banks hold such large 
stocks of particular assets, the mere suggestion of change in holdings 
can be sufﬁcient to change market sentiment and cause disruption. To 
support this proposition evidence from two recent episodes involving 
Central Bank reserves are examined. The ﬁrst involves the disruption in 
the gold markets resulting from the Central Bank divestment of gold in 
the 1990s, much of which seems to have been due to shifts in sentiment. 
The second is the result of sales of US Treasury securities from the 
reserves holdings of the HKMA to fund its intervention in the Hang 
Seng market in 1998, which had discernible effects on liquidity in the 
US Treasury markets. The point which emerges is that as the Central 
Banks are signiﬁcant holders of stocks of particular assets, information 
on their intentions is extremely valuable in ﬁnancial markets, and their 
actions may well trigger unanticipated effects in the operations of the 
markets for those assets. 
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1. Introduction
Let me start by thanking the organizer for inviting me to the 
Fourth Florence Colloquium and for letting me comment Dungey’s 
paper. I enjoyed reading her paper. It is well written, well struc-tured 
and nicely balanced. I would say Dungey has done a great service to 
the potential read-ers of the paper by presenting her research in such 
a clear and understandable way. Needless to say, I warmly recommend 
reading Dungey’s paper.
In her paper Mardi takes up an important issue, (active) asset 
management by central banks. This issue is highly relevant not only from 
the point of view of central banking per se but also, and in particular, from 
the point of view of the potential effects of asset management by central 
banks on ﬁnancial markets, as so vividly demonstrated by Dungey’s 
analysis. In commenting Dungey’s analysis I am, consequently, going 
to concentrate on two main questions. Firstly, should we conclude from 
the observation that active asset management and, more speciﬁcally, 
intervention through large scale open market operations by central banks 
can have major ﬁnan-cial market repercussions that there’s a need to put 
tighter constraints on central banks’ asset management policies? Secondly, 
in the context of the discussion on global imbalances I will raise the issue 
on the possibility of the existence of dark matter, which, if there, implies 
that the world is economically much more balanced that ofﬁcial external 
statistics would suggest. I will refer to dark matter, since it is not discussed 
by Dungey, although she summarizes most of the other arguments put 
forward in the context of the debate over global imbalances.
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2. Central bank asset management and monetary policy
The main focus of Dungey’s paper is on the potentially adverse 
ﬁnancial market effects of asset (reserve) management policies by 
central banks. She illustrates the main points of her analysis through 
two real life examples: in 1998 the Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA) bought a substantial portion of Hang Seng Market itself to 
ﬁght speculation against the currency and in July 1997 the Central 
Bank of Australia (BoA) announced that it had sold 2/3 of its gold re-
serves in the immediate past. The defensive and apparently successful 
intervention by the HKMA as well as the announcement by the BoA had 
major ﬁnancial market effects, although in the latter case the operation 
itself – selling gold – earlier in time did not move the market.
Now, one would think, much in line with the underlying tone in 
Dungey’s analysis, that these two events bear witness to the idea that 
excessive and adverse market movements can be the outcome of central 
banks reshufﬂing their portfolios in a nontrivial way and that, because 
of these market excesses the underlying central bank operations can be 
deemed problematic. But why should such central bank operations be 
problematic? Or more generally why should active asset management 
by central banks potentially be a problem?
Currently many central banks, particularly Asian central banks, 
hold large foreign currency, more often than not US dollar reserves. This 
implies, among other things, that risk preferences of a “representative 
international investor” are more biased in favour of the US dollar than 
would otherwise be the case with these central banks holding more 
diversiﬁed currency re-serves. It is plausible, then, that a nontrivial shift 
away from the US dollar by these central banks, resulting in less biased 
risk preferences by the “representative international investor” towards 
the US dollar, could lead to nontrivial exchange rate movements among 
the major cur-rencies and even to foreign exchange market turmoil. I 
would be surprised if we could ﬁnd a policy maker whose preferences 
would sustain such an outcome!
But I think there is a more important reason for thinking that 
active asset management by cen-tral banks could be a problem and even 
run against central bank policy preferences. This has to do with the fact 
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that central banks are policy making institutions. Now, the fact that 
markets observe or learn about major shifts in central banks’ portfolios 
could lead markets to search for policy signals in the observed policy 
moves. That is markets may think that the reason for a particular 
central bank to engineer a portfolio shift is that it wants to signal a policy 
change or a change in its assessment of the state of the home economy 
or relevant economies. These mar-ket perceptions could then adversely 
affect market expectations and, in the end, to a period where we can 
observe relatively large, possibly short lived asset market movements 
with local price trends strengthened and price volatility increased. In 
short, active asset management and policy making may not mix simply 
because of the possibility of markets inferring confusing sig-nals.
I think this type of market confusion, generated by markets not 
being able to separate “pure” portfolio diversiﬁcation or optimization by 
central banks from true policy signals, is a real possi-bility. However, 
central banks do actively manage their reserves or, more generally, 
assets. And there are good reasons for them to manage their assets, 
one important being that often tax payers’ money is involved. Indeed, 
seeking return (given risks) is very much in the business of central 
banking nowadays.
The problem is not, however, that central banks hold large 
reserves (and, consequently, ac-tively manage the underlying assets). 
These reserves are the outcome. For example, the accumulation of US 
dollar denominated assets by some of the Asian central banks has 
been dictated by, more often than not, implicit policy objective, like 
resisting appreciation of the domestic currency. The problem is then 
that, motivated by various policy objectives, central banks start to 
accumulate particular assets. The natural solution to this problem is 
to solve the underlying pol-icy problem, not to restrict central banks’ 
access to ﬁnancial markets for policy interventions or for “pure” portfolio 
management.
Active asset management by central banks can, of course, have 
nontrivial effects on local ﬁnan-cial markets, often because of the lack 
of sophistication and depth of these markets. Caballero et al (2006) 
have very recently emphasized this idea in their penetrating analysis of 
global im-balances and low interest rates. More speciﬁcally, in addition 
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to potential growth differentials among different regions of the world, 
heterogeneity in these regions’ capacity to generate ﬁ-nancial assets 
from real investments is the key force in explaining sustained rise in 
the US cur-rent account deﬁcit, persistent decline in long-term interest 
rates and the rise in the share of US assets in global portfolio. Although 
I think this is an important point, I also think that this does not provide 
us with a sufﬁciently strong case for arguing that central banks should 
be con-strained in asset management activities. First of all, in the 
context of normal business cycle management, the risk of ﬁnancial 
market inferring wrong signal is small, maybe even minimal. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, central banks resort to unconventional 
and even dras-tic policy measures, when there is a problem that needs 
to be addressed through these policy measures. Typically, in these 
special circumstances changing the major monetary policy tool – mostly 
the steering rate – is not effective or induces self-fullﬁlling equilibria. 
One of the exam-ples analyzed by Dungey, HKMA’s equity market 
intervention, is almost an ideal xample of this!
3. What if Dark Matter is there?
Finally, in the context of the ongoing discussion over global 
imbalances, I would like raise the issue of the existence and extent 
of dark matter. Although the debate over dark matter is not in 
the core of Dungey’s analysis, I expected her to comment it in the 
context of her otherwise balanced analysis over the issues raised in 
the context of the discussion over global imbalances. As suggested 
by the calculations presented in Hausmann’s and Sturzenegger’s 
(2006) thought-inspiring and provocative paper, US is exporting dark 
matter to the rest of the world in increas-ing amounts. Hausmann 
and Sturzenegger identify US foreign direct investment to rest of the 
world, liquidity and insurance services provided by US assets to the 
rest of the world as the main sources of dark matter. Now, the existence 
of dark matter, whatever the sources, implies that the global economy 
looks much better balanced once we adjust ofﬁcial balance of payment 
ﬁgures to account for the trade in dark matter. In fact Hausmann and 
Sturzenegger suggest that trade in dark matter is so large as to make 
US net creditor instead of net debtor as one would infer using ofﬁcial 
balance of payment statistics!
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Even though I do believe that Hausmann and Sturzenegger 
overestimate the size of dark matter2, the main point here is, I think, 
that if dark matter is there and is sufﬁciently large, then the potential 
effects of global shocks and generalized portfolio reallocation away from 
the US dollar on the dollar itself, the global economy and on the global 
ﬁnancial markets may not be so dras-tic as suggested by many recent 
studies3.  Dark matter could conceivably be one factor contributing to 
the resilience of the global economic and ﬁnancial system making soft 
landing more likely in the event of global rebalancing. This idea itself 
should motivate researchers and policy makers to continue investing 
resources into research that seeks to establish the existence and 
signiﬁcance of dark matter in the global economic system.
Let me conclude by reiterating that I was a true pleasure to read 
Mardi Dungey’s paper and that I hope that many potential readers ﬁnd 
their ways to her paper to enjoy the clarity of her analysis. 
  
2 See also Buiter’s (2006) critical account of Hausmann’s and Sturzenegger’s analysis. 
It should be note that the very recent balance of payment statistics for the US suggest 
that Net Investment Income (NII) for the US is currently negative, which contrasts with 
Hausmann-Sturzenegger whose calculations rest on positive NII. The reason for this is the 
rise in short-term US interest rates.
3 See in particular Blanchard et al (2005) and Obstfeld-Rogoff (2004).
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Background: The U.S. Experience
Beginning in 2001, the Bush administration cut U.S. tax rates as 
it increased government spending, particularly on war, turning a late 
1990’s era federal budget surplus into a consistently burgeoning deﬁcit. 
Meanwhile U.S. consumers continued to increase their consumption 
of imports and decrease their savings rates. U.S. trade deﬁcits ($782 
billion in 2005, approximately 6.5% of GDP) have grown exponentially 
as Americans increased their imports, particularly from China, Japan 
and oil-producing nations. Many economists are forecasting continued 
growth in these deﬁcits, perhaps to as high as 8-12% of U.S.GDP (Cline 
[2005], Roubini and Setser [2004] and Truman [2005]) sparking an 
eventual and perhaps sudden collapse in the dollar.
Dr. Dungey notes that throughout all of this thus far, the dollar has 
remained the primary currency of invoicing. This has been particularly 
true for raw materials such as oil, and U.S. Treasuries remain the refuge 
for the most risk averse. This set of circumstances has prevented the 
U.S. dollar from collapsing and enabled the U.S. to maintain low interest 
rates throughout the ﬁrst six years of the 21st century. In this informal 
arrangement sometimes known as Bretton Woods II, the renminbi is 
pegged to the dollar, enabling the dollar to maintain value worldwide. 
In effect, the U.S. Fed, following expansionary policy, “prints” money that 
increases demand for imports. The money is used by consumers to purchase 
underpriced imported goods from Asia. Asian countries then invest the 
proceeds in U.S. government debt securities to ﬁnance the U.S. war effort 
and other U.S. government and private investment. The process recycles 
itself over and over again as China pegs its currency to the dollar.
The U.S. role in this relationship is rather perverse, as the U.S. 
both retains the world’s key currency and maintains a current account 
deﬁcit, the second, just as developing countries are so frequently 
observed. Disaster often strikes when this set of circumstances arise in 
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developing countries when the world ceases to ﬁnance them. Similarly, 
the rest of the world can easily cease ﬁnancing the U.S. spending spree. 
Again, thus far, the dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency 
and currency of invoicing. This may protect the debtor U.S. from the 
plight typically suffered by developing countries. On the other hand, in 
2005, the sum values of international bonds totaled $18.6 billion, with 
43% denominated in euro and 39% in dollars (Bergsten [2005]). The 
euro certainly presents itself as a viable competitor to serve reserve and 
international invoicing roles. This presents additional risks to holding 
dollars. Worse, at some point, increases in borrowing will have to level, 
and existing debt, or some fraction of it has to be paid.
The World’s Reaction
Will there be a massive sell off of U.S. dollars and dollar denominated 
assets to avoid anticipated losses from dollar devaluations? If so, what in 
the meantime? If not, then what? Perhaps a more controlled and gradual 
sell off to avoid dollar losses? Maybe even a coordinated worldwide 
intervention to manage the outcome? Whether a massive sell off, gradual 
reduction or coordinated intervention, central bank actions are motivated 
by anticipated devaluations of the dollar; in essence, central banks are 
speculating on or encouraging a downward movement of the dollar value.
Prospects for the future have been summarized, are typically 
characterized something like the following:1  With the massive internal 
and external debts facing the American people, it is unlikely that 
interest rates can be maintained at their low levels. Furthermore, U.S. 
housing prices cannot be maintained at their high levels, especially if 
interest rates increase.
But, instead of this position-oriented sell off, or perhaps prior to it, Dr. 
Dungey is proposing that central banks may simply pursue a diversiﬁcation-
oriented risk management strategy. Here, China or another country acting 
in a self-serving manner may simply sell dollars to rebalance its portfolio 
with other currencies or assets. Regardless, as Dr. Dungey illustrates with 
historical examples involving Hong Kong and Australia, the impact of even 
a diversiﬁcation sell off can severely impact the asset’s market value. In 
fact, the anticipation of such a sell off can pose severe consequences. But, 
such sell offs, if conducted on a large scale, immediately exposes the central 
1 For example, see Roubini and Setser [2005] and Obstfeld and Rogoff [2004]
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bank to the dollar devaluation whose fear motivated the sale.
While other and sharply contrasting scenarios have been proposed 
for the current imbalance (See for example, Dooley et al. [2003]), none 
preclude the portfolio adjustment scenario suggested by Dr. Dungey. In 
a sense, this portfolio adjustment paradigm can be viewed as either an 
“end game” or “in process” scenario.
Portfolio Diversiﬁcation
While the paper does provide a broad and useful overview to the 
issues concerning current imbalances, the central theme of the paper is 
much more focused. First, rather than focus on the likelihood and timing 
of currency realignment or its effects (other than to review existing 
literature), the key argument focuses on the market’s expectation or 
fear that central banks will diversify their portfolios. The paper does not 
offer original theoretical or statistical evidence that such diversiﬁcation 
activities will occur, or on the broad macroeconomic or political impacts of 
these actions if they do occur. Instead, the paper presents illustrations of 
price effects of previous asset sell offs involving gold and U.S. Treasuries. 
The potential parallels to the current imbalance are clear. But, it is not 
clear to me from the paper whether there is any meaningful difference 
between the impact of dollar sell offs motivated by diversiﬁcation and 
the impact of sell offs motivated by the balance realignment. Both should 
affect currency values, but does one have a greater impact on values? 
How about in the broader macroeconomic and political realms?
The paper sparked several related questions concerning central 
bank risk management. To what extent are central banks already 
engaging in efforts to manage portfolio risks? Are they using any of the 
many types of derivative contracts on dollars? What types of contracts 
and how much? If so, how does central bank use of these contracts 
affect dollar value? Risk? Do central banks still need to sell dollars if 
their portfolios are deemed excessively dollar weighted; might a central 
bank better able to manage portfolio risk with derivatives? Derivative 
markets do provide opportunities to affect dollar positions without 
necessarily impacting relative currency values. Dr. Dungey does raise the 
derivatives issue brieﬂy with respect to a speciﬁc contract (p.8), though 
I’d like to see this issue further developed. The case for managing dollar-
holdings risk with derivatives rather than sell offs and the impact of 
this on relative currency values is worthy of further exploration.
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Abstract
The paper considers the challenges of regional ﬁnancial 
integration in the Asia-Paciﬁc region with an emphasis on China and 
discusses issues related to China’s large reserve accumulation versus 
the US’ large foreign liabilities and their implications for the process 
of ﬁnancial globalisation. The paper considers a Chinese perspective of 
issues related to global trade imbalances and the way the US should 
reconsider her monetary policy. The paper discusses the way APEC and 
ASEAN countries have been formed and the way in which these regional 
blocks wish to integrate and converge their economic and ﬁnancial 
markets. As part of this process of integration and as a way of responding 
to the need to address the large Chinese reserve accumulation, an Asian 
Single Currency has been considered by the Asian Development Bank. 
Some of the issues associated with the possibility of an Asian Single 
Currency for China and the way China could increase her investment 
and reduce her saving in a new environment of regional ﬁnancial 
integration are discussed. 
1. Introduction
We are currently in the second wave of globalisation. The ﬁrst one 
started in the late 19th century and ended up with the outbreak of the 
First War. The second wave of globalisation started in the 1960s. There 
are also some who argue that globalisation may well be traced back 
to Columbus’ voyage to America. Regardless of the beginning of this 
process, we have observed that technological changes, telecommunication 
and removal of trade barriers as well as ﬁnancial deregulation has 
contributed to the process of regional and global integration. We have 
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observed the emergence of the EU, the process of economic integration 
in the Asia Paciﬁc region in the context of APEC and ASEAN and in 
other parts of the world, various regional cooperation have been set up 
including in the Paciﬁc region amongst the island countries. Recent 
reforms and market liberalisation since the late 1970s has placed China 
in a strong position as part of the global economy. At the same time, 
the Asian Currency Crisis in the 1990s has created an environment in 
which Asian countries, including China, are a bit wary of the possibility 
of another ﬁnancial crisis in Asia. In the meantime, there have been a 
number of debates as to how to ensure that Asian ﬁnancial markets will 
become more stable and more predictable. One of the ideas proposed 
by the ASEAN countries, as well as China and Japan, is the possibility 
of an Asian Single Currency. It is clear that a Single currency is the 
outcome of a process of ﬁnancial and economic integration that may 
take years and sometimes decades to achieve. In other words, while 
an Asian Single currency concept may not be appealing to everyone, 
due to the fact that some see it as unpracticable, one should also note 
that it is the process that is important, a process that ensures that the 
economic and ﬁnancial policies ensure that in Asia, the key countries’ 
economies converge over time as part of the process of global ﬁnancial 
integration.
The remaining part of this paper discusses issues related to global 
trade imbalances from the Chinese perspective. In doing so, section 2 
deals with global trade imbalances and the US and Chinese monetary 
policies, section 3 discusses issues related to ﬁnancial development 
in China; section 4 presents a Chinese perspective of global trade 
imbalances; section 5 discusses issues related to Asian economic and 
ﬁnancial integration; section 6 deals with issues related to an Asian 
single currency, section 7 deals with issues related to a new Bretton 
Woods System and section 7 concludes.
2. Global Trade Imbalances and the US and Asian Monetary 
Policies
Economic success of China in recent years has contributed to the 
current global trade imbalances between the US on the one hand and 
China and some other Asian countries on the other. We have observed 
that the US current account deﬁcit increased to about 7 percent of GDP 
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in recent times. At the same time, we are observing that China’s reserve 
accumulation has increased to more than $900 billion dollars in 2006. 
We are also aware that China has had a trade surplus with the US over 
the last few years. 
A number of factors have been identiﬁed as the causes of global 
trade imbalances. For instance, high US productivity, the US ﬁscal 
deﬁcits and low savings in the US. At the same time, Bernanke ( 2005) 
argued that the “saving glut” in some Asian countries could explain 
the current global trade imbalances. The recent empirical study by 
Gruber and Kamin ( 2006) partially support the idea of a savings glut. 
However, another recent study by Chinn and Ito ( 2005) indicate that 
what we are observing is an “investment drought” in the South East 
Asian countries and a “saving drought” in the US. Such an observation 
is in contrast to economic theories that predict that economic growth 
in developing countries will increase  their current account deﬁcit and 
also increase their investment. The existence of such a phenomenon and 
also the presence of home bias that is slowing the process of capital 
ﬂows to developing countries have created an international ﬁnancial 
environment in which  some developing countries are skeptical about 
the future of international ﬁnancial architecture and they tend to invest 
less and accumulate more reserve as a way of hedging themselves for 
possible future regional or global ﬁnancial crises. China is one of these 
countries, particularly when in Asia, most countries have experienced 
an Asian Currency Crisis. 
3. Financial Development in China  
The reality of the current global economy is that we neither see 
a signiﬁcant capital ﬂow from developed to developing countries as 
predicted by the neoclassical theory nor a situation in which emerging 
countries will run a current account deﬁcit per annum, as long as 
these countries’ ﬁnancial markets are open to the world market and 
investment is expanding in their countries. 
Reform and deregulation in China has contributed to the 
expansion of her trade and investment. As can be seen from Figure 1, 
FDI to China has increased over time to the  extent that at the present 
time, we are observing that China is the largest recipient of FDI 
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amongst developing countries. Economic growth in China has also been 
signiﬁcant and strong over the last several years. Indeed, China has had 
the largest economic growth in the world in recent years. At the same 
time, the incentive to join the WTO has contributed to a large number 
of reforms within China. The gradual privatisation of government 
enterprises, including the major banks, are steps in the right direction. 
At the same time, more reforms are needed as part of a strategy to 
increase investment and reduce savings in China. At the same time, a 
more ﬂexible exchange rate and deregulation of the capital market are 
some of the processes of reform in China that should accelerate.
Figure 1 shows the developments of China’s FDI
from 1984 until the ﬁrst half of 2006.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (China).
China’s foreign assets are concentrated in ofﬁcial reserves that 
form 67 percent of her total foreign assets holdings. Figure 2 shows 
how rapidly in recent times, China’s foreign exchange reserves have 
increased.
It is argued that one may wish to consider that an increase in 
reserve accumulation could be seen as part of a strategy that allows 
export-led growth with less pressure to revalue the RMB. Such a policy 
could be argued to have beneﬁted the rest of the world, as the terms of 
trade remained relatively stable, with increased exports from China at 
low cost causing a downward pressure on global inﬂation. At the same 
time, the economy of those countries including those in the East Asian 
region that export intermediate products to China has remained strong. 
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Figure 2: China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves: 1979 - June, 2006
 
Source: China & World Economy, Statistic data (July 09, 2006)
Figure 2 shows China’s foreign exchange reserves from 1979 to 
2006. A few Tables and Figures in the Appendix to this paper are also 
reporting some relevant information regarding the recent data and 
developments in capital and ﬁnancial markets in China.  
With respect to China’s foreign exchange reserves, one should 
note that, as stated by Lane and Schmukler (2006),“high level of 
reserves could be considered as a subsidy that lowers the cost of external 
ﬁnance for the issuers of reserve assets.”  This in turn has assisted the 
US to keep its interest rates lower than otherwise. The recent study by 
Warnock and Warnock (2006) indicates that as a result of the ﬂow of 
foreign ofﬁcial assets from East Asia to the US, the US interest rate has 
been low by about 60 basis points that in turn has contributed to higher 
consumption and higher value for real estate in the US as well as a high 
current account deﬁcit. 
At the same time, the opportunity cost of reserve accumulation is 
high and hence it cannot be sustained in the long run. 
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A theoretical study by Devereux and Genberg ( 2006) shows 
that in the presence of current account surplus in China and current 
account deﬁcit in the US, a revaluation of  the Yuan will not necessarily 
improve the US current account balance. Partly because China imports 
a signiﬁcant amount of the inputs of her production from the US and 
hence in one respect, the Chinese will beneﬁt from a lower cost of 
imports. Even if the elasticity of trade is .5 rather than say .2.
In other words, revaluation of  the Yuan will not affect the overall 
expenditure by China. However, it will reduce the cost of intermediate 
goods as they are priced in US dollars and hence could increase the net 
foreign assets that China is holding in  US dollars. 
On the other hand, it is argued by Devereux and Genberg (2006) 
that a ﬁscal policy could have a better outcome subject to its source. 
In other words, a saving subsidy in the US may well lead to both the 
US and China’s reduction in consumption. It is argued that such a 
subsidy may not have any effects on the US inﬂation and hence real 
interest rates.  Assuming that the terms of trade are unchanged, output 
could fall in both the US and China. If the output falls in the US, the 
US consumption will fall by more than the US output. It is argued by 
Devereux and Genberg ( 2006)  that in the long run the US “net foreign 
assets are higher and it  has a higher  long run consumption “ , while 
China will have lower consumption and also lower output.
There is another study by Lau (2003) that shows that the cost 
of Chinese goods exported to the US will increase by about 2 percent, 
in the wake of a 10 percent increase in appreciation of the Chinese 
Yuan. Similarly, Lau ( 2003) shows that even if the Chinese value of 
exports may be high to the US and to the rest of the world,  the Chinese 
domestic value-added of these goods is no more than 20 and 30 percent 
respectively.  However, with respect to agriculture, there is an argument 
that the revaluation of Yuan may reduce the cost of imported foods and 
hence reduce the competitiveness of domestic agricultural products. 
This is even more sensitive when China has an over supply of labour in 
the agriculture sector. 
Another aspect of the Chinese foreign exchange rate is the 
possibility of fast tracking the process of moving to a ﬂexible exchange 
rate in China. It appears that due to less reform in China’s banking 
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system, there are some concerns that a less effective banking system may 
lead to destabilisation of the ﬁnancial market in China. This argument 
could be convincing, when the corporate and banking sectors in China 
are becoming increasingly more exposed to foreign exchange risk, 
particularly when China’s economy is becoming gradually integrated 
into the global economy. 
There is also another argument that foreign exchange rate 
ﬂexibility may affect trad and FDI. However, based on empirical studies 
of other developing countries, one may not necessarily argue that 
ﬂexible exchange or appreciation of the Yuan may lead to reduction in 
the amount of FDI or signiﬁcant trade income volatility. However, as 
will be discussed in the rest of this paper, Asian ﬁnancial integration 
and a more stable regional currency may well look after the concerns 
regarding stability in trade or FDI. 
At the same time, capital liberalisation is another major challenge 
in China. There are some who would argue that China may not be able 
to have  a ﬂexible exchange rate without ﬁrst having her capital account 
liberalised. At the same time, some argue that a ﬂexible exchange rate 
regime could assist in the process of capital account liberalisation. Past 
experience has also shown that when countries allow for capital account 
liberalisation, this in effect will increase capital inﬂow rather than lead 
to substantial capital account deterioration. This is because foreign 
investors see this as a signal for an economy that wishes to be fully 
integrated into the global economy and also attract  more foreign capital. 
At the same time, there are some legitimate concerns about the banking 
system in China and the link between their reforms and capital account 
liberalisation. The imminent  accession of China to the WTO will leave 
no choice but for acceleration of reforms in Chinese banks and hence 
one should also allow for the major role that Chinese banks could play 
in contributing to the process of ﬁnancial market deregulation.  
There is a research work by Dollar and Kraay ( 2006) in which 
they have shown that, subject to institutional reform and liberalisation 
in the capital market, the current account balance of China could be 
in deﬁcit for an average of  two to ﬁve percent of GDP over the next 
20 years. They also estimated that China’s net foreign liability position 
could be around 40 percent of her GDP by 2025. However, the reality 
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could be different to what has been projected for China. For instance, 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti ( 2002) show that  an increase in per capita 
output should be associated with a decrease in the net foreign asset 
position for developing countries. Yet, other studies such as Chinn and 
Ito ( 2005b)  refer to all investment drought in South East Asia that 
could  be contrary to the neoclassical view of capital ﬂows. 
At the same time, one could argue that in some other countries 
like Singapore and South Korea, the current account deﬁcit has been 
very high as they have gone through reform and development. ( in 
1982, Korea’s net foreign liabilities was 44.2 percent of GDP and for 
Singapore 54.2 percent of her GDP in 1976). One should also note that 
these countries are far smaller than China. 
4. China’s Perspective of Foreign Reserves and Global Trade 
Imbalances
A Chinese perspective of the current issues associated with the 
global trade imbalances and reserve currencies could well be explained 
by a reference to part of a recent newspaper article ( Sydney Morning 
Herald) in early September 2006, as stated below. However, it is also 
possible that this perspective may not be true as far as the actual 
ofﬁcial’s policy perspective is concerned. 
“The newest member of the Chinese monetary policy committee will 
today launch a stinging attack on those calling for a major revaluation 
of the yuan.
Fan Gang, a Harvard-educated economist who this month joined 
the People’s Bank of China committee responsible for advising on interest 
rates and exchange rate settings, says the US dollar, not the Chinese 
currency, is “a major source of instability”.
“The current problem is not RMB [renminbi, or yuan] revaluation, 
but dollar devaluation,” he says. “This is the major cause of the current 
imbalance.”
Dr Fan argues that the yuan is undervalued “only by less than 1 
percentage point annually”, and that any large revaluation will only be 
met with further US demands for more.
He says China’s huge build-up of foreign currency reserves owes 
more to speculators pouring capital into China in the expectation of yuan 
appreciation than it does to China’s low exchange rate producing a trade 
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surplus with the world.
The paper, written before Dr Fan joined the PBOC committee, will 
be delivered at the Australian National University’s China Update in 
Canberra today.
It suggests that no amount of yuan revaluation will remove the 
US deﬁcits of $US700 billion ($922 billion), or the bilateral US-China 
trade deﬁcit of $US200 billion, or the ﬁnancial imbalances that threaten 
developing economies.
“The huge stock of [over-supplied] ﬁnancial assets denominated 
in US dollars moves around knocking down the doors of developing 
countries which still have fragile domestic systems and are incapable of 
handling the risks the liberalised ﬁnancial market and free capital ﬂows 
may bring to them,” he says.
Dr Fan does not blame the US for the global imbalances that rile 
US Congressmen and jeopardise the ﬁnancial systems of developing 
economies. Instead, he points to the absence of any global currency system 
after the collapse of the gold standard.
He says the world’s choice of the US dollar as its global currency 
standard has released US policy makers from the usual economic 
constraints of excess liquidity.
“It seems that no matter how large the US ﬁscal deﬁcits are, no 
matter how loose the monetary policies and how much the excessive 
liquidity provided are, the US is not likely to run into ﬁnancial crisis 
like any one else in the world would do.
“This may delude, if not ‘corrupt’ people and policy makers in the 
‘anchor country’, as they may not see it as ‘their problem’.
“The fundamental problem is not in the US policies, but in the 
global currency system itself which makes the US follow a certain 
behaviour pattern.”
Dr Fan, the director of the National Economic Research Institute 
in Beijing, says the answer lies in a new currency standard somewhere 
between the old “rigid” gold standard and a new “utopian” international 
currency.
He advocates a new Asian currency unit being discussed at the 
Asian Development Bank.
“This is no ivory tower exercise. Both China and Japan are very 
serious about it.”
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5. Asian Economic and Financial Integration 
In the Asia Paciﬁc region, there are two economic Forums that 
are providing a mechanism for an increase in the level of integration 
in this region. One is APEC which consists of 21 countries including 
the US, China, Japan, Russia and Australia. This economic Forum was 
established in 1989. According to the APEC Secretariat “its 21 member 
economies account for more than one-third of the world’s population (2.6 
billion people), approximately 56 percent of the world’s GDP and about 
48 percent of global trade. APEC represents the most economically 
dynamic region in the world, having generated nearly 70 percent of 
global economic growth in its ﬁrst 10 years”. 
 The other regional block is the ASEAN that currently has 10 
countries including Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Philipines and 
Thailand.  According to the ASEAN Secretariat “The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 
in Bangkok by the ﬁve original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  Brunei Darussalam 
joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and 
Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The ASEAN 
region has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5 million 
square kilometers, a combined gross domestic product of almost US$ 
700 billion, and a total trade of about US$ 850 billion”.
The key ASEAN countries are also members of the APEC.  We 
also know that both APEC and ASEAN have plans to remove tariffs 
and other trade barriers between their members by 2020. In the case 
of ASEAN, there has also been a push for the emergence of a single 
regional currency. It is also noteworthy that countries in Asia are coming 
from different backgrounds. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia have 
Islamic background, the Philippines has Catholic background, Japan 
has Buddhist and Korea has both Buddhist and Christian backgrounds. 
This indicates that divergence in the background of nations could be a 
strength rather than an inhibiting factor for the process of integration. It 
should also be noted that ASEAN countries are very keen to have China, 
Japan and Korea as part of their Association.  As part of APEC, one may 
argue that some of the member countries such as  the US, Canada, Mexico 
and Chile are not part of Asia and hence the scope of such integration 
is either less natural or unmanageable. On the other hand, one may 
also argue that having China and the US as part of APEC could be 
65Faiborz Moshirian
the strength of this regional economic forum, as economic and ﬁnancial 
integration amongst these countries will ensure that both the US and 
China should agree to accept rules and laws of an integrated APEC. 
This will also entail accepting regional monetary and to some extend 
regional ﬁscal policies that are in conformity with the overall direction 
and interest of the countries forming APEC. This may well include limits 
on the US budget deﬁcit ( in the same way that the European countries 
forming the EU should abide by the European Central Bank’s rules) as 
well as domestic reforms and more deregulations in China that could 
also entail more domestic spending and investment. For the purposes of 
this paper, I would like to not consider ﬁnancial integration in Asia that 
includes the US and other countries outside Asia. Furthermore, I would 
like  to not speculate on the ﬁnal number of countries that could form 
such an Asian economic and ﬁnancial integration but rather analyse 
the actual concept of regional and global ﬁnancial integration and its 
consequences for the current world ﬁnancial challenges. 
One of the consequences of economic and ﬁnancial integration in 
Asia will be monetary convergence of countries forming such a union 
and the possibility of a single currency that could emerge as a result of 
such ﬁnancial integration. In such a scenario,  China may well invest 
and spend money in Asian currency rather than simply holding US 
dollars. This in turn, as stated above, will have some implications for 
the cost of capital, the interest rate and saving rate in the US and may 
well encourage a change of monetary and ﬁscal policies in the US. With 
this in mind, the rest of this section will discuss issues associated with a 
single currency in Asia as an additional world major currency that could 
then address some of the current challenges of issues related to reserve 
currencies and global trade imbalances.
6. A Single Currency in Asia
The Asian currency crisis has led some people, including the 
former President of Philippines, in one of the APEC forums and others 
such as Moshirian ( 2002) to promote the concept of an Asian Single 
Currency. In this century, various factors, including the process of 
integration through ASEAN and/or APEC, as well as the success of 
some European countries in the establishment of the Euro has led to 
the call by some governments and non-government ofﬁcials in Asia to 
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argue for the emergence of a single Asian currency in Asia. In recent 
years, the Asian Development Banks proposed an Asian Currency Unity 
( ACU) as a way forward towards the establishment of an Asian Single 
currency. Here is what the RIS policy brief ( May 2006) “the ACU is a 
weighted average of regional currencies a la the European Currency Unit. 
It is expected that the weight will be determined on the basis of regional 
country GDP and trade shares, with China, Japan and Korea expected to 
dominate the weight scheme. At the micro-level the rationale for an ACU 
is to afford regional economic agents the opportunity to invoice regional 
ﬁnancial and trade transactions in the ACU, hence reducing the region’s 
dependence on the US dollar and other external currencies.”   
In late December 2004, Robert Mundell and Fariborz Moshirian 
were interviewed by a Chinese newspaper for the emergence of a single 
currency in Asia. In that interview, Moshirian argued that for any Asian 
single currency to succeed it is important for all nations involved to feel 
that they are part of the process and that there is genuine ownership 
of the process associated with the creation of such a currency. Thus, 
despite the strong position of the Japanese Yen or in the not too distant 
future the importance of the Chinese Yuan, it is best that an Asian 
single currency be independent from the existing currencies in  Asia. In 
the same way that Germany was willing to give up the Deutsch Mark, 
the most successful European currency in exchange for a European 
Single currency, a similar attitude should exist towards the emergence 
of an independent single currency in Asia. This obviously will entail 
the eventual emergence of an Asian Central Bank and the role that an 
Asian Monetary policy should play in ensuring low inﬂation and low 
interest rates amongst countries forming such a union. 
However, in the context of global trade imbalances and also the 
issues related to China’s domestic spending policies, one could envisage 
a different policy and approach by the Chinese government, if Asian 
countries agree to economic and ﬁnancial integration of the Asian 
countries.  In other words, in the presence of Asian ﬁnancial integration, 
the Chinese Yuan may well be replaced by an independent Asian Single 
currency. In such a scenario, China would not see the necessity of 
holding most of her assets in the US dollars. This in turn will have 
some ramiﬁcations for monetary policy in the US as well as the way 
the US government is currently able to ﬁnance its massive budget 
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deﬁcit. In other words, as part of ﬁnancial integration in Asia, there 
will be more discipline on the part of the US government to act more 
cautiously in dealing with its expenditure and also domestic policies. 
At the same time, such an Asian ﬁnancial integration will assist China 
to have more conﬁdence in the Asian ﬁnancial system that another 
Asian currency crisis is less likely and hence China can invest her 
massive foreign reserve in productive purposes both within China and 
also in Asia and other countries. It also appears that once the Asian 
countries agree to the process of ﬁnancial integration in Asia, there will 
be more incentive on the part of all Asian countries, including China, 
to accelerate the process of domestic reforms including more domestic 
ﬁnancial deregulations as a way of ensuring the establishment of the 
expected standard of a regional ﬁnancial integration in Asia. In other 
words, the process of economic and ﬁnancial integration in Asia could 
potentially become another major incentive ( similar to the membership 
of China to the WTO) for further domestic ﬁnancial reforms. However, 
such a process of integration would also require commitment on the 
part of Japan and other Asian countries to also accept the process of 
domestic reforms in their own countries. 
Financial integration in Asia and the ultimate emergence of 
an Asian single currency would ensure that the US dollar is not the 
only major international currency ( the Euro has already been used as 
the second major world currency) and hence China would  be willing 
to invest part of her foreign exchange reserves for both domestic and 
international investment purposes, as the likelihood of another Asian 
currency crisis would be much less and also China would not need to 
hold her assets mainly in US dollars. 
In Search of the New Bretton Woods
A number of issues and policies have accelerated the process of 
ﬁnancial integration over the last several decades. The Bretton Woods 
institutions came into existence with the view to ensuring liquidity 
and a stable monetary system as well as adequate capital and know 
how for development. The Post Wars period witnessed the emergence 
of the European Common Market, the European Monetary System, 
the emergence of the Euro, a European Central Bank, a European 
Parliament. At the same time, in the Asia Paciﬁc region, China and India 
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are emerging as two powerful developing countries that are contributing 
to the process of regional economic and ﬁnancial integration in this 
region. China’s rapid growth and increase in the level of investment and 
trade will contribute to the process of regional integration. Although, 
the emergence of an Asian Single Currency could be challenging and 
slow to start, yet the process of integration in the Asia Paciﬁc has been 
in place for the last several years. This process has been intensiﬁed 
by both the removal of tariffs and other barriers amongst some of the 
Asian countries as well as the process of bilateral free trade between 
China and some countries in Asia, including Australia. The research 
work into the Eastern European countries indicates that once nations 
are given the vision of becoming part of a greater level of integration, 
national reforms accelerate. In other words, in the case of China, 
domestic reforms may well accelerate if China is committed to work 
with other Asian countries for a greater level of integration. The same 
process could apply at the international level, as we search for the  new 
Bretton Woods system. Acceptance of a higher level of integration will 
fast track the process of national, regional and global integration and 
will provide  more stability and predictability for the international 
ﬁnancial system. In the case of Asia, the process of regional integration 
may well lead to greater ﬁnancial integration in this region and the 
emergence of regional institutions such as an Asian Central Bank. All 
these events will contribute to the process of regional integration that in 
turn will assist the process of improvement in the international ﬁnancial 
system and also reliance on more than the US dollar as the only reserve 
currency. The strength of the Euro and the possibility of an Asian Single 
currency will ensure that the world liquidity will increase and at the 
same time, there will be less risk of global ﬁnancial instability and less 
accumulation of reserves by some emerging countries. At the same time, 
the current Bretton Woods institutions should either be substantially 
reformed as a way of representing all the nations and their needs and 
requirements or should be replaced by other international institutions 
that represent the needs and requirements of the new century better.
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7. Conclusion
The paper considers the challenges of regional ﬁnancial 
integration in the Asia-Paciﬁc region with an emphasis on China and 
discusses issues related to China’s large reserve accumulation versus 
the US’ large foreign liabilities and their implications for the process 
of ﬁnancial globalisation. The paper considers the way some of the 
regional economic forums such as the APEC and ASEAN have been 
developed. It also considers the role of regional economic integration 
and the way ﬁnancial and economic integration in Asia could assist 
the process of reducing global trade imbalances. After considering a 
Chinese perspective of issues related to global trade imbalances and 
the way the US should reconsider her monetary policy, the paper argues 
that such ﬁnancial challenges are symptoms of a less effective level of 
global ﬁnancial integration. The paper argues that the emergence of 
an Asian Single Currency may contribute to a reduction in the current 
world trade imbalances and also ensure more global ﬁnancial stability. 
The experiences of the Europeans with the Euro and the way economic 
and ﬁnancial integration in the EU have contributed to the process of 
integration and more ﬂow of capital within the EU should be considered 
as part of the process of addressing current global trade imbalances. 
In other worlds, regional and global ﬁnancial integration will assist 
in the process of reducing global ﬁnancial stability and a reduction in 
currency volatility. At the same time, the possibility of An Asian single 
currency that could compete with the US dollar and the EU will ensure 
faster convergence of national currencies and at the same time, less 
reliance on the US dollar as the only major international currency. This 
in turn will encourage China to hold less US dollars and also be more 
conﬁdent in investing and reducing savings, as the risk of another Asian 
Currency Crisis will decline, and at the same time,  the Asian countries 
could accelerate the process of regional ﬁnancial integration.
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Appendix
 
Figure 3: The growth of China’s GDP at current price
(1978 - ﬁrst half of 2006)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (China)
Table 1: China’s International Investment Position
(end of 2005, US$ billion)
Net Foreign Assets 278.5
Fross Foreign Assets 1218.5
Equity 64.5
o.w. FDI 64.5
Debt 327.9
Reserves 825.7
Gross Foreign Liabilities 930.7
Equity 673.8
o.w. FDI 610.2
 Debt  256.9
Source: China Quarterly Update, August 2006, IMF
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Figure 4: The change of China’s export, import, and trade balance 
(from 1978 to 2006)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (China).
Note:
The data of 2006 is estimation based on the real ﬁgure of the ﬁrst half year of 2006.

It is a pleasure to comment on the survey paper by Professor 
Fariboz Moshirian. This paper is an interesting paper on a critically 
important topic, which is, what is the best way to bring some equilibrium 
to global ﬁnancial imbalances? Clearly, the issue of the imbalances 
between China and US need to be addressed before any resolution to 
the global ﬁnancial situation can be resolved.
The context
Let us examine some ﬁgures from what I think of, somewhat 
provocatively, as some kind of global ﬁnancial “mess.”  Figure 1 shows 
China’s current account as a percentage of GDP (Obstfeld, 2006, p. 6). 
As we can see, the percentage hovers around 2% until 2000 (with many 
bumps along the way), but after 2000, we note the “hockey stick” nature 
of the graph, as the current account surplus exceeds 7% of GDP.  Figure 
2 shows reserve ﬂows of China as a percentage of GDP (Obstfeld, 2006, p. 
7).  The top line represents the reserve ﬂow, which is the combination of 
ﬁnancial inﬂows, errors / omissions, and the current account surplus (from 
the prior graph).  Again, one notes the enormous growth since 2000.
Figure 1: China’s current account as % of GDP (Obstfeld, 2006, p. 6)
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Farborz Moshirian The Chinese Perspective
Christopher L. Tucci
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)
76 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY FARIBORZ MOSHIRIAN
Figure 2: Chinese reserve ﬂows as % of GDP (Obstfeld, 2006, p. 7)
There is a popular counterargument against worrying too much about 
the global ﬁnancial mess. It is that “the system we have today is similar 
to the Bretton Woods system, so we really have nothing to worry about.” 
However, if we are supposed to worry or not depends on whether we are at 
the beginning of the “new” Bretton Woods period, or at the end of it when it 
was collapsing (cf., Dooley & Garber, 2005; Eichengreen, 2006; Rose, 2006). 
As the conference theme was about a “new” Bretton Woods, we should note 
that one of the reasons for global instability in international ﬁnance in 
the past was inﬂexible exchange rates combined with freer movement of 
capital1. This was at least partially addressed by a cooperative agreement 
among major economies working together in the domain of exchange rates 
and also other areas as well.  It is clear that this is a complex problem that 
cannot be solved unilaterally or by using only one lever.
For example, it cannot be solved only via exchange rate solutions. 
The international ﬁnancial system is far too complex to be solved by simply 
making exchange rates more ﬂexible. Perhaps there has been too much 
emphasis on exchange rates to the detriment of other solutions, especially 
regarding the US-China imbalance(s). It seems that it is the dream of 
many (if not most) macroeconomists that China should have a fully open, 
convertible, ﬂexible exchange rate, and that that should completely take 
care of the mess. While this might be a good idea in principle — and possibly 
may be one good goal as part of a “package” — it may not be as practical as it 
sounds, nor as “easy” as the case of Chile & Israel, two cases that have often 
been raised as “model cases” where ﬂexible exchange rates saved the day.
1 There were many other reasons as well but most economists would agree that at least part of the 
problem was the combination of inﬂexible exchange rates and the freeing up of capital ﬂows.
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China’s reserve holdings also create tensions for the Chinese 
government and limit their ability to act perhaps even in their own best 
interest, let alone the interest of the global ﬁnancial community.  An 
interesting current analogy for the position of the central bank of China 
may be the story of Kirk Kerkorian, who was one of the largest individual 
shareholders, if not the largest individual shareholder, of General 
Motors (GM) Corporation2. Kerkorian wanted to rebalance his portfolio, 
or change the way the company did business along many dimensions. 
The company, however, refused to take his advice, for example on the 
potential alliance with Nissan.  If he were to sell, his holdings would 
continue to drop in value as he sold.  This would be bad enough.  Now 
imagine, however, that he put in an order a long time ago to continue 
buying the stock in certain amounts every day and he could not cancel 
the order!  (This cannot even come close to the complexity and in some 
sense desperation of the actual situation with domestic interest rates, 
inﬂation, speculation, sterilization “bills,” and so forth.)
Conclusion: we are at an impasse with every party unable to 
move away from a suboptimal solution.
The proposal itself
Which brings us to the interesting paper by Fariborz Moshirian, 
who proposes the introduction of a single Asian currency as a 
solution to global capital imbalances.  Professor Moshirian proposed 
the following three main reasons that this is a good idea: (1) Such a 
currency union would be a forcing mechanism for national institutions 
that are more friendly to efﬁcient capital ﬂows; (2) it would encourage 
regional investment due to exchange rate stability, which also has an 
equilibrating effect; and (3) it would allow capital to ﬂow within, out of, 
and into the region, also equilibrating some imbalances.
I found the idea to be creative and the thinking behind it out-of-
the-box. Furthermore, I found the paper to be passionately argued, and 
emphasizing a “system” approach to imbalances, which, as described 
above, is exactly what we need to move forward.  I also thought that the 
2 Actually, after the conference took place, Kerkorian did end up unwinding most of his position 
in GM for what most analysts considered to be a much lower amount of money than he origi-
nally anticipated or wanted.
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idea of a sort of “co-evolution” of institutions, exchange rates, and global 
equilibrium is intuitively appealing and intriguing.
However, for this proposal to actually be taken seriously (which 
again, I emphasize, I believe it should be), we need to consider several 
points.  The ﬁrst of which is, what is the standard of evidence for this 
proposal?   The essence of the justiﬁcation / argument as it currently 
stands is (1) we look at the European Union experience and note its 
home country bias and institutions and how they changed over time (to 
the beneﬁt of the global ﬁnancial system); (2) we then examine the US 
experience prior to 1913 as well.
This raises the question: Should we go ahead with this proposal? 
(It seems from the paper that there is in fact tentative interest from the 
major Asian economies for this, but:) Is this enough evidence to support 
moving ahead, seriously?  Professor Moshirian only considers two 
monetary unions in any depth in the paper.  What are other monetary 
union situations throughout history?  How are they similar to, and 
different from, the current situation?  For example, is there really 
an analogy to the Chinese economy and the ability to create / evolve 
institutions in the Euro zone?  Is the Chinese institutional environment 
really on a course to evolve in a similar direction, politically speaking? 
These questions must be answered head on to provide the logical 
consistency necessary to take the next steps.
Furthermore, if the proposal is to truly gain traction, there ought 
to be a direct comparison with exchange rate-oriented proposals, such 
as “Basket, band, and crawl” (cf. Williamson, 2001) applied to China. 
For example, Obstfeld (2006) discusses an exchange-rate-oriented 
approach involving gradual “exit strategies” from currency peg.  In such 
an approach, central bankers would create baskets of currencies, set the 
bands, and slowly widen them. Obstfeld would also argue to not move 
ahead on ﬁnancial liberalizations on an ad hoc basis (whose philosophy 
is consistent with the proposed currency union).
The analysis of the above and a more direct comparison of 
alternative approaches will help answer the two important questions 
that one is left with after reading the paper: (1) 
Is this proposal desirable? and (2) Is this proposal practical?
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Minor point of framing
The paper is trying to do too many things and the main issues are 
being obscured.  I understand that it is supposed to be a broad review 
article as well as a practical proposal, but perhaps this being pulled 
in so many directions will actually mute the potential impact of the 
proposal itself.
As an example of what this paper is trying to do, consider the 
following quotes from the paper about the purpose of the paper itself:
 • “to consider the process of ﬁnancial globalization in the context of 
the recent trade imbalances between the US and China”
 • [To] “analyze issues that are related to the ways in which the 
monetary policies both in the US and China could address the 
current global trade imbalances”
 • “The paper argues that a number of national bottlenecks may well 
be removed once we also consider the role of new international 
institutions as well as the role of regional and global ﬁnancial 
integration”
 • Asserting that global ﬁnancial stability is a “global public good”
The solution I would propose would be to simply give up on the 
broad survey paper, and focus on the proposal itself.  I would suggest 
framing the paper in terms of solutions going beyond exchange rates 
that would facilitate market mechanisms in (slowly?) equilibrating 
global imbalances.  This could be a history paper that really digs into 
past situations and how they are similar and different to the current 
situation.  (There could be modeling papers in here as well, but I think 
the most effective defense of the proposal would be the above.)
In my more focused version, the following outline would be the 
most parsimonious and effective for getting the point across: 
 • Motivation: why exchange rates alone are inadequate
 • Proposal and why it makes sense for global ﬁnancial imbalances
 • History of monetary unions and ﬁnancial implications
 • Discussion of why the current situation is similar and different
 • Return to the proposal and answer the questions about whether 
the proposal is (a) desirable, and (b) practical
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper addresses a very important issue, namely that 
of China-US [and therefore global] ﬁnancial imbalances.  It contains a 
good kernel of an idea and interesting, passionately argued proposal for 
single Asian currency.  I would suggest making the message of the paper 
simpler, and the defense as convincing as possible. I wish Professor 
Moshirian the best of luck in this work!
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General comments
· Two basic opposing views about the global imbalance: pessimistic 
and optimistic.
·  Professor Moshirian holds a third view: the current imbalance is 
problematic but it can be corrected in a right way.
· What is the right way? The answer lies in the nature of current 
imbalance and the nature of current imbalance is related to the 
second wave of globalization. 
·  US and China happen to be two big players in the global imbalance.
What makes a difference in the current situation is that capital 
ﬂows seem to follow a direction that is different from which 
neoclassical theory suggests. Contrary to the theory, the US, as the 
biggest developed country, receives almost entire ﬂows of global 
capital, whilst China, as a developing country, becomes one big fund 
provider. 
· The question is why? Perhaps traditional trade theory missed out some 
new elements of comparative advantage: ability of capital allocating, 
level of ﬁnancial market development, ﬁnancial institutions, legal 
system, etc. 
· Prof. Moshirian provided large number of evidence both of empirical 
studies and in practice and his argument is thought-provoking, 
especially when we consider the solutions to the global imbalance. 
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China’s perspective
· Three key questions stand out:
 - What is the nature of China’s imbalance? 
 - How serious are the problems of China’s imbalance? 
 - What are the solutions to correcting the imbalance? 
· China is one of the biggest fund providers by running large amount 
of current account surplus and accumulating huge amount of foreign 
reserves. China is playing a key role in the whole situation. However, 
in searching for the solutions to the imbalance, China cannot solve 
the problem unilaterally. 
· This is especially true if we have a close look at the nature of China’s 
imbalance and China’s place in the whole picture.
· A “triangle relationship”: China is standing in between the US and 
the rest of East Asian countries:
 - China holds a special place in the geographical distribution of 
global current account balances: running huge current account 
surplus with the world biggest debtor country (the US) and at the 
same time running current account deﬁcit with many other big 
creditors in East Asia. 
 - This special role of China is related to the place that China holds 
in international production networks: China buys capital and 
technological equipment, hi-tech parts and components from 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan, primary goods, natural resources 
and resources-based products from ASEAN and Australia, and 
ﬁnancial, commercial and legal services from Hong Kong and 
Singapore. China uses the imports to produce manufacturing, 
processing, assembling goods and thus turns the products Made 
in Asia into Made in China. China then exports them to the US, 
Europe and the rest of the world. (Wang 2006) 
 - This type of processing trade leads to current account surplus 
by deﬁnition, and in China’s total exports, processing trade 
accounted for as high as 54.6%. 
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Implications of China trade balance pattern
· Why does China, as a country with excessive savings, import so much 
capital goods, mainly via inﬂows of FDI? 
· Two top reasons that are relevant to what Prof Moshirian observed: 
 - China’s immature ﬁnancial markets
 - Capital control in China and inconvertibility of RMB 
· China’s domestic savings are intermediated by foreign capital 
markets for domestic investment, which resulted in so called  “twin 
surplus” of China’s external balance (surplus in both current account 
and capital account) (Yu, 2006).
· In sum: because of China’s special role in the “triangle relationship” 
of trade balance:
 - Better to see the problem from a multilateral perspective. 
 - Better to consider the solutions on multilateral basis, either at a 
regional level or on global level. 
Regional monetary cooperation as a solution
· Professor Moshirian’s key conclusions: need to search for regional cooperation 
in East Asia, possibly to consider the use of a single currency in the region 
binding all the countries together and create incentive for the reform of 
national ﬁnancial institutions and coordination of national economic and 
ﬁnancial policies so that the institutional barriers could be reduced to the 
minimum and to refrain capital from ﬂowing out of the region.
· It seems to be a sound solution to reduce the excessive reserves and 
reduce the size of current account surplus in China and in the whole 
region of East Asia. 
· It is also a partial solution to the global imbalance given that the 
need of an effort in the global sphere is equivalently critical.
· However, in regard to the regional solutions, one issue needs to be 
investigated carefully: can a single currency in East Asia be possibly 
working?
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· When we refer to the theoretical answer, the answer is yes. 
 - The general beneﬁts of monetary union are well accepted. 
 - Furthermore, if you are a believer of the theory of “endogeneity 
of monetary union”, you will see that a single currency creates 
converging effects (Frankel and Rose 1998, Chai 2003, Blanchard 
and Giavazzi 2003)
 - EU is the case and the European Commission strongly holds this 
opinion. 
· This is probably why, as Prof. Moshirian points out, EU has had 
capital home bias declined after the creation of the EURO. 
Can a single currency in East Asia be a solution?
·  The rationales for monetary cooperation in East Asia are 
recognized.
·  However, there are several barriers:
 - Any collective actions in coordinating exchange rate policy in the 
region seem unlikely.
 - There is no common agreed vision on mutual monetary regime in 
the region.
 - US dollar’s dominant role brings about the difﬁculty for Asian 
countries to have any form of collective exchange rate management 
and monetary cooperation with the involvement of their own 
currencies.  
· The merits of adopting Asian Currency Unit (ACU) is obvious as 
long as it serves as an index of measuring volatility of concerning 
countries’ exchange rates and it has no compulsory need of policy 
coordination. 
· However, the idea seems not welcomed by all the concerning countries 
because of its technical difﬁculties in determining the weights of 
individual currencies in the basket. 
· ADB postponed the lunch of the ACU in 2006. When is it going to be 
in place? No one knows.
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Concluding remarks
· In regard to the possible solutions at regional level, there are several 
obstacles for having a mutual arrangement in East Asia. However, 
this does not mean that we should be pessimistic about the birth of 
a single currency in the long term. 
· The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is a good start. If the ACU can be 
successfully incorporated in the CMI mechanism and the regional 
bond market proposals can be put into practice, the excessive 
amount of reserves in the region would be more effectively recycled 
within the region and the current situation of capital ﬂows would be 
changed in favor of the region itself. 
· To this end, I totally share the view with that of Prof Moshirian’s. 
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Abstract
Global imbalances have attracted increasing attention from academics 
and policymakers, as one of the main risks the world economy is going 
to face in the years to come. Particularly, the US current account deﬁcit 
hit an explosive level that could cause a global ﬁnancial crisis [Roubini, 
Setzer (2005)]. Even if the Euro Area appears to provide a modest 
contribution to global imbalances -- since its current account is largely 
in balance --, evidence from the  movements in the bilateral dollar-euro 
nominal exchange rate suggests that a large amount of the effective 
dollar depreciation since 2002 has been borne by the euro. Therefore, 
if global imbalances persisted, Europe would be negatively affected, 
especially given the major international role of the euro. In our view, 
European policymakers can play an important role in addressing global 
imbalances. Actions should be taken mainly towards two directions: 
ﬁrst, enhancing eurozone growth potential, through policies aimed at 
making labour and product markets more ﬂexible; second, strengthening 
international cooperation, in order to avoid liquidity and currency 
turmoil. 
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Introduction
Over last months, global imbalances have caught the attention 
of academics and policymakers as one of the main risks on the world 
economy is going to face in months and years to come. At the present, 
despite solid growth showed over last years, the global economy rests 
on quite shaky foundations because of large and continuing global 
imbalances that could cause a ﬁnancial crises or a global recession, 
should they unwind in a disorderly way.
The most visible aspect of global imbalances is a large deﬁcit in 
the current account of US balance of payments (6.25% of GDP in 2005), 
that is counterbalanced by large surplus in the current account of other 
countries, mainly Asian ones, and more recently of oil-exporters as well.
Basically, the current account balance must equal the difference 
between Investment (I) in a country and its national (public + private) 
savings (S). Thus, a current account deﬁcit can be reduced either via 
less investment or more private and public savings.
The US economy has been experiencing current account 
deﬁcits since 1982, but over last years the imbalance has reached an 
unsustainable dimension. Fundamentally, global imbalances, and 
consequently the US current account deﬁcit, are sustainable only as 
long as foreigners are willing to ﬁnance US expenditure, i.e. to buy US 
assets. This implies some risks: the longer the US runs such a large 
deﬁcit, the more its debt vs the rest of the word will increase, thus 
reducing US assets’ appeal.
The recent debate and a new perspective
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005)1 recently argued that “any sober 
policymaker ought to regard the US current account deﬁcit as a Sword of 
Damocles hanging over the global economy”. More speciﬁcally, they estimated 
that major shocks to aggregate demand or shifts in the balance between 
tradable and non-tradable goods would be needed to cause an abrupt decline 
in the C/A deﬁcit. According to their estimates, the real exchange rate would 
1 Obstfeld M. and Rogoff K. (2005), “The unsustainable US current account deﬁcit revisited”, 
NBER Working Paper 10864.
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2 Blanchard O., Giavazzi F., Sa F. (2005) “The US current account and the Dollar”, M.I.T. 
Working Paper 2005-02
3 Roubini N. and Sester B. (2005), “The US as a net debtor: the sustainability of the US External 
Imbalances”, NYU working paper
depreciate between 15% and 33% if the C/A deﬁcit were eliminated by a 
change in aggregate demand and between 10 and 26% if the adjustment 
came from rebalancing in the supply of tradable/nontradable goods.
Blanchard et al. (2005)2 focused on the inﬂow side of the C/A 
balance, estimating that a 15% decline in the dollar would be associated 
with a decline in the C/A deﬁcit equal to 1.4% of GDP. Even more 
worrying, according to their model, stabilizing the net-debt/GDP ratio 
at current levels would require the dollar to immediately depreciate by 
56% and the C/A deﬁcit to decline to 0.75% of GDP.
Roubini and Setser (2005)3 went even further, saying that “the 
C/A deﬁcit will continue to grow (...) even if the trade deﬁcit stabilizes. 
That is why sustained trade deﬁcits will set off the kind of explosive debt 
dynamics that lead to ﬁnancial crisis”.
Chart - Is it sustainable?
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
90 THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
Pretty scaring, isn’t it? Well, not really, according to two Harvard 
economists who recently revived the debate. Indeed, Ricardo Hausmann 
and Federico Sturzenegger (HS henceforth)4 contend that we should not 
worry too much about the US external imbalance, since– simply as it 
seems – there simply isn’t one. The US net external position has been 
wrongly computed and, they argue, “once assets are valued according 
to the income they generate, there has not been a big US external 
imbalance”.
What’s the (Dark) Matter with US imbalances?
The HS argument starts from an apparent paradox. First, the 
economic landscape in the US has been characterized by a persistent 
and growing current account deﬁcit for more than twenty years, so 
that the economy is now left with the world’s largest cumulated stock 
of international liabilities. Indeed, at the end of 2004 (ﬁgures for the 
whole 2005 are not yet available) the market value of foreign-held US 
assets exceeded the market value of US-held assets abroad by more than 
$2.5trilllion, equivalent to 21.7% of GDP. While in principle one would 
expect such a large net liability position to be matched by corresponding 
substantial payments made to the rest of the world, the opposite turns 
out to be true: in 2004 the US earned $36B more on its foreign assets 
than it paid out to service its foreign liabilities.
If this seems quite puzzling, you would be even more surprised 
when looking at net investment income over time: in 1980 the US had in 
fact about $365B of net foreign assets, which yielded $30B of investment 
income, not much of a difference from now. How is this possible?
HS argue that such confusion stems from an “unnatural set 
of accounting rules”, as data on foreign assets and liabilities tend to 
be “inaccurate and systematically biased”. Thus, they introduce a 
new methodology to measure US external imbalances. A ﬁrst crucial 
hypothesis of their model relies on the fact that if an asset pays more 
than another asset, then it must be worth more, even if they have the 
same book value. Second, they assume that assets yielding a positive 
investment income can be valued at 20 times their annual earnings 
(which implies a return of 5%). Thus, $36B worth of income stemming 
4 See Hausmann R. and Sturzenegger F. (2006) “Global imbalances or Bad Accounting? The 
missing Dark Matter in the wealth of Nations”, CID working paper 124, Harvard University.
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from an asset, which is yielding 20 times its earnings, would mean that 
such an asset is worth $720B. Indeed, not very different from the $600B 
that would be implied in 1980, using the same methodology.
The conclusion is quite appealing: since the income ﬂow has 
remained fairly stable over the last 25 years, so should have the US 
net foreign assets. Clearly, this result stands in sharp contrast with 
ofﬁcial data hinting at a $2.7 trillion deterioration over the same period 
of time.
Chart - Where is the Dark Side of the Matter?
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, our calculations based on
Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005)
Borrowing from physics, HS label “Dark Matter” the difference 
between the $2.5 trillion stemming from ofﬁcial BEA ﬁgures and the 
$720B implied by their methodology, as it corresponds to assets that 
exist (as they generate a revenue), but cannot be seen (in ofﬁcial ﬁgures). 
In turn, this would mean that the US owns roughly $3.2 trillion of 
unaccounted net foreign assets, or, in more fashionable terms, of “Dark 
Matter”.
While it is difﬁcult to understand the nature of Dark Matter, 
HS identify three factors that might account for its accumulation. In 
particular, they contend that traditional accounting rules prevented us 
from recording a stream of unconventional service exports:
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  • A ﬁrst source of dark matter is Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), which embodies a transfer of managerial skills and 
knowledge. The result, according to HS, is that the cumulated 
historical value of these FDI ﬂows is often but a small fraction 
of the fair value of the equity claims on the assets they created 
abroad.
  • Second, HS argue that the US dollar remains a preferred store 
of value in countries with unstable domestic currencies and 
histories of high inﬂation or even hyperinﬂation. In this way, 
the US provides liquidity services, which come bundled in the 
US currency. In turn, remuneration for these services should 
go into investment income.
  • A third source of dark matter is insurance services provided 
by US when holding risky assets such as emerging market 
debt, against a safer liability such as US treasuries. The world 
would exchange a safe asset for a risky one, and should pay a 
price for that. Again, HS argue that such insurance service is 
not accounted for in ofﬁcial ﬁgures.
Bottom line: according to the HS methodology the US would not 
be a net debtor any more, so that the US (and global) imbalance would 
not be a major problem simply because it would not exist.
Flaws in the Dark Matter: the need for adjustment remains
While the “Dark Matter” theory sounds intriguing, it suffers in 
our view from some important ﬂaws that should make one wary of 
accepting the “don’t worry, be happy” attitude implied by HS. One of our 
major doubts is methodological and concerns the valuation method of the 
“Dark Matter”. HS assume that all assets should be valued at the same 
multiple of 20 times the earnings. However, assets such as equities and 
FDIs carry greater risk than government securities and thus should be 
valued at higher multiples. Moreover, we are not too convinced one can 
use the same multiple over a period spanning more than twenty years 
(not no mention the alternate phases of the economic cycle). In fact, P/E 
valuations for the S&P index have been on a rising trend for twenty 
years now, hovering around 10 in the early 1980s, and reaching values 
around 50 in the late Nineties during the internet frenzy. Therefore, it 
would be a major methodological ﬂaw to use a single multiple to make 
inference on the level of net investment income to obtain the value of 
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5 See “Higgins M., Klitgaard T., Tille C. (2005) “The income implications of rising US internatio-
nal liabilities”, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve of New York.
the net international position.
Our second concern is that, even when using the same 
methodology employed by HS, we would still get a deterioration in the 
US net investment position: when considered as a share of GDP, $600B 
of net asset in 1980 (21.7%) is clearly much more than $720B in 2004 
(5.0%). Moreover, preliminary data for the ﬁrst three quarters of 2005 
show a surplus of only $4B: barring any massive improvement in Q4-
05, this would point to a further deterioration, both in absolute and in 
relative terms.
Third, the apparent puzzle between a positive net investment 
income and a negative ﬁnancial account (which is the whole point of the 
Dark Matter theory) could be explained, at least over the last few years, 
by a couple of temporary factors which might soon be reversed thus 
pushing the net investment income in negative territory5.
A ﬁrst factor stems from the fact that the net ﬁnancial position 
is made of several types of assets and liabilities: a ﬁrst class is given by 
interest-sensitive assets, such as ﬁxed income securities and banking 
claims. While they tend to move together with interest rates, US assets 
and liabilities belonging to this class have been moving together, with 
little difference between them. The same applies for equities, whose 
rates of return tend to move together as well. The story is different 
when we come to FDI: since 1982, the US rate of return on FDI assets 
has been higher than the one prevailing on US FDI liabilities by 5.6%. 
More recently, since 2000, the rate of return on US FDI has risen 3.2% 
(from 5.4% to 8.6%), thus outpacing the rate of return on foreign FDI in 
the US, up 2.3% (from 2.0% to 4.3%). Thus, while net receipts for FDI 
have more than offset net payments on interest sensitive liabilities, we 
worry that even a relatively modest fall in return on FDI assets would 
have a substantial negative impact on net income: for instance, even a 
small decline of one percentage point would contract income receipts 
by $33B: ceteris paribus, this would be enough to bring to zero the net 
investment income.
A second factor that contributed to maintain the net investment 
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income position in surplus can be found in the fact that from 2000 to 
2002 interest rates fell sharply and then remained extremely low until 
2004. As a consequence, while net interest-sensitive liabilities actually 
rose from $1.6 trillion to $3.5 trillion, net interest payments increased 
much less, from $83B to $113B. With interest rates on the rise since 
2004, it would be reasonable to expect that the net income payments 
will increase, as most of the recent build up in net liabilities has been 
concentrated in interest-sensitive assets. Ultimately, this would depress 
net investment income, eventually pushing it into negative territory.
Thus, while the favorable gap between rates of return on assets 
and liabilities has somehow obscured a ballooning external imbalance, 
the current run up in net liabilities to the rest of the world would imply 
that the US net income balance will soon turn negative, as higher 
interest rates are going to increase payments on the large stock of 
liabilities. Ultimately, this would imply some form of adjustment.
Unfolding the need for long-term adjustment
While some adjustment in the C/A deﬁcit appears unavoidable, 
our analysis will unfold following a double-level approach. On the one 
hand, national accounts identities reveal that behind current account 
issues there are both trade and income ﬂows, thus highlighting the 
relationship to domestic savings and investment. On the other hand, as 
the object of our investigation here is the extent of “Global” Imbalances, 
we will not focus just on US economy, but we will explore two other 
important sides of the “Dark Matter”, namely Asia and Europe, with 
particular attention to the latter, trying to understand which policy 
implications can be derived when tackling these problems. Indeed, since 
a C/A deﬁcit in the US equals a C/A surplus elsewhere, decisions by 
foreigners are actually as important as their US equivalent in explaining 
the global disequilibria.
National income accounts provide a useful framework for 
analyzing the connection between the current account balance and 
trade ﬂows and, in turn, their relationship to domestic savings and 
investment. We start from the trade side, and we notice that the 
sizeable deterioration of the US trade deﬁcit (in Q4-05, it has reached 
the record high at $656.3B) must have occurred elsewhere: easy enough 
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to answer, the usual suspects are Japan and China. As for the former, 
its trade surplus with the US rose constantly over the last decade: from 
Y3.5 trillion in 1996 to Y7 trillion in 2000, to Y7.7 trillion in 2005. The 
relevance of China is even more striking when considering that it has 
accounted for roughly a quarter of the overall US trade deﬁcit over last 
year, besides being one of the main drivers in the deterioration of the US 
external position over recent years.
China and Japan are the other face of US trade deﬁcit
Source: US Department of Commerce
Thus, it is easy to understand why the adjustment on the US 
trade balance side has been one of the most debated issues over the last 
cycle. Indeed, the improvement in the US trade position would imply 
some combination of lower domestic demand, stronger foreign demand 
and a sizeable dollar depreciation. Recall that an alternative way to 
look at the current account balance is to see it as the difference between 
saving and investment: to this extent, lower domestic consumption 
simply means more domestic savings. Indeed, this option usually sparks 
concerns as many fear that a smaller support from domestic spending 
(especially from personal consumption) would push the US economy 
into a sharp and abrupt recession. Indeed, we do not think this will be 
the case as long as the whole burden of the adjustment process is not be 
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born entirely by US consumers.
In Japan, we expect some structural changes on the trade balance 
side. Thanks to a domestic demand-driven growth momentum, the 
increase of private consumption should contribute to reduce households’ 
saving, already on a declining trend. At the same time, the improvement 
in business conﬁdence along with the recovery of the credit channel 
will boost ﬁrms’ investment, thus strengthening the current trend of 
a gradual narrowing in the C/A surplus. Coming to China, we cannot 
step into the debate about global imbalances without mentioning the 
adjustment of the exchange rate. To this extent, it would be reasonable 
to expect a continuation of the gradual “reformism” seen in 2005, 
albeit some larger appreciation of the Yuan will be allowed. While we 
don’t expect the PBoC to introduce any other signiﬁcant change in the 
FX regime, the pace of appreciation should accelerate somehow: we 
expect the Yuan to appreciate roughly 5% in nominal terms in 2006, as 
improving domestic fundamentals are reducing China’s need to keep 
the exchange rate rigidly pegged to the USD.
Therefore, endogenous forces currently at play both inside and 
outside the US economy seem safely to rule out a Doomsday scenario 
characterized by a large and abrupt contraction in the trade and C/A 
deﬁcit, that would lead to a massive dollar depreciation, thus forcing the 
Fed to adopt an even tighter monetary stance, eventually pushing the 
economy into recession. Rather, all conditions seems to be in place for a 
scenario of a mild slowdown in US consumption, a mild depreciation of 
the US dollar against the Yuan and a pick up in domestic demand both 
in Japan and in China. Clearly, this will point to a moderate trend of 
narrowing US trade deﬁcit, and a small downward adjustment of the 
huge trade and current account surplus in Asian countries, as import 
growth should pick up and export growth should moderate.
The role of oil-exporting countries
Traditionally, Asian countries, and particularly China, have been 
the main “saving provider” in the world, thus ﬁnancing the US C/A 
deﬁcit. However, over the last three years the location of the surplus 
has been changing and a new actor has appeared on the scene: oil-
exporting countries. Because of the sharp increase of oil prices during 
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2002-2005, a large amount of money moved from oil consuming to oil-
exporting countries, thus implying an increase in the current account 
surplus of the latter, surpassing the one of Emerging Asia, which was 
already high. Even if oil exporters’ current account surplus is still small, 
its scale is growing rapidly (in 2005 they represented 40% of US current 
account). So far, the US current account deﬁcit has continued to widen, 
and the group of oil exporters has been playing a more signiﬁcant role 
in the allocation of world current account imbalances. In 2005, Asia C/
A surplus has risen to $341bn, equivalent to 47% of the US current 
account, while the share of oil-exporters has reached 41% ($296). This 
surplus should be rebalanced with an adjustment in investment and 
savings equilibrium as well: however, since oil exporting countries have 
lower savings and investment rates than economies in Asia, this would 
imply a shift way from investment goods towards consumption goods. In 
turn this would beneﬁt more us exporters (more consumption- oriented) 
rather than German ones (more investment goods oriented).
It is not simple to understand how oil exporters could affect global 
imbalances. Much will depend on their spending patterns, as a part of the 
higher revenues from oil (petrodollars) could be used to purchase goods 
and services from abroad and a part to buy foreign assets. Therefore, it 
is useful to distinguish two channels:
  • Absorption: money is spent to ﬁnance domestic consumption 
and investment, fuelling demand for imported goods and 
services. However, the recent evidence shows that oil exporters 
have much lower tendency to import from US than from other 
countries.
  • Capital account: petrodollars not spent on imports are saved 
and spent in foreign assets. There are reasons to think that 
US assets remain an important component of oil exporters’ 
saving allocations.
Both channels are important when analyzing the impact of 
oil prices on global imbalances. Indeed, the increase in oil importing 
countries’ demand for goods and services can help contain the increase 
in their C/A surplus. Therefore, depending on their destination, capital 
outﬂows from oil exporters’ countries may play a role in affecting world 
trade ﬂows and consequently global imbalances.
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In its WEO 2006, the IMF stressed that it is difﬁcult to understand 
in which way and how rapidly oil exporters are spending their revenues. 
A large part of the increase in oil revenues has been saved and in the 
period 2002-2005 only 52% of oil-export receipts were spent, less than 
in the previous episodes of oil shock when 90% of additional oil export 
receipts was spent on imports. However, if in the future they decide 
to spend their money this implies an increase of goods and services’ 
demand from oil exporters countries. If they decide to save and not spend 
petrodollars this means less exports for oil importers countries, and 
consequently negative impact on trade balance but a big reﬂow of US 
dollars into US as petrodollars should be used to invest in US assets.
The European perspective: are “global” imbalances also 
European imbalances?
As matter of fact, Europe, and the eurozone in particular, seems 
to contribute very little to global imbalances. In fact, the counterpart 
of large and growing US current account deﬁcit are large and growing 
surpluses in Asia and in the major oil exporting countries. In 2005, a 
massive $800B C/A deﬁcit in the US was matched by roughly $400B of 
surplus in Asia and $375B in oil exporting countries (see Table 1). In 
contrast, the euro area current account seems largely in balance, with 
only some internal disequilibria, implying that it is not a major player 
in global imbalances. As a matter of fact, while sluggish growth in the 
euro area over the last years would have (in theory) led to a surplus in 
the trade and current account balance, a progressive appreciation of the 
single currency has actually weighed on exports, so that the aggregate 
balance has turned slightly negative.
Moreover, the Asian perspective remains quite diversiﬁed: while 
a surplus in Japan reﬂects mainly the world’s highest savings rate (and 
somehow a weaker yen over the last three years), the large and growing 
surplus in China appears due mainly to a structurally weak currency 
and a favourable internal market conditions (low tax rate, labor market) 
that prevent a prompt adjustment of the terms of trade.
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Table 1. Current Account Balances ($Bn)
 
1995 2002 2005
US -114 -472 -791
UK -14 -25 -58
Euro Asia 44 54 -35
Asia 72 240 405
Japan 111 113 164
China 2 35 159
Korea -9 5 17
Major Oil Exporters 11 91 374
Source: BEA, IMF, OECD
From a strictly European point of view, the optimal rebalancing 
scenario would be one in which the eurozone imports more US-produced 
goods and services and exports more goods and services to Asia and to oil-
exporting countries, thus leaving its current account unaffected, even when 
the US C/A deﬁcit declines. However, this scenario would imply a decline 
in the Asian C/A surplus, which in turn will likely require an appreciation 
of Asian currencies. On the other hand, an alternative scenario would be 
one where economies of the euro area import more from the US and export 
less to Asia, allowing the US C/A deﬁcit to narrow but leaving the Asian 
position unchanged: this is likely to happen if Asian currencies remain 
pegged to the dollar. Clearly, this second scenario is the one feared the most 
by eurozone governments and policymakers, as a sharp drop in the dollar 
would easily lead to an excessive real appreciation of the euro.
Given that the responsiveness of US exports and imports to changes 
in the real effective exchange rate is relatively small, substantial real dollar 
depreciation will be required to make the US trade deﬁcit decrease. When 
the real effective exchange rate of the dollar depreciates, the key factor 
determining how the burden of adjustment is shared across countries 
will be movements in bilateral exchange rates. The bilateral dollar-euro 
and dollar-sterling nominal exchange rates have moved much more over 
recent years than the US nominal effective exchange rate, suggesting that 
a large amount of the effective dollar depreciation since 2002 has been 
borne by the euro. It is easy to understand why European policymakers 
fear that this unequal distribution of adjustment will continue.
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Indeed, so far European countries have been always quite reluctant 
to accept large changes in their current account position to allow global 
adjustment. The only exception seems to have been the brief period between 
1986 and 1988, when Europe tolerated a moderate shrinking in its C/A surplus, 
coinciding with the period in which international coordination worked.
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES
We regressed $/euro (euro per US$) on US trade balance, yen and 
yuan. The regression output showed that the relationships with yuan 
and yen are positive but very mild. On the contrary the relationship 
with US trade deﬁcit (vs Japan and Euro Area) are inverse, meaning 
that when deﬁcit increases, dollar depreciates. Particularly, with respect 
to China a negative prime difference implies an appreciation of dollar.
Dependent Variable: EUR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/13/06 Time: 17:40
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q2 2006Q2
Included observations: 29 after adjustments
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.258567 4.236912 -0.769090 0.4513
YEN 0.009987 0.003690 2.706476 0.0140
YUAN 0.326728 0.463815 0.704435 0.4897
TB_CHINA 1.41E-05 6.85E-06 2.056243 0.0538
TB_EURO_AREA -5.69E-06 1.39E-05 -0.408482 0.6875
TB_JAPAN -2.96E-05 1.24E-05 -2.382641 0.0278
D(YEN,1) 0.002007 0.004390 0.457170 0.6527
D(EUR,1) 0.118013 0.471003 0.250556 0.8048
D(TB_CHINA,1) -6.51E-06 3.51E-06 -1.854772 0.0792
OIL_WTI 0.004200 0.004231 0.992596 0.3334
R-squared 0.817881 Mean dependent var 0.949085
Adjusted R-squared 0.731614 S.D. dependent var 0.132738
S.E. of regression 0.068766 Akaike info criterion -2.249405
Sum squared resid 0.089848 Schwarz criterion -1.777924
Log likelihood 42.61637 F-statistic 9.480821
Durbin-Watson stat 1.020102 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000024
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Which consequences of real euro appreciation?
An excessive appreciation of the euro would be a serious cause 
for concern for many reasons. First, a disproportionately large real 
appreciation might well depress euro-area net exports and put growth 
prospects at serious risk. Second, euro-area markets for labour and 
products are not sufﬁciently ﬂexible to promote a smooth reallocation of 
resources across sectors. Finally, a signiﬁcant appreciation in the euro 
would have asymmetric effects on individual countries, thus adding to 
existing divergences across the euro area.
1. Recent indicators on activity across eurozone are signalling a solid pace 
of growth in coming months, but sustainability of demand might be put 
at serious risk should a sharp appreciation in the real exchange value 
of the euro occur. Moreover, a sharp appreciation in the euro versus 
the dollar might also have a depressing effect on domestic demand in 
the euro area as a result of negative wealth effects as eurozone-based 
investors are large net holders of dollar-denominated assets.
2. A second major concern is that labour and product markets in the 
eurozone are not ﬂexible enough to facilitate a smooth reallocation 
of resources. For instance, to keep unemployment from rising, 
signiﬁcant resources would need to shift from the traded goods sector 
to the non-traded sector. While the ﬂexibility that characterises the 
US economy has allowed a sizeable reallocation among sectors as the 
trade deﬁcit has swelled, it is not clear whether eurozone markets 
are ﬂexible enough to engineer such a large reallocation.
3. A third concern is that a large appreciation of the euro could worsen 
economic divergences in growth and inﬂation between existing 
EMU members. A sharp appreciation in the euro would represent a 
common shock to countries in the euro area, but it would probably 
have asymmetric effects on individual members. These asymmetric 
effects would complicate the response of policy to the rise in the euro, 
especially when ﬁscal polices are not yet consolidated together.
Implications for Europe of exchange rate regime change in Asia
While US have historically been a strong advocate for a more 
ﬂexible exchange rate system in China, European policymakers suggest 
that other countries, whose bilateral dollar and effective exchange 
rates have not appreciated over the past few years should allow their 
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currencies to adjust. Since adjustment will involve depreciation in the 
US real effective exchange rate, one would ask whether governments in 
Asia allow their currencies to appreciate, with particular focus to China’s 
exchange rate regime. In fact, China has pegged its currency ﬁrmly to 
the US dollar for many years. In July 2005, the yuan was allowed to 
appreciate about 2%, and has been stable since then. Only after the 
recent G7, the yuan has managed to appreciate against the dollar more 
than what has been seen after the July 2005 one-off appreciation. (2.3% 
vs. 2.1%). Indeed, this remains too little, considering that the dollar/
yuan Forward rates (NDF) are already pricing in a much larger yuan 
appreciation in the medium term, even below the current dollar/HKD 
parity at 7.80.
Figure- The yuan performance vs. USD so far
China’s government announced that, in the future, it would peg to 
a basket of currencies, but the exact composition of this basket remains 
unspeciﬁed.
Future adjustments in China’s exchange rate policy have different 
implications that appear particularly relevant for the eurozone:
1. The level of the exchange rate. The more the yuan is allowed to 
appreciate against the dollar, the larger the part of the US C/A 
adjustment falling on the trade ﬂows between China and US, and the 
less need there is for adjustment between the US and the eurozone.
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2. The exchange rate regime. The more the Chinese peg shifts from the 
dollar to the euro, the more China will become a net buyer of euro 
assets. This is likely to result in a euro area C/A deﬁcit vis-à-vis 
China, and an appreciation of the euro’s real exchange rate, thereby 
weakening euro area exports.
Other risks for European policymakers - Going beyond 
adjustment in activity
We have already highlighted that adjustment of global imbalances 
might imply an exchange rate realignment that could in turn involve a 
large real appreciation of the euro. While the consequences in terms of 
real activity are pretty clear (i.e. a higher risk of recession following 
a decline in exports), there are also important implications for the 
international ﬁnancial system.
Consider for instance the event of a disorderly adjustment, which 
would imply that ﬁnancial markets become progressively reluctant 
to roll over their credit to the US. This means a US current account 
reversal associated with strong relative price and exchange rate 
movements, creating ﬁnancial turmoil across markets: risk premia 
would rise markedly, and the dollar may fall dramatically. In this 
scenario, it is highly plausible that European ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial 
ﬁrms would suffer from strong deterioration of their balance sheet and 
liquidity shortages. This scenario would call for eurozone monetary and 
supervisory authorities to provide emergency liquidity to ﬁrms and 
ﬁnancial markets do not need to compromise the ability of the ECB to 
retain control over aggregate liquidity in the euro area. On the other 
hand, if the magnitude of ﬁnancial crisis is large enough to generate 
substantial uncertainty about default rates by ﬁrms and banks, monetary 
authorities may face difﬁcult trade-offs between ﬁnancial stability 
and price stability, as monetary interventions may not be effective in 
preventing widespread default. Governments may then have to shoulder 
large ﬁscal costs to avoid a chain of destabilizing bankruptcies. This raises 
important issues about the distribution of possible ﬁscal costs across 
countries. Moreover, weak public ﬁnances may create undue constraints 
on emergency ﬁnancing in the case of a crisis associated with a “hard” 
unwinding of global imbalances. This provides yet another argument for 
ﬁscal discipline now as a precaution against future ﬁnancial crisis.
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Overall, however, even if eurozone monetary authorities are 
successful in ﬁghting ﬁnancial contagion and other undesired effects 
of liquidity shortages due to large price swings in asset markets, the 
eurozone would still face a severe aggregate demand problem well 
beyond the reach of monetary policy. Perhaps the most important risk 
associated with global imbalances is that of facing a severe crisis without 
effective policy instruments to stabilize the eurozone economy.
Challenges for European Policymakers
“The problem is not to have imbalances. When you have them, be cautious 
on how to reabsorb” (Karl Brunner)
While the eurozone so far has not been at the center of the problem 
of widening global imbalances, it should be part of the solution. The fact 
that the euro area’s current account balance has been small and stable, 
while imbalances have grown elsewhere does not warrant that it can 
escape the fallout from a disorderly adjustment—especially given the 
major international role of the euro. Moreover, whether adjustment of 
the US current account deﬁcit is orderly, occurring through a gradual 
increase in its public or private savings, or disorderly, occurring through 
an abrupt exchange rate depreciation and a rise in interest rates that 
would force a drop in investment, one outcome is likely to be lower 
growth of exports from other countries to the U.S.
We think that European institutions can play an important role in 
addressing global imbalances. Keeping in mind the two risks highlighted 
above, action should be taken mainly towards two directions: ﬁrst, 
enhancing eurozone growth potential, through policies aimed at making 
labour and product markets more ﬂexible; second, strengthen international 
cooperation, in order to avoid liquidity and currency turmoil.
Raising growth potential
Eurozone’s key economic challenge is to raise its growth and 
employment performance, with an aging population. A falling working-
age population and rising spending related to aging will cause major 
problems.
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A part of the solution will be to achieve higher employment. Several 
countries in the eurozone have already shown ways to tackle structural 
problems in employment, without undermining social solidarity. Indeed, 
recent improvement in the labor market have been achieved mostly 
thanks to more job-friendly wage policies, the liberalization of part-time 
and temporary employment, and the phasing-out of early-retirement 
schemes. However, more needs to be done if the eurozone is to enjoy 
sustained strong growth.
Several policy options could be considered:
• Reform pensions in a sensible way, promoting intergenerational 
equity and help the sustainability of pension plans.
• Supporting the jobless, but strengthen incentives: Long-term 
unemployment beneﬁts can also be linked to active job searching 
and the performance of socially useful work.
• Continue to improve labour market ﬂexibility: more ﬂexible labor 
contracts, for example, would promote job creation and prevent the 
existence of dual labor markets.
• Promote more active social spending: better education and job 
training would improve employment and income prospects and 
lessen the need for income support through welfare mechanisms.
Moreover, it will be crucial to advance liberalization of product and 
services markets. While some progress has been made in deregulation 
of product markets, wide divergences exist across EU countries. And the 
largest sector of the economy—services—remains insular. A good start 
would be the adoption of the EU Services Directive without delay and 
dilution.
Strengthen coordination and integration of ﬁnancial markets –The role 
of institutions
Another promising avenue toward higher growth and efﬁciency 
is through further integration of Eurozone’s ﬁnancial markets. Greater 
ﬁnancial integration should enhance competition, improve efﬁciency, 
lower the cost of capital, and improve monetary transmission. Some 
progress has been made, and much has been done at the EU level to 
advance the integration of national ﬁnancial markets. But effective 
implementation is still needed, and work has barely begun on differences 
in taxation and legal systems that have impeded ﬁnancial integration.
Also, ﬁnancial innovation is still very much proceeding at the national 
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rather than at the aggregate level. Further progress will require ﬁnancial 
institutions to compete and innovate, to the beneﬁt of consumers and 
investors.
Strengthening coordination and integration of ﬁnancial markets 
would require a deep knowledge of the underlying mechanisms, together 
with the main factors behind global imbalances. For instance, setting up 
a sound coordination policy agenda would imply a careful analysis of 
the current state of imbalances:
• If they depend from inability to invest national savings and/or 
different propensity to liquidity, then we imbalances themselves 
might be the solution
• If they depend from excess demand on one side, then we require to 
cut them curbing the excess demand
• If they depend from inadequacies in exchange rate regimes and/
or behavior of the world money supply, than institutional changes 
would be needed
To this extent, while market might be seen as the fastest and 
most efﬁcient problems’ solver, different market institutions might 
bring different results. In particular, if market forces alone take the 
task of adjusting imbalances, then the euro area might be forced to a too 
abrupt adjustment process. In this case, clearly strengthen coordination 
among different institutions can be of great help. In fact:
• Market forces can do only a part of the business to absorb 
imbalances
• The international cooperation should complete the process according 
to a shared global vision, something that could be reached setting 
up a permanent table of discussion of world economic problems (a 
secretariat)
• Bilateral agreements open to be transformed in multilateral 
agreements, in which moral suasion and multilateral surveillance 
would take a leading role.
General Comments
• The paper by Maccario, Savona, Stroppa and Zazzara raises some 
very important issues regarding the effect of the global imbalances 
on the world economy focusing on a European perspective.
• In particular, the paper presents a very careful analysis of different 
scenarios of unwinding the US current account deﬁcit
 – (1)in an orderly way, and
 – (2)possibly disorderly way.
 – Especially focusing on EMU.
Summary
• First part of the paper presents the debate on the seriousness of the 
US Current Account Deﬁcit
 – Obstfeld and Rogoff (NBER WP 2005)
 – Blanchard et al (MIT WP 2005)
 – Roubini and Setser (NYU WP 2005)
• Obstfeld M. and Rogoff K. (2005), “The unsustainable US current 
account deﬁcit revisited”, NBER Working Paper 10864.
• Blanchard O., Giavazzi F., Sa F. (2005) “The US current account and 
the Dollar”, M.I.T. Working Paper 2005-02.
• Roubini N. and Sester B. (2005), “The US as a net debtor: the 
sustainability of the US External Imbalances”, NYU Working 
Paper.
• The new “dark matter” perspective of Hausman and Sturzenegger 
(CID WP 2006)
• Hausmann R. and Sturzenegger F. (2006) “Global imbalances or Bad 
Accounting? The Missing Dark Matter in the Wealth of Nations”, 
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Aurelio Maccario, Paolo Savona, Davide Stroppa, 
Cristiano Zazzara  The European Perspective
Kose John
New York University
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 – Traditional accounting rules prevent us from recording a stream 
of unconventional service exports
 – Once assets are valued according to the income they generate, 
there has not been a big US external imbalance
• Flaws in the valuation method
• The analysis unfolds following a double-level approach
• The connection between the current account balance and trade ﬂows 
for the US
• Looking carefully at the ﬂip-side (Asia 47%,oil-exporting countries 
41%)
• Not just the US, also these other countries and their responses
The The Flip-Side Picture
Table 1. Current Account Balances ($Bn)
1995 2002 2005
US -114 -472 -791
UK -14 -25 -58
Euro Area 44 54 -35
Asia 72 240 405
Japan 111 113 164
China 2 35 159
Korea -9 5 17
Major Oil Exporters 11 91 374
Source: BEA, IMF, OECD
Consequences for Europe
• Two scenarios:
 – Europe imports more of US goods and services and exports more 
goods and services to Asia and oil-export countries. Europe C/
A same. US C/A deﬁcit declines. Decline in Asian C/A surplus. 
Appreciation of Asian currency.
 – Europe imports more from US, less exports to Asia. Asian C/A 
same. US C/A deﬁcit declines. Drop in the Dollar. Appreciation of 
Euro.
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• Signiﬁcant real depreciation of dollar will be needed. Signiﬁcant 
consequences for Europe
• Depresses exports putting growth at risk.
 – Holdings $3000billion, huge negative wealth effects, 10% of GDP
• Markets for labor and capital not ﬂexible enough to facilitate the 
smooth reallocation of resources across sectors required.
• Asymmetric effects on individual EMU members adding to already 
sizable divergences in economic performance, growth, and inﬂation. 
Complicates response of policy.
Viability of EMU
• The theory of optimum currency area
 – Tamim Bayoumi (IMF Staff Papers 1994)
 – Bayoumi, T. (1994), A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas, 
IMF Staff Papers, December.
• Trade-Off: Monitory efﬁciency gain and economic stability loss from joining
 – Macroeconomic convergence criteria
 – Stability and Growth Pact
 – No monitory policy, complicates ﬁscal policy
 –  Trade and factor mobility?
 – Without ﬁscal federalism
Financial Financial globalization
• If it means removal of explicit barriers to international investment, 
a lot has happened, especially within industrialized countries.
• However important differences remain
 – Firm ownership
 – Firm size
 – Capital structure
 – Governance
Country Differences Remain
• For portfolio choice, savings and investment, consumption, capital 
structure, and governance
• For ownership structure
• An Optimal Currency Area?
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Twin-Agency Theory Perspective
• Stulz (JF, August 2005) Presidential Address,
• Stulz, R. 2005, “Limits to Diversiﬁcation”, Journal of Finance, 
August.
 – John,K. and S. Kedia, “Institutions, Markets, and Growth: A 
Theory Of Comparative Corporate Governance”, NYU Working 
Paper, 2006.
• Sharp decrease in barriers to international investment: ﬁnancial
globalization.
• Overall impact has been limited:
 – “Globalization is not rampant. It remains remarkably limited.” 
(Wolf)
 – Negative equity ﬂows to LDCs over last six years.
 – IMF study.
• So, why has the impact not been larger? Why is ﬁnancial globalization 
not complete?
• Country heterogeniety is important.
• Agency costs of corporate insider discretion.
• Agency costs of state rulers discretion.
• Ownership and the twin agency problem.
• The twin agency problem and the international ﬁnance puzzles.
• The twin agency problems and consequences for corporate ﬁnance, 
leading to heterogeneity among EU countries.
Agency Problems with Corporate Insiders
• Corporate insiders consume private beneﬁts
 – Planes, easy life, outright theft
• Deadweight cost of private beneﬁts is higher in countries with better 
investment protection
• Ex post incentives to extract private beneﬁts fall as the insiders’ 
stake in the ﬁrm grows
• More co-investment is optimal when investor protection is weaker
Agency Problems with State Rulers
• Extract private beneﬁts also
 – Redistributive taxes, conﬁscate assets, require bribes
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• Managerial entrenchment limits expropriation by state rulers
• Firms with professional managers and atomistic shareholders are 
inefﬁcient when problem is serious
Government expropriation
• What is it? Broad understanding – predatory taxation, regulation 
capture, outright expropriation, etc.
• Extent depends on restraints on government.
• Literature: Buchanan and Tullock, Olson, Stigler, Roe, Pagano and 
Volpin, Perotti and von Thadden.
• John and Kedia(WP,2006)
• John,K. and S. Kedia, “Institutions, Markets, and Growth: A Theory 
Of Comparative Corporate Governance”, NYU Working Paper, 2006.
Twin Agency Problems
• Problems interact with one another
• Empirically, low expropriation risk is a necessary condition for 
diffuse ownership
• Pervasive family control of ﬁrms is prevalent in all countries with 
moderate or high risk of state expropriation
Consequences
• Twin agency problems limit the impact in at least ﬁve ways:
 – Co-investment is reduced by risk-aversion.
 – Co-investment is reduced by wealth constraint.
 – Reduced cost of external ﬁnance leads to lower insider 
ownership.
 – Foreigners are more vulnerable to expropriation from the state.
 – When expropriation from the state is signiﬁcant, ﬁnancial 
liberalization is less credible.
Twin Agency Problems Reduce Investments in Governance
• Investments in general are less proﬁtable
• Lack of transparency reduces risk of state expropriation
• Entrenchment reduces risk of state expropriation
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• Risk of expropriation by the state reduces value of private contracting 
solutions
Governance differences: Europe An Optimum Currency Area?
name ISO rule_law nant_dir cred_ind eff_jud repudiat risk_exp account c3pri
Austria AUT 10 2 3 9.5 9.6 9.69 54 0.58
Belgium BEL 10 0 2 9.5 9.48 9.63 61 0.54
Denmark DNK 10 2 3 10 9.31 9.67 62 0.45
Finland FIN 10 3 1 10 9.15 9.67 77 0.37
France FRA 8.983334 3 0 8 9.19 9.65 69 0.34
Germany DEU 9.233334 1 3 9 9.77 9.9 62 0.48
Greece GRC 6.183333 2 1 7 6.62 7.12 55 0.67
Ireland IRL 7.8 4 1 8.75 8.96 9.67 0.39
Italy ITA 8.333333 1 2 6.75 9.17 9.35 62 0.58
Netherlands NLD 10 2 2 10 9.35 9.98 64 0.39
Norway NOR 10 4 2 10 9.71 9.88 74 0.36
Portugal PRT 8.683333 3 1 5.5 8.57 8.9 36 0.52
Spain ESP 7.8 4 2 6.25 8.4 9.52 64 0.51
Sweden SWE 10 3 2 10 9.58 9.4 83 0.28
Percentage of Outstanding Held by Block Holders
(48 countries in 2002; Source: Worldscope)
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Conclusion
• The paper by Maccario,Savona, Stroppa and Zazzara contains a nice 
analysis of the consequences of the unwinding of the US Imbalance. 
A disorderly adjustment will affect Europe and the EMU.
• Europe’s key problem: To raise growth and employment performance 
given an aging population.
• Sensible Pension Reform, Improve incentives, More ﬂexible labor 
contracts, Less distortions.
• Greater ﬁnancial integration (Taxes and Laws), Lower cost of capital, 
Better monetary transmission.
• A very thoughtful paper with some key insights.
114 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY MACCARIO, SAVONA, STROPPA AND ZAZZARA
References
Obstfeld M. and Rogoff K. (2005), “The unsustainable US current account 
deﬁcit revisited”, NBER Working Paper 10864.
Blanchard O., Giavazzi F., Sa F. (2005) “The US current account and the 
Dollar”, M.I.T. Working Paper 2005-02.
Roubini N. and Sester B. (2005), “The US as a net debtor: the sustainability 
of the US External Imbalances”, NYU Working Paper.
Hausmann R. and Sturzenegger F. (2006) “Global imbalances or Bad 
Accounting? The Missing Dark Matter in the Wealth of Nations”, CID 
working paper 124, Harvard University.
Stulz, R. 2005, “Limits to Diversiﬁcation”, Journal of Finance, August.
John,K. and S. Kedia, “Institutions, Markets, and Growth: A Theory Of 
Comparative Corporate Governance”, NYU Working Paper, 2006.
Bayoumi, T. (1994), A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas, IMF 
Staff Papers, December.
The Issue
• Do we need a new reserve currency?
 – Since Bretton Woods the dollar has fulﬁlled that role
 – However forces are in play that suggest that there should be 
cause for concern of the dollar’s ability to fulﬁll this role
Advantages of Reserve Currency
• Convenience for the country’s residents
• More business for the country’s banks and other ﬁnancial 
institutions
• Seignorage
• Political power and prestige
Disadvantages
• Larger ﬂuctuations in demand for the currency
• An increase in the average demand for the currency
• Burden of responsibility.
Factors that Suit a Currency for International Currency Status
• Patterns of output and trade
• The country’s ﬁnancial markets
• Conﬁdence in the value of the currency
• Network externalities
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Aurelio Maccario, Paolo Savona, Davide Stroppa, 
Cristiano Zazzara,  The European Perspective
Bill B. Francis
Lally School of Management
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, NY
116 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY MACCARIO, SAVONA, STROPPA AND ZAZZARA
Take away from the Paper
• Although not stated you come away with the belief that the authors 
believe that it is important that the dollar should remain the reserve 
currency of the world and that it does not make sense for the euro to 
try and fulﬁll this role
• I arrive at this conclusion based on the fact that the core of the paper talks 
about what needs to be done to reduce the U.S. current account deﬁcit
• Speciﬁcally they discuss the role of the two Asian countries China 
and Japan with most of this discussion centered around China.
• However most of the paper focuses on the euro and what can be done 
by the countries in the Euro-area to achieve this
Problem with the Dollar (US Economy)
• America today has a Current account deﬁcit of over $720 billion 
which is about 7% of GDP
• This trade Imbalance continues to grow each month
• Implication – increase risk of ﬁnancial instability that would lead to 
tremendous turmoil in the world ﬁnancial markets and therefore in 
the global economy
• Some questions as to whether or not the U.S. in fact has a current 
account deﬁcit
• Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006) – the perceived deﬁcit is due to 
faulty accounting “inaccurate and systematically biased”
• Based on their method the U.S. currently has a current account 
surplus
• Are they correct?
• Probably not – Maccario, Savona, Stroppa and Zazzara do an excellent 
job highlighting the ﬂaws in their argument
• Conclusion by the authors is that there is massive deﬁcit that 
continues to grow and if not controlled could lead to major global 
economic instability
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U.S. Trade Summary
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Source: Haver
U.S. Economy
• Interest rates increasing – this could lead to increase in US dollars 
being held as reserves thereby exacerbating the problem
• A decline in the housing market that could lead to a decline in 
consumer wealth (both perceived and real) resulting in if not a 
recession a slow down in the U.S. economy
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Current Account Balances
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), and IMF staff estimates
Net Foreign Assets
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), and IMF staff estimates
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Current Account Balances ($Bn)
2005
US -791
UK -58
Euro Area -35
Asia 405
Japan 164
China 159
Korea 17
Major Oil Exp 374
Pro Euro
• Other EU members, in particular UK, joining Euroland will make it 
larger than the US economy and ﬁnancial market
• US macroeconomic policies could undermine conﬁdence in the value 
of the dollar through inﬂation and depreciation
• Germany and Japan export 7-9% of their GDP to emerging 
economies
• Equivalent ﬁgure for America and Britain is only around 3%
• France and Italy are somewhere in-between
Euro area’s exports to emerging economies have grown by an 
annual average of 14% since 2000 (twice as fast as America’s)
• Since 2000 the euro area’s share of world export markets has risen 
slightly, to 17%; while America’s share has slumped from 14% to 10%
By many measures of competitiveness, Europe appears to be 
coping better with the emerging economies than America
• If EU were to fully embrace the rise of China and India, its GDP per person by 
2050 could be up to 8% higher than it would otherwise have been, implying 
a boost to average annual growth of 0.2% annually over this period
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• If, on the other hand, EU countries lurch towards more protectionist 
policies, GDP per head could be 5% lower than in the base case
(study by European Commission)
• European countries hold 30% of the seats on the executive boards of 
the IMF and World Bank
• Over 30% of those institutions’ voting rights
(giving them nearly twice as much weight as the United States)
• Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands each have more voting power in the 
Bretton Woods twins (IMF and World Bank) than Brazil, China or India
Emerging Europe
Strong domestic demand has buoyed growth in emerging Europe, 
underpinned by sizable and increasing net capital inﬂows and rapid credit 
growth. Howevere, with its heavy reliance on foreign savings, the region 
is vulnerable to changes in international ﬁnancial market conditions. 
Weak ﬁscal positions in some countries exacerbate the situation.
Source: IMF staff calculations
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Source: IMF staff calculations
Against the Euro
• Europeans disagree because their interests diverge too much
 – Britain is a large exporter of ﬁnancial services
 – Germany a large exporter of manufactured goods.
 – But EU countries differ just as much over trade and agriculture
• European countries could settle their differences but they fail to do 
so because of existing institutions that are somewhat dysfunctional.
• Except in euro-area monetary policy and in trade, most macroeconomic 
matters are ﬁrmly in the hands of national European governments.
• These governments will not voluntarily give up their over-
representation in the G8 or the IMF in favor of a common EU stance.
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Between Dollar and Euro
• Since 2002 the dollar has fallen by 28% against the euro and by 14% 
against a broad basket of currencies.
• Even so, 66% of the world’s ofﬁcial foreign-exchange holdings are 
still in dollars, compared with 25% in euros, 4% in yen and 3% in 
pounds, according to ﬁgures published last week by the IMF.
• Since 1997 employment in the euro area has grown slightly faster 
than in America.
• The reason why America is growing faster than Europe’s is that 
sluggish real wages have been offset by large capital gains on homes, 
massive borrowing and an unsustainable fall in saving, all of which 
have boosted American household spending. If (when) house prices 
fall and consumers wake up to the fact that they are not saving 
enough, consumer spending will weaken perceptibly (e.g., recent 
housing slump).
• European ﬁrms have been much more successful than America in 
holding down unit labor costs, thereby remaining competitive.
Euro and the Dollar
Additional comments on the paper
• Maccario et al. present regression analysis examining the 
determinants of the euro/dollar exchange rate
• The results are quite interesting in that the variables that are most 
important in terms of explaining variation in the exchange rate are 
those having to do with Japan – both the yen and the trade deﬁcit
• Yuan insigniﬁcant but China’s trade deﬁcit signiﬁcant
Some Issues
• The emerging economies has grown tremendously in importance 
following their liberalization which started in the early 1990’s
• For example, these economies hold 70% of global foreign-exchange 
reserves
• Emerging economies are fueling their export led growth by ﬁnancing 
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US Deﬁcit
• Thus not only should China be included in the analysis but the other 
emerging economies should also be included
• It is not clear if the authors used exchange rate changes or if they 
use levels in their econometric analysis. If it is levels they need to 
test for unit roots in the exchange rates. If they do ﬁnd unit roots 
then they should difference the variables. However, I do not believe 
that this would alter the inferences made by the authors
• The authors present a very good discussion of what the problems are if 
the Euro-area would bear the burden of reducing the US current account 
deﬁcit. It would be helpful if they could do some simulation analyses to 
quantify the impact that it would have. Variables that could be used 
are variables such as – GDP ratio, inﬂation differential, volatility of the 
currency, exchange rate turnover, share of currency in reserve holdings. 
This would help to bolster the arguments made in the paper
The issue of Japan
• Note that the US trade deﬁcit with Japan is larger than with China
• Maccario et al. do an excellent job discussing the role of China in 
the U.S. current account deﬁcit. However although they show that 
Japan’s surplus is larger they do not discuss its implication(s)
• The issue of Japan needs to be brought to the forefront of the 
discussion. I say this because by doing so it highlights the importance 
of Japan and the possibility that the yen along with the euro and the 
dollar can (and probably should be) the three reserve currencies
• It is generally agreed that the Yuan is undervalued and one way 
to improve the U.S. current account balance is to get the yuan to 
appreciate
• However a currency that is ﬂying under the radar is the Yen
• Since March it has fallen slightly against the dollar but by as much 
as 8% against the Euro
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The yen
• Since 2001 the yen has fallen by 35% against the euro but little 
changed against the weaker dollar
• Implication is that the yen has gained competitive advantage against 
the other currencies that have appreciated against the dollar
• In fact an article in the Economist points out that whereas the yuan 
is undervalued by 7% against the dollar the yen is 12% and against 
the euro it is almost 30% below its fair value
• What is even more surprising is that while there is tremendous 
pressure being placed on China by its trading partners to do 
something about the Yuan, Japan’s trading partners are relatively 
quiet about the yen
• However Jean-Claude Trichet the president of the ECB has recently 
complained that Japan is not bearing its share of the dollar decline
• While the yuan is not allowed to ﬂoat freely, the undervaluation 
of the yen is puzzling – especially given that it is a freely ﬂoating 
currency and not being held down by currency intervention as it was 
back in 2003-2004
• Why is it so cheap?
 Nominal interest rates is 0.25% with the recent increase in inﬂation 
real rates are close to zero
• A more popular explanation is the revival of the “carry trade” (borrow 
cheap yen and investing in higher yielding investments elsewhere)
• Another possible explanation – global “funnelling hypothesis” this 
focuses on the net trade and capital ﬂows of Asian and oil-exporting 
countries
• The basic idea is that the world buys from these countries and they 
then invest the net proceeds in ﬁnancial markets
• Central banks of these countries prefer to put money in well developed 
127Bill B. Francis
ﬁnancial markets thus the liquid markets of America, the Euro area 
and the UK attract most of this capital
• The implication of this is that there is a funneling from Asian 
currencies into dollars and euros
• With the tremendous increase in the current account surplus of 
the emerging economies there has been an accompanying increase 
in their foreign reserves which have served to push the yen down 
against the euro regardless of the fact that the yen is freely ﬂoating
• This suggests that if the current trading patterns are maintained and 
the Japanese central bank does not intervene the yen will continue 
to be undervalued for a substantial period of time
• This is not the ﬁrst time that the yen has been undervalued
• The ﬁrst time led to the Plaza Accord 21 years ago that led to a 
tremendous increase in the value of the yen
• Note that at that time the yen was substantially less undervalued 
than it is today
• Maybe it is time for another “Plaza Accord” meeting – by this I mean 
that there should be a meeting of the central banks of these three 
major currencies where a discussion similar to what is being done at 
this colloquium can occur
• This is clearly needed because it is not clear that we can go back to 
the time when there was only one true reserve currency – given the 
tremendous increase in globalization, it is unrealistic to believe or 
expect that one currency can serve this purpose. This would pose 
tremendous risk to the ﬁnancial stability of the world. This was 
recently alluded to by bankers in China who pointed out that by 
holding so much of their reserves in dollars, China is tremendously 
under diversiﬁed and could suffer tremendous losses if the US dollar 
were to depreciate signiﬁcantly
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Conclusion
• The conﬁdence in dollar as a reserve currency is going down due to 
ballooning current account deﬁcit
• The emerging economies are the primary holder of dollar reserves, 
which they use to fuel their export led economies
• Although in theory the euro can be a replacement to dollar as a 
reserve currency the euro area is currently not ready/able to support 
the massive responsibility and implications of having the euro as the 
world’s reserve currency
• Although de facto the dollar continues to be the major reserve 
currency, it is not clear that this is sustainable or is even desirable. 
This suggests that it is time for the central banks of the major 
economies to get together and determine some sort of global strategy 
going forward with special emphasis placed on the – dollar, euro and 
the yen
Abstract
There are two interrelated usages of the term Bretton Woods in 
international macroeconomics.  First it refers to the institutional 
structure put in place to govern international ﬁnancial relationships 
in the post World War II era.  Second it refers to the way in which 
the ﬁnancial interactions relationships among countries operate.  In 
both instances there are important differences between the Bretton 
Woods of the early post war period and the contemporary experience. 
In particular, the most important Bretton Woods institution, the IMF, 
plays a different role today than it did in the original ﬁxed exchange 
rate system of the post war period.  With regard to operations, large US 
current account deﬁcits in recent years provide some resemblance to the 
role of the dollar earlier.  This paper explains and contrasts the old and 
new Bretton Woods institutional and operating systems.
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Bretton Woods is a beautiful place in the White Mountains of New 
Hampshire.  But, it is also a key phrase in the lexicon of international 
macroeconomics.  The term Bretton Woods ﬁgures prominently in economic 
thinking and the search for a new Bretton Woods (hereinafter, BW) goes on far 
from the New Hampshire mountains.  As the term has become increasingly 
familiar, it has become less clear what the phrase is supposed to convey.  
The BW system that emerged from that mountain setting has two 
distinct but related parts.  First, it refers to the institutional structure put in 
place to govern international economic relations and second, it refers to the 
way in which international ﬁnancial relationships operate.  Thus, the original 
system (old BW) consists of the institutions and operations of international 
ﬁnance from the end of the war to the breakdown of ﬁxed exchange rates in 
the early 1970s.  The old BW system had a long demise – from the end of gold 
convertibility in 1971 through the ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s.  However, 
there is now much conjecture about the emergence of a new BW system.  
Our objective here is to examine old BW and to provide a context for 
understanding the new BW.   Just as old BW has two facets – institutions 
and operations – so does new BW.  In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crises of 
the 1990s there were wide discussions of the reform of the BW institutions, 
particularly the IMF, and the search for a new ﬁnancial architecture 
continues to this day.  From the operational perspective, the inﬂuential work 
in just the last few years by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (DFG) 
postulates that the world is operating under a new BW system.  DFG argue 
that the international ﬁnancial system operates today with features that 
closely resemble the old BW system.  
We will ﬁnd that the old BW system was remarkable in many 
respects. First, the war time conference cobbled together a set of institutions 
and arrangements for international ﬁnancial relationships that were just 
the right thing for the right time.  The aim was to provide a setting for post 
war economic growth and to avoid the problems that hobbled the interwar 
economy.  The old BW system met these objectives handsomely. 
However, the old BW system was a victim of its own success.  A 
growing world economy evolved away from the initial conditions of the post 
war period.  The growth of trade increased the demand for reserve assets 
which were beyond the supply capability of the old BW system.  Furthermore, 
the re-globalization of a growing world economy inevitably led to more open 
capital accounts.  
With regard to institutional changes, no suggested reform has the 
consensus backing that led to the old BW.  With regard to operational changes, 
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DFG postulate that the international ﬁnancial system has been operating in 
ways that bear many similarities to old BW.  Their view is that this new BW 
can be sustained for a generation or just like old BW worked for the ﬁrst post 
war generation.  However, their view is debated by observers who view the 
large global imbalances of countries like China and the US as unsustainable.  
Our examination of the institutions and operations of the old BW era 
will, hopefully, help us understand the two facets of the new BW era.  The 
paper starts with a step back in history to the Bretton Woods conference that 
brought together 730 policy makers from 45 countries in the midst of the 
Second World War.  It was an odd gathering in an odd place that, even more 
oddly, had enormous inﬂuence.   
Bretton Woods, 1944.  There was a consensus among the allies that an 
important part of victory – the success of the post war world – would be new 
arrangements in international economic relationships.  Efforts to develop a 
new structure for international ﬁnancial relationships started early in the 
War and culminated in the BW conference held over three weeks in July 
1944.  The conference started just a month after D-Day when there was a 
thought or a hope that the war would end soon.  So, with the war waning 
and with a broad determination to change the landscape of international 
economics, hundreds of participants converged on a very remote resort 
hotel sitting at the foot of the tallest mountain in the Eastern US.  Most 
participants arrived by special overnight trains from Washington and from 
Atlantic City where key participants had hammered out the ﬁnal plans.  In 
fact, discussion had been underway for several years between the two key 
players – the US and the UK.  The agreements were virtually in place before 
everyone reached New Hampshire. 
There were really two players at BW – John Maynard Keynes of 
the UK and a less well known Treasury economist from the US, Harry 
Dexter White.  Keynes and White had been discussing the design a post war 
international ﬁnancial architecture for several years and the Keynes and 
White plans were made public early in 1942.  Much debate went on – often 
with coded trans Atlantic messages – before the meeting at BW started.  One 
thing is for sure, there was a determination to change the way the world 
economy was managed in the post war world. 
Sixty years later, there is still determination to manage and stabilize 
international ﬁnancial relations but there is less and less agreement about 
how to do so.  Perhaps the Bretton Woods conference was successful because 
of Keynes’ dominant intellect or because the US had already emerged as the 
predominant player on the post war world stage.  One way or the willingness 
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to reach agreement stands in sharp contrast with recent experiences such as 
the failures of the Doha trade talks or the attempts to reform the IMF since 
the ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s.
BW in 1944 was different because there was a shared perception that 
there was something terribly wrong with the prewar structure and that an 
entirely new system was needed.  Bretton Woods was different because of the 
shared fear of returning to the conditions and structure of the interwar period. 
International trade plummeted in the Depression particularly as countries 
competed vigorously to impose trade restrictions on each other in vain efforts 
to save domestic industries.  The determination to avoid a return to such a 
situation was accentuated by the fact that all serious economists expected 
that there would be sharp post-war economic slowdown1. The difﬁculty in 
establishing trade policies was probably understood at BW.  Moreover, it was 
known that the pre-war tariff wars were misguided response to ﬁnancial crises. 
Thus, the emphasis at BW was the efforts to reconstruct the ﬁnancial system. 
Financial architecture before BW. In theory the countries of the pre 
war world were on the gold standard.  Now, the gold standard model – David 
Hume’s price-specie-ﬂow model – is elegant and simple.  Countries with trade 
deﬁcits have to export gold, which leads to a domestic money contraction, 
prices fall and presto the deﬁcit disappears. It was probably the ﬁrst general 
equilibrium model and is much loved by economists.   
Although, the gold standard model called for automatic self correcting 
responses to imbalances, the ability of central banks, then as now, to inﬂuence 
interest rates and credit (money supply) expansion complicated the structure. 
The gold standard model demanded that central bankers play by the “rules of 
the game” (a term coined by Keynes in the 20s).  The unwritten rules stated 
that a proper central bank set policy that was consistent with the automatic 
adjustment mechanism of the gold standard.  Playing the game meant that 
a central bank would raise interest rates and contracts the money supply 
in the presence of incipient gold losses. Thus, the system can work without 
major gold reserves or gold ﬂows. However, by the time the term was coined, 
central banks were ﬂouting the rules; other things, domestic concerns, had 
a substantial inﬂuence on interest rate and credit policy (which at that time 
consisted of discounting by central banks). 
Moreover, the gold standard adjustment model abstracts from the 
1 It is interesting to note that the one failure of BW was dealing directly with the trade is-
sue.  The conference envisioned that in addition to the international ﬁnancial institutions there 
would be a comprehensive organization to govern trade.  Such an organization did not emerge 
and the GATT agreements of 1947 were a weak substitute from the very start.
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existence of international capital markets, which had been around throughout 
the gold standard era.  Lending can stem the demand for gold outﬂows and 
thus postpone the operation of the adjustment mechanism.  That sounds 
ﬁne; capital markets can absorb short term shocks without either gold ﬂows 
or deﬂation. However, loans accumulate to form a stock of claims on the gold 
reserves.  If reserves are small relative to the accumulated imbalances ﬁnanced, 
capital markets can make the system more volatile rather than less volatile. 
Capital ﬂows in the late 19th century were often immense.  Current 
account deﬁcits of 10 percent of GDP in developing economies were not 
unusual. Gold still had some importance; when the willingness to lend 
dissipated for whatever reason, it was important to have gold reserves to 
smooth out any adjustments and to set a correction in motion via the money 
supply.  Thus, the world supply of gold provided liquidity to the international 
ﬁnancial system.  But even in the era where the gold standard supposedly 
reigned, imbalances could accumulate. 
There were multiple pressures on the adjustment mechanism.  First, 
central bank failure to tighten in the presence of a balance of payments deﬁcit 
could lead to larger and larger deﬁcits.  Second, capital market lending could 
create stock of debt problems that were much larger than the ﬂow imbalance. 
Third, irregular gold discoveries could lead to sudden and disruptive changes 
in supply and prices.  Fourth, there was no natural means of increasing the 
supply of liquidity as the world economy expanded.  Fifth, there was nothing 
to insure that the gold supply would be in the right place at the right time.  A 
country with a large deﬁcit which capital markets were unable or unwilling 
to ﬁnance would likely not have ample gold reserves as well. If the gold 
reserves were there, the capital markets would have been willing to lend.  
As a consequence some observers contend that the gold standard 
adjustment mechanism never existed, at least not in the 20th century.   That 
might be an exaggeration but it is true that the 19th century ideal of a self 
adjusting mechanism through business cycles was no longer operational.  In 
practice, the gold standard was a system of ﬁxed exchange rates where gold 
served as the liquid reserve asset.  And therein lays the problem: the pre war 
ﬁxed exchange rate system had all the problems we associate with late 20th 
century ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.   The success of the gold standard – i.e. 
the commitment to and conﬁdence in the ﬁxed exchange rate to gold – was the 
source of its demise.  It allowed imbalances to accumulate to unsustainable 
levels before any adjustments took place. 
The Bretton Woods Solution - Structure.  Like the gold standard 
that preceded it, the old BW structure started with a commitment to ﬁxed 
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exchange rates which would provide a stable environment for the growth 
of world trade. However, the BW system understood that occasional 
realignments would be needed so a mechanism for changes in parities was 
part of the system.  In addition, there was an understanding that a growing 
world economy would need more than just a given supply of gold as a source 
of liquidity if economies were going to avoid costly deﬂation episodes.  So, a 
mechanism was needed that could create sufﬁcient liquidity and also make 
sure that it was in the right place.  
The Keynes plan was the more radical suggestion.  He proposed an 
international clearing currency, the ‘bancor,’ that would be issued by an 
international clearing union. Importantly, the union could create bancor 
money by ﬁat and set its value with respect to gold.  Exchange rates to the 
bancor would be ﬁxed although the clearing union could approve changes. 
Nations could borrow or just accumulate deﬁcits (overdrafts) or surpluses 
at the clearing union.  The clearing union would be an international central 
bank, a lender of last resort.   
The plan overlooked the fact that central banking is more than just the 
ability to create money.  The role of central banks is to maintain the stability 
of the ﬁnancial system and oversight of money creation is only part of its 
role2. A successful central bank that maintains stability creates a situation 
where the lender of last resort facility is rarely called upon.  Keynes’ clearing 
union might be a lender of last resort with inﬁnite ability to create money 
but the plan did not provide it with the political power to inﬂuence national 
economic policies and make sure that countries would not need to resort to 
borrowing in extremis.  
The role of a modern central bank is as much to provide the regulatory 
and risk management framework that makes the lender of last resort 
superﬂuous than it is to be a liquidity facility.  With active money markets 
for interbank lending and reﬁnancing banks can avoid liquidity crises.  Good 
regulation includes, at the extreme, the ability to force banks to change 
their behavior or even to close banks down before there is any need for the 
LLR function. Our modern understanding of the lender of last resort is that 
the lender (the central bank) has to also create a situation where there is 
rarely any need for its lending services.  An analogy can be drawn to the 
2 The original theory of central banking – Bagehot – emphasized bank stability.  Macroecono-
mic monetary policy concerns would only appear later.  However, in the 20th century central 
banking became almost exclusively associated with interest rate and money growth policies. 
The pendulum has begun to swing back with less emphasis on macroeconomic policy and more 
emphasis on ﬁnancial sector stability issues.
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international LLR envisioned by Keynes.  To be an effective issuer of bancors, 
the world lender of last resort would also have to have extensive political and 
economic powers that seemed as remote at the time of BW as they are now.  
We cannot very well expect the international central bank to be 
able to close down a country; they are all ‘too big to fail’ or even to put into 
receivership.  Nor did the Keynes plan include a surrender of sovereignty 
that would enable the international central bank to determine ﬁscal or 
monetary policy in a country. A generation later, Geithner (2004) made 
the same observation in regard to the IMF which has a “ﬁnancial mission 
that had some of the characteristics of a lender of last resort...but without 
mechanisms to constrain risk-taking behavior.”
The plan that won the day at the BW conference was that contributed 
by the Americans.  It shared the same goals – to stabilize exchange rates, 
facilitate payments, and encourage investment and trade – but its liquidity 
feature was less ambitious.  An international organization would not have 
rights to create ﬁat money but would have lending capabilities that came 
from member subscriptions.  The BW solution provided limited availability 
of new liquidity and attempted to structure a system that would discourage 
the demand for it3.  
The differences between the Keynes and White plans do not seem large 
but they do represent different views of the world.  In the view of de Vries 
(1986) Keynes advocated a highly structured system with rules governing 
trade and payments and intergovernmental cooperation to manage the 
system.  The White plan gave more emphasis to market based solutions with 
limited government interference.  It is interesting that in many respects 
the IMF was structured by White’s plan but developed along the Keynesian 
view.  It is also interesting that contemporary discussions about revising the 
international ﬁnancial architecture display the same tension between rule 
making by intergovernmental agencies and market based solutions. 
As noted earlier, adequate provision of liquidity does not solve the 
inherent ﬂaw of ﬁxed exchange rates which is the absence of an adjustment 
mechanism.  The BW system dealt with this in two ways.  First, there was 
provision for exchange rate realignments and second, the international 
ﬁnancial architecture envisioned at BW reduced the need for liquidity. 
Speciﬁcally, the old BW system assumed that capital controls would remain 
in place and in fact the IMF articles allowed for the extension of capital 
3 The approach was not entirely new.  In the 1920s and 30s (prior to the collapse of the gold 
standard), there were League of Nation discussions about how to economize on the use of gold 
and improve the payments system when ‘liquidity’ (i.e. gold) was in short supply
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controls.  Some gradual opening of capital ﬂows was perhaps envisioned 
but there was clear sense of sequencing – this would not occur until the 
international ﬁnancial system could handle the pressures.  The solution was 
admirable but not perfect as noted by Timothy Geithner (2004):  “The Fund, 
from its inceptions was burdened by a mismatch between the aspirations of 
its architects and the authority and instruments they gave the institution to 
purse those ambitions.”
How did old BW operate? The post war world envisioned by old BW 
discouraged capital ﬂows discouraged and presumed that current account 
imbalances would be quickly corrected with gold reserves and borrowing 
from the new international organization, the IMF which would also oversee 
exchange rate realignments.
 The IMF spent a number of years ﬁnding its way, accumulating 
reserves and deﬁning its activities.  There were not very many exchange 
rate realignments and almost a modest amount of IMF lending between the 
British devaluation in 1948 and the early 1970s.  Nevertheless, the world 
economy got on its feet and trade grew rapidly.  What else was going on 
to provide the grease that kept the engine running?  Or, in terms of my 
taxonomy, how did old BW operate?
The answer lies in the dominant role of the United States.  US demand 
for goods fueled export driven growth in Europe and Japan.  Moreover, the 
dollar became the world’s reserve currency.  The role of the dollar was not 
foreseen by the architects of the BW system.  In effect, the old BW system 
stood on three legs:  ﬁxed exchange rates, capital controls and increased 
liquidity in the form of an increased supply of dollars4.   
The US ran trade surpluses for some years after the war though they 
were not large – about 1-2% of US GDP in the 1950s.  By the 1960s the world 
economy had recovered substantially and the US began to run trade deﬁcits 
although they were not large relative to US GDP. Unlike the present, US net 
borrowing from abroad was not large; ﬁnancing current account deﬁcits was 
not the source of dollar liquidity to the rest of the world.  Unlike the present, 
large US borrowing was not the source of liquidity to the rest of the world.
In the old BW system, the US acted as a banker or a ﬁnancial 
intermediary in the traditional sense of the word.  It transformed long term 
assets into short term liabilities. The source of added liquidity was indeed 
4 This point is particularly interesting because the role of the dollar is the linchpin in discus-
sions of the contemporary international ﬁnancial system.  However, there are signiﬁcant diffe-
rence between the role of the dollar in old BW and new BW.
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5 The difference between the provision of banking services by the US in the old BW system and 
the role of the US as a debtor nation today can not be understated.
6 For example, voucher privatization in the Czech Republic was carefully conceived and the 
right thing to do.  But, it failed miserably because legal codes deﬁning ownership, securities 
laws and bank regulatory authorities were not yet in place.  They did not get the sequencing of 
reforms right. 
short term dollar liabilities coming from the US which were balanced by 
increases in US holding of long term assets around the world.  The US was 
the world’s banker and the dollar was the banking unit of account5. Thus, the 
third leg of the old BW system was not simply that that the dollar was the 
source of liquidity.  It was that the provision of banking services by the US 
increased the liquid supply of dollars.  
 However, old BW had its share of problems that ultimately led to 
its demise.  First, exchange rate realignments were needed with increasing 
frequency. Differences in productivity growth even more than differences in 
inﬂation rates led to real exchange rate changes that necessitated changes in 
parities.  Second, as economies matured capital controls began to peel away 
(sometimes by law, sometimes by practice).  Third, the demand for liquidity 
began to put pressure on the dollar at just the time the US was beginning to 
run current account deﬁcits.   
 For some years the system lumbered on because the world’s central 
banks were committed to it and agreed not to call on US gold reserves even 
when US liabilities exceeded its reserves.  However, over time US gold 
reserves began to dwindle and ultimately President Nixon closed the gold 
window in 1971.  By 1973 the old BW system of ﬁxed exchange rates was 
a thing of the past.  These events can be viewed in two ways.  First, it is 
possible that the end of old BW was a US problem rather.  The Viet Nam war 
inﬂation put pressure on the dollar and the US did not have enough gold 
reserves to maintain a ﬁxed exchange rate.  Second, we can argue that the 
old BW system was doomed because it did not allow for enough ﬂexibility of 
exchange rates.  It is possible that a timely realignment of the dollar parity 
with gold could have kept the system alive. 
The old BW operating architecture was the right thing for that 
time.  That odd conference in the mountains of New Hampshire provided 
a framework for international cooperation, a development institution (the 
World Bank) and a liquidity facility (IMF loans).  The stability of the ﬁxed 
exchange rate regime in the 1950s and 1960s successfully jump started the 
world economy.
Contemporary discussions of economic reforms often refer to the idea 
of sequencing.  The absence of proper sequencing can be the death knell of 
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good ideas6. The old BW system, perhaps by accident, got the sequencing 
right. A closed capital account was the right choice in the immediate post war 
period.  Modern sensibilities bristle at any thought of controlling markets 
but capital account ﬂexibility had to be put off until the world economy 
was on better footing.  At the same time, and this was not understood in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the re-emergence of signiﬁcant capital market activity 
implied that the old BW institutions needed to adapt.  Fixed exchange rates 
were a reasonable choice until capital market activity began to overwhelm 
the availability of both gold and dollar reserves.  For ﬁve years, from the 
British devaluation in 1968 to the demise of ﬁxed exchange rates in 1973, 
policymakers tried to patch up the old BW system.   
The old BW system was not altered in any fundamental ways 
although the IMF’s credit creation capabilities were expanded (starting 
with the creation of Special Drawing Rights in 1969). New lending facilities 
and expanded quotas increased the fund’s capabilities.  It also developed 
the expertise to monitor the world’s economies and provide policy advice. 
The last two decades of the 20th century were deﬁned by international 
ﬁnancial crises that the IMF helped ameliorate but could not eliminate. 
First, in the 1980s, the recycling of petro dollars by international commercial 
banks resulted in the LDC debt crisis.  Second, the 1990s were marked by 
numerous emerging market banking and exchange rate crises.  By the close 
of the century, there were widespread suggestions that a new international 
ﬁnancial architecture was needed.  
The new BW structure.  The exchange rate crises of the late 1990s gave 
rise to a vast outpouring of proposals concerning the international ﬁnancial 
architecture.  The debates were an echo of the Keynes-White disagreements. 
Should the IMF be a lender of last resort?  
For a time, there were suggestions that the IMF’s lender of last resort 
capabilities should be strengthened. A Supplemental Reserve Facility was 
created in 1997 that gave the fund the ability to provide large amounts of 
lending for short periods at penalty interest rates.  This was very much like 
the classical idea of a central bank lender of last resort function except that 
instead of collateral borrowers provided promises regarding future economic 
policy.  The difference between promises and collateral is a large one and it soon 
became clear that moral hazard may be impossible to avoid in IMF lending.  
The lending capabilities of the IMF can be strengthened but “the 
parallel between the Fund and Bagehot’s lender of last resort cannot be 
taken too far” (Ann Krueger, the IMF First Deputy Managing Director, 
Nov. 26, 2001).  The realization that the fund cannot be a central bank 
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(all countries are too big to fail) muted the search for a new international 
ﬁnancial architecture. There is no alternative organizational form on the 
horizon which would provide a new BW structure that would preclude the 
reoccurrence of debt or foreign exchange rate crises.
At the same time the IMF has changed and improved its operating 
capabilities.  It plays an important role in crisis prevention by being the 
source of good information and good advice.  It has improved its capabilities 
in this regard by shifting its emphasis away from macroeconomics and 
towards data dissemination and ﬁnancial sector stability.  In 1999 the Fund 
started the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) to supplement the 
regular macroeconomic reviews of country policies and performance. These 
assessments require considerable cooperation on the part of the subject 
government which can choose to withhold release of the results7. As for crisis 
resolution, the IMF realized that there is little it can do to force a particular 
resolution other than provide adjustment loans and use their availability to 
encourage certain outcomes.
The limits of the IMF’s capabilities at resolving crises had been clear 
much earlier.  The sovereign debt problems of the 1980s were worked out 
gradually through private sector negotiation.  Typically, the debts were 
syndicated bank loans and so the number of holders was fairly small which 
facilitated a negotiated outcome.  The crises of the 1990s were more difﬁcult 
to manage.  Emerging market bonds were widely held which makes a work 
out process hard to manage.  Moreover, the IMF was powerless to force 
debtors and creditors together. 
Thus, the fund proposed a ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism,’ 
which would be a sovereign Chapter XI reorganization supervised by the 
IMF.  The fund would have the power to both extend credit and protect 
debtors.  However, any such mechanism would require amendment to the 
Fund’s articles and approval by the US Congress.  The political obstacles 
were formidable and the idea dropped by the wayside by 2003.  
The alternative to an IMF capability for forcing governments to 
restructure debt was a private sector mechanism.  At just the time that the 
political obstacles to a new Fund sovereign bankruptcy facility became clear, 
the private sector began to innovate. 
Restructuring diffusely held debt is simpliﬁed if the bond issues 
7 An internal review by the fund (IMF, January 2006) indicated that the programs need to be 
strengthened. It suggested that the protocols for stability assessment are not fully developed 
and that the assessments have not been fully integrated into the Fund’s relationship with mem-
ber countries
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include a collective action clause that keeps holdouts from standing in the 
way of a negotiated restructuring.  The only problem was that the standard 
bond did not include such clauses and the ﬁrst introducer would seem to be 
signaling weakness.  Although no one objected to such a clause, no issuer 
wanted to be the ﬁrst mover.  However, in early 2003, Mexico sold bonds with 
such a clause (under New York law) and did so without any negative market 
reaction (see Roubini and Setser, 2004).  Such clauses are now common and 
the calls for an IMF mandate for crisis resolution have receded. 
The formal international ﬁnancial architecture of the new BW 
system is not profoundly different than the old BW system.  However, the 
environment has changed:  closed capital accounts are now the exception 
rather than the rule, exchange rates are often managed but the overall 
system is one of market determined exchange rates and both trade and 
capital market activity has reached the peak levels seen a century ago. 
The new BW structure does include some new elements.  First, the IMF’s 
emphasis on crisis prevention and ﬁnancial sector stability is a major change 
in the way it views its mission.  Second, the private sector’s innovation of 
collective action clauses along with improved fund lending facilities has 
improved the system’s ability to respond to sovereign ﬁnancial crises.  Finally, 
exchange rate and ﬁnancial sector crises have not been occurring with the 
same frequency as in the 1990s.  As a result, the sense of urgency about the 
structure of the BW institutions has abated.  
The tension evinced at the Bretton Wood conference 60 years ago 
between an international central bank and an international cooperative 
institution remains in evidence.  The IMF of the old BW structure was the 
latter and the new BW structure is basically the same.  It has evolved to 
respond to a changing environment and continues to works reasonably well. 
How does new BW operate?  The crises in the 1990s were associated 
with large current account deﬁcits in emerging market countries.  Almost 
without exception, these countries have become aggressive savers and the 
most prominent global imbalances are now the large US current account 
deﬁcits. US borrowing and reserve accumulation by the Asian export 
economies are the deﬁning characteristics of the new BW.  
It has become fashionable to use the term Bretton Woods system 
as buzzwords for the way the international ﬁnancial system is currently 
operating.  In particular, the relationship between the two principal players in 
world trade – China and the US – is reminiscent of the old BW era. However, 
there is much disagreement concerning the strength of the analogy.
The analogy was ﬂoated by Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau 
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and Peter Garber (DFG) in a series of inﬂuential and widely read but 
unpublished papers beginning in 2003.  The elements of the analogy are: 
 • Although there are no ﬁxed parities at present, for all intents and 
purposes China’s Yuan is ﬁxed to the dollar.
 • China maintains a low real exchange rate in order to generate 
export led growth. Throughout the old BW period, the recovering 
economies of Japan and Europe had undervalued currencies. 
 • The dollar serves as the reserve asset and is the source of 
international liquidity.  That was the case under old BW too 
but there are signiﬁcant differences in the way capital markets 
operate.
 • The demand for dollar reserves around the world means that US 
current account deﬁcits can be sustained indeﬁnitely.  Similarly, 
the old BW system was sustained as long as there was conﬁdence 
in the convertibility of the dollar to gold or to other currencies at 
ﬁxed or predictable exchange rates.  
DFG made an interesting, accurate and imaginative observation. 
There are similarities between old BW (circa 1946-71) and new BW (about 
the last decade).  Their observation was made in 2003 when many observers 
already expected a reversal of the US current account or at least large dollar 
depreciation.  So, the fact that the current account deﬁcit is larger than it 
has ever been and that the trade weighted dollar is still fairly strong serve 
to prove DFG right.  There seems to be an analogy between the operations of 
old and new BW, but there are notable differences as well: 
 • In old BW, the US had current account surplus and provided 
liquidity by being the world’s banker.  It transformed maturities 
of debt from long term to short term.  Pressures on dollar reserves 
began as soon as deﬁcits emerged, even though they were small. 
In new BW, the large current account deﬁcits are the source of 
liquidity.  The US serves as a banker to the extent that it provides 
risk free assets, Treasury securities.
 • There was widespread support for the way old BW operated.  The 
world’s central banks agreed through negotiation to hold US debt 
and avoid calling on US gold reserves in order to preserve the 
system.  Central bankers at present are unlikely to negotiate a 
public commitment to continue absorbing US debt.  And in any 
event, such an agreement, as was the case in the late 1960s, only 
postpones an inevitable adjustment. 
 • The world ﬁnancial system is much different in the new BW 
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era: there are extensive capital markets, few capital market 
restrictions and with the exception of the Yuan/Dollar exchange 
rate most important exchange rates are ﬂoating.
Eichengreen (2004) argues forcefully that these differences between 
the contemporary world economy and the old BW era make the BW analogy 
a poor one.  The dominant position of a reserve currency is maintained by 
demand and the absence of alternatives.  Only the dollar was ﬁxed to gold 
in old BW and there were no other reserve assets.  At the present, capital 
markets make movement into and out of dollar assets easy and the Euro 
is standing in the wings.  If the world’s central banks doubt the Fed’s 
commitment or ability to maintain the value of the dollar, tastes for reserve 
holding can change quickly, particularly in the absence of capital controls 
and the liberalization of domestic ﬁnancial markets in most countries (China 
being the notable exception).  
It took a generation for the gold standard to expire but only ﬁve or 
so years for old BW to die.  In the late 1960s policymakers tried to patch 
together the old BW ﬁxed exchange rate system.  Finally, after the US ended 
gold convertibility in 1971, efforts to hold the ﬁxed exchange rate system 
together continued for two more years.  The new BW era could disappear 
much more quickly.
Now, if DFG are right and we are now in a new BW era, then the world 
will continue to absorb US debt as its reserve asset.  Indeed the world economy 
has a strong demand for these assets in order to sustain export growth in 
China.   But, the ﬁnal lesson from old BW is that all good things come to 
an end.  At some point, the desire to hold more reserves will abate and an 
adjustment through exchange rate changes and, more likely and potentially 
more harmful, through changes in demand will occur. Thus, the issue at hand 
is not the strength of the analogy between old and new BW but how the world 
economy can engineer a soft landing and gradual adjustment.  
 Richard Cooper (2005) envisions a scenario of gradual adjustments 
to the supply and demand for dollar reserves that could lead to a soft landing 
without any dramatic changes in currency values or disruptive movements 
in interest rates.  First, aging populations in Europe and Japan will generate 
less saving.  Second, improved ﬁnancial intermediation in China will 
enable domestic saving to meet more of the demand for investment.  Third, 
he predicts that investment rates will level off in China and that the US 
will reduce its government deﬁcit.  Cooper’s paper (“The sustainability...”) 
contrasts with Nouriel Roubini’s (“The unsustainability...”, 2006) view that a 
sharp adjustment is imminent.  He cites numerous cyclical factors that are 
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likely to lead to a weaker dollar.
 Without weighing one argument against the other, it is interesting to 
note one similarity.  Both papers cited view international policy coordination 
as the best way to avoid sharp adjustments.  However, it is unclear how 
policy coordination could be initiated.  Neither China nor the US is potential 
borrowers from the IMF who might be inﬂuenced by dire warnings in IMF 
policy reports.  The IMF has already done that in its most recent economic 
reviews of both countries.   Economic policy coordination would require 
political agreement which has been lacking in the absence of a crisis and 
with elections looming in many important countries. 
 The world’s political leaders seem to have adopted a view of 
complacency about international ﬁnancial imbalances.  In contrast, in 
the waning days of old BW, agreements for coordinated management of 
reserves kept the system on life support for several years.  Later on, there 
were important episodes of international policy coordination such as the 
Plaza accords. But, at present there does not seem to be any momentum 
for cooperation.  Moreover, US policy making and the leadership provided 
by Ben Bernanke and the White House give short shrift to international 
adjustments. The reluctance to acknowledge that an adjustment might be 
due is intentional as if doing so will precipitate a crisis.   Bernanke’s interest 
in more transparent policy making should include a bolder willingness to 
address the issues8. 
Thus, the only sure lesson from old BW for the new BW is that 
the operating structure will come to an end.  Commenting on the old BW 
system, Eichengreen (1996, p.95) wrote that exchange and capital controls 
were substitutes for a missing adjustment mechanism, “but their use did not 
ensure adjustment; it only delayed the day of reckoning.” The same can be 
said for the new BW.  The coincidence of China’s demand for reserves and 
the US demand for imports substitutes for an adjustment mechanism and 
delays but does not preclude a day of reckoning.  Thus, there are likely to be 
tumultuous times ahead for the world’s ﬁnancial system.  We also know from 
the old BW experience that the new BW structure is not entirely equipped 
to deal with the end of the new BW operating system.  It does not have the 
means or any way of moving economic powers like China and the US away 
from risky behaviors.  Recognizing this requires a degree of economic policy 
coordination that does not seem to be on anyone’s political agenda.
8 Bernanke’s testimony to Congress on July 19, 2006 as part of the semi annual monetary 
policy report to congress (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2006/july/testimony.htm) 
makes no mention of external imbalances or exchange rates.
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Paul Wachtel has written a very interesting and wide ranging 
paper which summarizes the history of Bretton Woods, the purposes 
which it was intended to serve when adopted, how it actually operated 
and why it fell apart. He also discusses Bretton Woods II, including 
arguments along the lines of Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber in 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers and in published 
papers (2004, 2005). He then discusses what he sees as issues with that 
line of argument.
Rather than discuss details of Paul’s analysis, I will take a 
different tack and ask how current arrangements deviate from what I 
would consider a reasonably desirable set of international economic and 
ﬁnancial relationships.
A key distinction in Paul’s paper is between the institutions and the 
actual operation of international economic and ﬁnancial relationships. I 
will take that distinction perhaps a step further than Paul intended and 
distinguish between the formal rules of such arrangements and their 
actual operation.
I focus on the actual behavior of the arrangements and completely 
ignore the institutional framework and rules. I also abstract from the 
political feasibility of these arrangements. Relative to Paul’s historical 
and concrete discussion, this analysis is quite abstract. At the end, given 
the implications of those deviations, I return to the issue of the U.S. 
current account deﬁcit and the likelihood of disruptive implications.
Desirable and Actual Arrangements
Rather than start from current institutions determined by the 
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past, I begin by asking what I think are a set of desirable institutions. 
It would take far more than a comment to explain what I mean in detail 
and justify my suggestions, but outlining them provides a background 
for me to assess  actual arrangements and for you to understand my 
observations.
 A key aspect of any set of international economic relations is 
determination of the exchange rate. When everything is said and done, I 
think that ﬂexible exchange rates determined in markets are preferable 
to other arrangements1.  The price reﬂects marginal valuations by 
buyers and sellers. I prefer this for the same reason that I prefer that 
other prices be determined in markets – including stock and bond prices 
as well as crude oil prices and the prices of many other assets.
 Support of a ﬁxed exchange rate or a managed exchange rate 
often requires substantial controls on people’s use of foreign exchange. 
Controls then extend, inexorably, to ﬂows of goods and services and 
assets. It take some memory to recall the extraordinary exchange 
controls under Bretton Woods on the 1950s, but not a lot. In the 1950s, 
people were severely limited in the amount of money that they could 
take out of countries to convert into other currencies. Capital controls 
were ubiquitous, and arguably not helpful. Furthermore, capital controls 
were introduced at various times to support the ﬁxed exchange rates.
 I am not suggesting a ﬂexible exchange rate given any possible 
monetary policy is likely to work well. A predictable monetary policy 
with low inﬂation now and in the future is important for the smooth 
functioning of ﬂexible exchange rates2. I am suggesting that manipulation 
of currency values is not likely to be a purely nominal affair.
 Relatively low tariffs are another aspect of a desirable set of 
international economic arrangements. One of the ﬁrst things that we 
teach students in principles of economics is comparative advantage. 
Tariffs can generate revenue and, by an argument based on equating 
1 A ﬁxed exchange rate might well be the best arrangement for a small country because 
it avoids uncertainty about the government’s monetary policy. Examples include the 
Bahamas’ use of the Bahamian dollar and some Caribbean countries’ use of the East 
Caribbean dollar.
A ﬁxed exchange rate also can be a commitment device for a country that has a history 
of bad monetary policy, but developments in Argentina in recent years undermine this 
argument.
2 In a country with unpredictable monetary policy and high inﬂation, a ﬂexible exchange rate 
might be even more worthwhile although it is not likely to change smoothly. But then ﬁxed or 
managed exchange rates are likely to operate with episodic exchange crises precisely because 
the exchange rate does not reﬂect the value of the currency and changes in it.
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the marginal social cost of taxation, there can be good reason for some 
tariffs to generate revenue. It would take a tortuous line of argument 
to use this support for revenue-producing tariffs to justify policies such 
as the multilateral textile agreements involving the United States over 
the last 30 years. These agreements allocated the production of textiles 
worldwide and generated the obvious inefﬁciencies and evasions, not 
revenue for the U.S. government.
 Unrestricted capital ﬂows are another desirable part of 
international economic and ﬁnancial arrangements. Capital ﬂows 
represent a major way that countries with opportunities to invest 
can raise the funds to make those investments. While it is a matter 
of debate whether totally unrestricted  capital ﬂows can have adverse 
consequences for an economy, it seems to me that people in a country 
are likely to be better off if other things are changed so that unrestricted 
capital ﬂows can deliver their beneﬁts.
 In such a system, some countries would invariably be growing 
faster than others, but I do not think that disparities in growth rates 
would be as large as they are now. If wide divergences in growth rates 
are conducive to problems, the wide divergences would be lessened, not 
increased, by the set of arrangements that I have outlined.
 This system can be contrasted with actual institutions in place. 
Fixed and managed exchange rates are widespread. Tariffs are lower 
than in the past but trade restrictions are widespread. Capital ﬂows are 
more or less free. Or they are more or less restricted depending on one’s 
point of view. Some countries are growing dramatically; some not. The 
most obvious countries growing rapidly are two very large ones, China 
and India.
 I think that the implications of these actual arrangements are 
reasonably clear.
 Intermittent international ﬁnancial crises have occurred since 
the 1950s up to the present day and I see little reason to predict their 
end.
 Some people are substantially worse off due to restrictions on 
imports into other countries. In general, these restrictions have the 
effect of making poorer people worse off to beneﬁt those with higher 
incomes. Most in the news recently, trade restrictions on agricultural 
goods lower the incomes of farmers in low-income countries to make 
farmers in higher income countries better off. I personally am not in 
favor of policies with such effects, which are only aggravated by the 
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failure to let people exploit their comparative advantages.
 It is an open question whether capital ﬂows are a source of the 
intermittent ﬁnancial crises or are part of the solution. This, of course, 
is conditional on the other policies, not conditional on the better policies 
suggested above that other countries might have.
U.S. and China
The United States currently is running large trade deﬁcits and 
concomitant large capital account surpluses. As Maccario, Savona, 
Stroppa and Zazzara (2006) show, viewed from a world-wide perspective, 
these current account surpluses are ﬁnanced by oil exporting countries, 
Japan and China. The European Union is running a relatively small 
trade deﬁcit.
 What is the adjustment likely to be? Apparently the concern 
is that countries will abruptly stop acquiring U.S. ﬁnancial assets and 
maybe ben dump their current holdings of securities on the market. It 
is an open question whether the demand for these assets is sufﬁciently 
inelastic that any of this matters for the U.S. economy or world-wide 
interest rates, but I leave that issue aside.
 Most discussions focus on the People’s Republic of China. 
Why?
 In the oil exporting countries, crude oil is largely owned by the 
governments, and  in most cases, the government is indistinguishable 
from the individuals ruling the country. Essentially, today’s current 
account surpluses in these countries can be interpreted as the 
transformation of crude oil in the ground into ﬁnancial assets. It does 
not require much imagination to think that such transformation is in 
the interests of the countries’ rulers and is likely to continue to be so. 
While any one current regime may well end abruptly, there is no reason 
to expect all of them to end simultaneously. Even with the end of a 
current regime, it is not obvious that there would be sudden cessation 
of oil production and acquisition of ﬁnancial assets, but there might 
be. Still, if there were, it is unlikely that any one country is sufﬁciently 
important that it would precipitate a ﬁnancial crisis in the U.S. or the 
rest of the world
 Turning to Japan, the lack of concern also seems warranted. 
The government of Japan is democratically determined and the country 
has a market economy. While Japan no doubt does not have some ideal 
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political and economic institutional framework (any more than the U.S. 
or any other country), there is no reason to expect dramatic changes. 
Even if the Bank of Japan decides to diversify its portfolio, the Japanese 
central bank has no incentive to dump U.S. securities on the market if it 
will dramatically lower the value of assets it holds. 
 The government of the People’s Republic of China raises different 
issues. China’s external policies include a relatively ﬁxed exchange rate 
supported by capital controls. While such regimes do not have to end 
abruptly or badly, they have in the past. China’s internal policies involve 
a government run by the Communist party with functioning markets, 
some property rights, entrepreneurs and people becoming billionaires. 
I probably am not alone in seeing a contradiction that is not likely to 
persist for a long time – say 20 or 30 years.
 What are the implications of these arrangements in China for 
the current account? I think that it is in the interest of Chinese people 
to have a smooth adjustment. I am not so sure about whether it will be 
in the interest of China’s current rulers.
 What will happen? No one really knows with much certainty. I 
think that uncertainty is at least part of the reason that discussion of 
current account surpluses in the U.S. focuses on China so much.
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Introduction
First, I let me say that I am delighted to be a participant in this 
Fourth Florence Colloquium on “In Search of a New Bretton Woods: 
Reserve Currencies and Global Imbalances,” jointly organized by the 
Associazione Guido Carli and Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri in Collaboration 
with the Editors of the Journal of Financial Stability.  The conference 
is both timely and important in addressing the many policy issues 
associated with the global ﬁnancial system and its evolution.
  In my role of discussant of the survey paper—“Understanding 
the Old and New Bretton Woods,” by Professor Wachtel of the Stern 
School of Business at New York University, I ﬁrst want to thank 
Professor Wachtel for providing us with a very nice overview of the old 
Bretton Woods system ﬁxed exchange rates, how it worked, and why 
it lasted for so long as a stabilizer of the global ﬁnancial system.  His 
analysis examines how and why the system worked as a process and as 
an institution for so long and he also touches on why it was inevitable 
that the system would breakdown.  As he suggests in his paper, critical 
thinking about reform of the global ﬁnancial system or what will be 
henceforth referred to as the so-called New Bretton Woods, is in a 
continuous state of transition.  Despite the unsettled nature of this New 
Bretton Woods system and how it should be organized (either formally 
or informally), there seems to be a general consensus that the primary 
goal of the system should be to help insure global ﬁnancial stability. 
The desirability of this goal is non-controversial and relates mainly to 
the adverse impact that recent ﬁnancial crises have had on the global 
economy and ﬁnancial system.  It is now well understood that the cost 
of ﬁnancial instability can be very high.  For example, we know that in 
countries that have had at least one banking system crisis in the last four 
to ﬁve decades (this includes virtually all countries that are members 
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of the International Monetary Fund) the average ﬁscal costs of banking 
system resolution can be as high as 50 percent of GDP.  Furthermore, 
the deadweight economic costs of banking and currency crises occurring 
together, measured by cumulative output losses, can amount to as much 
as 30 percent of GDP.  Clearly, these crises have greatly contributed to 
the renewed interest in studying ﬁnancial instability and the design of 
mechanisms like a new Bretton Woods system that might mitigate their 
occurrence. 
One difﬁculty in analyzing ﬁnancial instability, in addition to 
ﬁnding a widely accepted and applicable deﬁnition of it, lies in the 
fact that most of the recent ﬁnancial crises have  manifest themselves 
in seemingly unique ways and, as a result, frequently have required 
different policies to manage and resolve.  The fact that many approaches 
to crisis resolution take coordination failure (e.g., coordination failure 
between ﬁscal and monetary authorities) and informational frictions as 
their basis reﬂects and often contributes to this difﬁculty.  As any reader 
of the international economic press can garner, there are scores of 
proposals aimed at reforming the international ﬁnancial system.  These 
proposals range from new ﬁnancial and legal mechanisms that would 
preempt crises, to more sweeping recommendations for the general 
overhaul and reform of the International Monetary Fund, to proposals 
for the establishment of a new world ﬁnancial authority along the lines 
of a world central bank or lender-of-last-resort that would oversee the 
“public good” of global ﬁnancial stability.
Categorizing Approaches to Global Financial System Reform
In his paper, professor Wachtel alludes to some of these proposals 
for reform and hints at the pros and cons of some approaches.  I am 
sure that the reader of the paper would like to see a deeper analysis of 
various reform proposals and I would recommend that Professor Wachtel 
consider writing an extension to his survey paper that provides just 
such an analysis.  What I would like to do in my commentary is identify 
three key camps into which recommendations for reform can be placed. 
Stated differently, I’d like to identify the various paradigms, schools of 
thought, or categories that reform proposals—in the new Bretton Woods 
tradition—tend to fall.  These camps are more political than economic 
in nature given that any reform that effectively deals with the global 
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public good of ﬁnancial stability must be political by necessity.  As will 
be come obvious, the thrust of my remarks will focus on non-technical 
matters. 
One set of proposals ﬁt into a category that focuses on the 
infrastructure of the global ﬁnancial system rather than on the overall 
design or architecture of the system. In simple terms, this school of 
thought might to labeled the—“it’s the infrastructure stupid, not the 
design that is the problem” school of thought.  Alternatively, proponents 
of this approach to ﬁxing the global ﬁnancial system might say that it is 
the wiring of the system that is broken not the architecture.  This school 
is most often associated with the Unites States and is a school that is 
supported by the G-7 countries, perhaps with the possible exception of 
Japan. The basic idea here is that the current global ﬁnancial architecture 
is sound, there is no need for major reform, and it’s simply a matter of 
improving the plumbing, wiring, or infrastructure of the system.  This 
school assigns primacy to reforming the ﬁnancial sectors of crisis and 
developing economies through increased transparency and accounting 
disclosure, toughened bankruptcy laws, adoption of private property 
rights, elimination of political corruption, better prudential supervision 
and regulation, adoption of investor protections, better credit allocation 
decisions at the micro and national levels, and the elimination of the 
moral hazard problem in the banking sector.  For example, this approach 
is characterized somewhat by the various programs of the Bank for 
International Settlements, including programs focused of capital 
standards or requirements, banking and ﬁnancial stability forums, 
and the like. In addition, this school tends to favor the inﬂow of foreign 
capital to stabilize local ﬁnancial systems and to recapitalize domestic 
banks.  This school tends to support the expansion of powers of the IMF 
(e.g., contingency credit lines that are assessable if a country has good 
macroeconomic fundamentals as stipulated by the Fund).  
The second school or category into which reform proposals tend 
to fall can be termed the back-to-the-future school.  Proposals that ﬁt 
into this category would propose tougher controls at the global level, for 
example, perhaps in the form of so-called Tobin taxes or some variant 
of Tobin taxes.  Tobin taxes (named after the James Tobin the Nobel 
Prize winner in economics) are transaction taxes on capital inﬂows 
and outﬂows at all key points of the world economy that would “throw 
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sand into the gears of global capital movements” thereby reducing 
speculative foreign exchange trading and speculative currency attacks 
as well as speculative short-term capital ﬂows.  In addition, controls 
at the global or international level may be supplemented by national 
level controls on capital inﬂows and outﬂows.  An often cited example 
of such national controls is the case of capital controls in Chile.  There 
capital importers had to put up a deposit of 30 percent in an interest 
free account at the Chilean central bank for one year to engage in 
capital importation activities.  This plan, along with the very tight 
capital controls put in place in Malaysia following the Asian ﬁnancial 
crisis, have been cited as two examples were strict capital controls in 
the framework of an old Bretton Woods were effective in discouraging 
massive capital portfolio inﬂows and outﬂows.  Regional capital controls 
and regional economic integration schemes also ﬁt into this school or 
category.  The Asian Monetary Fund is a scheme that ﬁts in this regard. 
The Asian Monetary Fund was proposed by Japan at the height of the 
Asian ﬁnancial crisis to serve as a pool for the foreign exchange reserves 
of the reserve rich Asian countries that would repel speculative attacks 
on Asian currencies.  It is not surprising that the industrialized western 
countries did not support the establishment of this institution.  The 
key thrust of the these international, national, and regional controls 
is partly to prevent destabilizing waves of capital entry and exit and to 
move investment from short-term portfolio investments and short-term 
loans to long-term direct investment and longer-term loans both of the 
technology transferring type.
The third school of thought or category into which reform proposals 
fall can be identiﬁed as the development school or development model. 
Within this school are proposals that tend to regard institutions like 
the IMF and WTO in particular as outdated and institutions that are 
impossible to reform owing to their deep neo-liberal orientation and 
their allegiance to the industrialized western countries.  This school is of 
the mind set that the global economy would be better off without these 
institutions since they systematically marginalize the developing world or 
southern hemisphere.  Here national capital controls are viewed as much 
more promising since it is not in the ﬁnancial interest of the developed 
countries to regulate their ﬁnancial intermediaries, particularly their 
hedge funds and other speculative investing intermediaries who exploit 
or prey on the developing economies.  National capital controls are seen 
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as the way to go and examples of success that fuel this view include: 
China and India avoiding spillover from the Asian ﬁnancial crisis 
through the use of controls and the previously cited cases of Chile and 
Malaysia invoking strict capital controls and effectively stabilizing 
their economies.  The goals of this school are to prevent current efforts 
to reform the global ﬁnancial system from becoming a project to more 
thoroughly subordinate and exploit the ﬁnancial sectors of developing 
economies within the global ﬁnancial system controlled by the developed 
countries (this is a rather sinister view) and to devise a set of effective 
capital controls, trade controls, and regional, trade agreements that 
would protect developing economies and allow them to go through an 
orderly process of economic transformation with minimal disruption 
from external speculative forces.
In the end, it is probably true that each of these schools or 
approaches to global ﬁnancial system reform have some elements of merit. 
Clearly, improving the existing economic, legal and social infrastructures 
of the global ﬁnancial system we currently have in place makes sense as 
does encouraging long-term investment and direct foreign investment in 
developing countries by ﬁrms and organizations in the developed world. 
Similarly, the proper sequencing of the liberalization of the ﬁnancial 
sectors of developing economies deserves proper attention and care 
in execution.  As with any political solution to international economic 
problems, appropriate cooperation and coordination are required.
Clearly, the debate about the international ﬁnancial system, 
its stability, who manages it, and in whose interest it is managed is 
important and our global interdependence probably demands that 
we cooperate in our efforts to devise a robust and effective system for 
dealing with global crises.  Again, I want to thank Professor Wachtel 
for writing an interesting and stimulating overview of the old and 
new Bretton Woods and for raising issues dealing the evolution of the 
global ﬁnancial system that deserve much further research and policy 
discussion and debate.

Some brief comments, stimulated by the interesting papers 
presented by Mardi Dungey and Paul Wachtel.
In the last years, a new branch of literature has ﬂourished on 
the disequilibria at world level in the balances of payments on current 
account. In particular, a major new issue is the sustainability of the 
current account deﬁcit of the U.S., which, over time, has made this 
country the great “debtor” vis-a-vis the rest of the world. More recently, 
the U.S. deﬁcit has brought about an enormous accumulation of dollar-
denominated assets by the Central Banks of Asian countries,unwilling 
to let their currencies appreciate vis-a-vis the dollar.
How high is the risk that these Central Banks, determined to 
diversify the currency composition of their foreign assets , cause a slump 
of the US dollar in the exchange market?
Indeed, over the decades, Central Banks have changed their 
priorities in managing ofﬁcial reserves. Under Bretton Woods and, 
for European member countries,under the E.M.S., liquidity was of 
paramount importance. Reserves were relatively scarce and had to be 
ready for intervention on the exchange market to defend the agreed 
parities.
Over time, the growth of the international ﬁnancial market, 
where a country can easily borrow, and the shift from a ﬁx to a ﬂoating 
exchange rate system, has induced Central Banks to manage their 
foreign assets more and more within a “portfolio approach” with a 
special focus on yield. However, Central Banks,an opinion supported 
by a life-time professional experience in the Bank of Italy, are market 
operators endowed with a peculiar sensitivity. It is hard to imagine they 
neglect consequences of their behaviour on markets and, more broadly, 
on economic international relations.
For instance, within the European System of Central Banks, 
National Central Banks have to follow, in managing their foreign assets, 
well deﬁned criteria, agreed upon by the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank. Again, the Bank for International Settlements, 
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in Basle, a true “school” of cooperation among Central Banks, has wisely 
enlarged its membership during the 1990’s to new, emerging countries, 
from Mexico to South Africa, from South Korea to China.
In conclusion, I am inclined to think the risk of ruthless behaviour 
on the part of the Central Banks is slight. They know very well that a 
slump of the US dollar would weigh heavily on the world economy; they 
know equally well  that, in such  an event, it would be impossible to 
detect ex ante losers and winners.
The search for a solution to present disequilibria and the efforts 
to prevent deep crises stimulate many authors to rivisit the experience 
of the Bretton Woods System and to formulate hypothesis for a new 
Bretton Woods. History seldom repeats itself. That system was created 
in the very special post-war conditions: capital controls were the rule 
rather than the exception, the U.S., the dominant power, was at the 
centre of the system. These features have gradually faded away. We 
now have a global ﬁnancial market; on the international  economic and 
political arena new countries have shown and are showing themselves.
It is my opinion that a system “ à la Bretton Woods”, with written 
and respected rules, cannot be proposed. We have to rely on more 
complex forms of cooperation among countries, that adjust rapidly to 
changing conditions. More easily said than done.
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